


WOMAN’S COLLEGE LIBRARY 


DUKE UNIVERSITY 
DURHAM, N. C. . 











DUKE UNIV ERSITY = PUBLICATIONS 


CHILE 


AND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE 
UNITED STATES 


CHILE 


AND ITS RELATIONS WITH 


THE UNITED STATES 


BY 


HENRY CLAY EVANS, Jr., Pu.D. 


Professor of History in the 
University of Florida 





DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS 
DURHAM, NORTH CAROLINA 


1927 


COPYRIGHT IN 1927 
BY DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS 


PRINTED BY 
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PREFACE 


Considerable attention has been devoted in recent 
years to American diplomacy in its relations with 
the Hispanic-American republics grouped around 
the Caribbean Sea. Fairly familiar themes, also, are 
the policy of the United States toward Mexico, the 
expansion of American commerce and finance in the 
Caribbean islands, American intervention in Central 
American politics, and the Panama Canal affair. But 
apart from discussion of the Monroe Doctrine 
and Pan-Americanism, comparatively little has yet 
been written concerning the relations of the United 
States with the stronger nations in the southern part 
of South America. Here European influence was 
dominant during the whole of the nineteenth century ; 
and only just before the period of the World War did 
American commercial and financial interests begin 
to rival those of England, France, and Germany. Yet 
the attitude of the larger South American nations to- 
ward the United States has an important bearing on 
the success of its policies in the western world. This 
treatise, accordingly, has been prepared to give a 
fairly detailed account of American dealings with 
one of the three outstanding countries of the South 
American continent, the republic of Chile. 

Chile has been chosen as the particular field for 
study for several reasons. Few countries have had 
more occasions to regard the United States with un- 


fooeds 
Q3 

Ow 
peels 
HO 


viii CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


friendliness and to resent its policies. The inde- 
pendent spirit shown by this Hispanic-American 
republic cannot but attract the attention of students 
of world politics, and possibly no better field 
could be chosen to illustrate the difficulties that beset 
the path of American diplomats when they attempt 
to assert a leadership for their own country in its 
relations with the sensitive and proud people of 
smaller nations. 

In the second place, the domestic history of Chile 
is an unusual one in Hispanic-American annals. In 
the eighteenth century its rank among the poorer 
and more backward of the Spanish dominions ap- 
peared to furnish scant promise of future great- 
ness. Yet after independence was attained, the new 
republic enjoyed for almost a hundred years a peace- 
ful development broken by only three revolutions of 
serious moment, of which the longest lasted eight 
months. In this respect it has a history unlike that 
of any other among the former colonies of Spain, 
and one which compares favorably with that of the 
United States. In Chile the great landed proprietors 
have been able to retain their hold upon the reins of 
government substantially down to the present day. 
Its history thus has a significant place in Hispanic 
America, in that it shows how a republic of Spanish 
origin can make a record of virtually unbroken prog- 
ress, and the extent to which a nation may prosper 
under the rule of an agrarian aristocracy. 

Furthermore, the history of American relations 
with Chile includes the narrative of one of the most 


PREFACE ix 


ambitious undertakings ever attempted by the United 
States on this continent—that of mediation in the 
Tacna-Arica dispute. The outcome of the enterprise 
may mean much to the prestige of the northern re- 
public in the New World. One of the chief factors 
in a possible success would have been the measure in 
which past blunders in Chilean relations were over- 
come. The signal failure of the Tacna-Arica arbi- 
tration proceedings up to the present (December 
1926) is anything but gratifying. 

In fact, many of the obstacles to general Pan- 
American accord, so little understood by citizens of 
the United States, have had their origin in events 
similar to those related in the present work. It is 
hoped then that this book may serve as a basis for 
a more intelligent study of all our inter-American 
relations. Chile may be little known in this country, 
but is has loomed large in South America for half 
a century and must be taken into account in all our 
dealings with the other nations of the western world. 

Acknowledgment is due particularly to Professor 
William R. Shepherd, of Columbia University, for 
his invaluable assistance, not only in making sugges- 
tions as to sources and arrangement of material, but 
likewise in the careful revision which he made of the 
entire work. I am also indebted to Dr. Talcott Wil- 
liams, of Columbia University, for the use of his 
large library, which he kindly placed at my disposal. 
I wish to thank Mr. Tyler Dennett, Chief of the 
Division of Publications and Editor of the Depart- 
ment of State for making it possible for me to use 


x CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


the archives of the department, and Mr. David A. 
Salmon, Chief of the Bureau of Indexes and Ar- 
chives, for placing this diplomatic correspondence 
at my disposal. 


Henry Cray EVAns, Jr. 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER 


it, 


II. 


Til. 


IV. 


VI. 


VIL 


VIII. 


IX, 


XI. 


XII. 


XIII. 


THE END OF A COLONY 
THE BEGINNINGS OF A NATION 


EARLY DEALINGS WITH THE NORTHERN 
REPUBLIC 


THE CONSERVATIVES IN CHARGE 
FACING TOWARD EUROPE 
DISREGARDING THE UNITED STATES 


EUROPEAN MENACES AND AMERICAN 
SENTIMENT 


THE EMERGENCE OF TACNA-ARICA 
LIBERALISM TO THE FORE 

AT LOGGERHEADS WITH THE COLOSSUS 
INTERNATIONAL MAKEWEIGHTS 


NEUTRALITY ABROAD AND DIFFERENCES 
AT HOME 


THE GREAT QUESTION OF SOUTH AMERICA 
FOR ALL AMERICA 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


INDEX 


PAGE 


11 


29 


42 


54 


67 


83 


97 


135 


155 


172 


196 


221 


235 





CHILE 
AND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE 
UNITED STATES 








a 





CHAPTER I 


THE END OF A COLONY 


An autumn festival, the most elaborate and im- 
pressive that the residents of Santiago had ever seen, 
marked the closing months of the year 1789 in the 
capital city of the Spanish colony of Chile. There 
were banquets at the palace of the captain-general, 
dances at the homes of the colonial aristocracy, bon- 
fires in the streets of the poorer sections, bullfights 
for the populace. For the loyal subjects of the King 
of Spain were celebrating the coronation of His 
Majesty Charles IV. For four days the festivities 
lasted while masses were chanted in the twenty-six 
churches of the town. The opening day had been 
marked by a parade that was headed by Captain 
General Ambrosio O’ Higgins, an Irishman who had 
risen high in the favor of the Spanish monarchy. 
Four Indian chieftains had been brought from the 
frontiers to proclaim allegiance to the new king. This 
was colonial Chile at its best. 

The year had witnessed far different scenes in 
other parts of the globe. The young king of France, 
with his Austrian wife, had been forced to leave 
his palace at Versailles and ride to Paris in a mock 
procession formed by the rabble of the French capital. 
_ In the United States George Washington had taken 
the oath of office as president of the first republic 
in the new world. A triumphant period for republi- 


* Diego Barros Arana, Historia jeneral de Chile, VII. 39. 


4 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


canism was opening which was to make many a mon- 
arch uneasy. But apart from an Indian uprising in 
Peru, the Spanish king had not heard even so much 
as a threat of rebellion from his dominion overseas. 

The colony of Spain at the southwestern part of 
South America had been founded more than half a 
century before the Atlantic shores of North America 
were occupied by Englishmen. Pedro de Valdivia 
came from Peru to the southwestern valleys of the 
Andes in 1540. There he started the colonization of 
Chile sixty odd years before the Susan Constant 
brought to Virginia the hardy band of men from 
Britain who laid the foundation of what was later 
to be the United States. But the Virginians and 
their neighbors had established a nation more than 
thirty years before the Chileans made their first at- 
tempt toward independence. 

During its two centuries and a half as a colony, 
Chile was practically isolated from the rest of the 
world. The great Andes mountains cut off inter- 
course from the east, while the deserts in the north 
where copper and silver were mined formed a second 
barrier. The western coastline extended toward the 
southern end of South America, but Spain closed 
the sea. Until nearly the middle of the eighteenth 
century only two regular voyages a year brought 
goods to Spanish America from the motherland, and 
the nearest port of landing for Chile was in the 
northern end of the continent. Even when Spanish 
trading vessels were allowed to come to Chile, for- 
eigners were forbidden to barter there under penalty 


‘THE END OF A COLONY 5 


of six months labor in the mines.? Thus did the Span- 
ish king keep his colonial subjects separated from a 
restless world. 

The basic racial element in the colony was the 
mestizo, a mixture of white and Indian. Most of 
the mestizos were illiterate, rural workingmen who, 
until the time of O’Higgins, lived on the big landed 
estates of central Chile under a system of serfdom 
wherein they were forbidden to change their home 
and master.* When this system was abolished, the 
rural laborer was given a field of his own to till, or 
else was allowed to work for wages on the big estates. 
Even then he barely made a subsistence. A few of 
the mestizos became skilled artisans in the towns, 
whereupon they tried to throw a veil over their 
origin and deny that any Indian blood flowed in 
their veins.* 

The proprietors of landed estates were the descen- 
dants of the men who had come to the colony in its 
early days. They often owned city homes as well 
as their spacious country dwellings. In Santiago, par- 
ticularly, they formed an aristocracy of proud fami- 
lies who still furnish leaders for the Chilean people. 
During the colonial period, these held themselves 
aloof from the great mass of people, who numbered 


*A. S. M. Chisholm, The Independence of Chile, p. 12. 


“This system was known as the encomienda. A grant of 
land together with the Indians to work on it was made to the 
white settler, who was supposed to care faithfully for the 
Natives. 


“José Victorino Lastarria, Investigaciones sobre la influencia 


social de la conquista y del sistema colonial de los Espanoles 
en Chile, p. 62. 


6 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


all told about four hundred thousand toward the 
close of the eighteenth century.® 

All important officials in Chile were appointed by 
the King of Spain. There was a governor and 
captain-general, who represented the royal authority. 
In theory, the governor was under the Viceroy of 
Peru, but in later colonial times he was almost inde- 
pendent of the government at Lima. Besides the 
chief executive there was the audiencia, which acted 
as a council for the governor and also as a supreme 
court for the colony. The only bodies in any way 
representative of the people were the cabildos, or 
town councils, that operated under the strict super- 
vision of the governor and his subordinates. Mem- 
bership in the cabildos was obtained sometimes by 
appointment, sometimes by election, and often by 
purchase. These town councils discussed local taxa- 
tion and other affairs of municipal government, but 
their chief function was to register the royal decrees 
that formed part of the laws framed for the colony. 

The Chileans were devout Roman Catholics, and 
a familiar figure in the country was the priest, who 
had tremendous influence, especially with the coun- 
try people. The church received tithes from the in- 
come of each communicant and first fruits from the 
products of every farm, so that by the close of the 


* José Victorino Lastarria, Investigaciones sobre la influencia 
social de la conquista y del sistema colonial de los Espatoles 
en Chile, p. 69. 

*Department of State, Bureau of Archives, undated report 
of Joel R. Poinsett to President James Madison, which declares 
that, after the overthrow of Spanish rule, the rural priests 
were the real rulers in country districts. 


THE END OF A COLONY 7 


eighteenth century its income was greater than that 
of the Colony. With foreigners barred and all books 
censored before the colonials could read them, Roman 
Catholicism was firmly entrenched in Chile before 
independence came. 

But in spite of all outward signs of continued 
loyalty to the mother country, there was restlessness 
beneath the surface in 1789. As Spain clung stub- 
bornly to its monopoly of the colonial trade all 
through the revolutionary eighteenth century, the for- 
bidden foreigner with his cheaper goods became a 
welcome smuggler in many ports. The coasts were 
- too long to be guarded well against British and 
American traders. Extensive whale fishing was car- 
ried on in the waters of the lower Pacific by adven- 
turers from England and the United States, and 
many ships came to Chilean waters nominally to 
obtain whale oil but chiefly to barter contraband 
wares. One member of an American expedition 
reported that a merchant had bribed soldiers sent 
to arrest him so that they helped him land his goods.7 
“Piracy and contraband are common things now,” 
wrote the Viceroy of Peru in 1790. “It has been 
made thus by the English and Bostonians.’’ 

When wide-awake Chileans saw what open ports 
would mean to them, the restrictive Spanish trade- 
system became an odious thing. Even a more griev- 
ous cause of complaint was the appointive plan that 
“Spain followed. Though the kings had often ex- 


sviliom Moulton, A Concise Extract from the Sea Journal, 
p. 78. 
* Barros Arana, op. cit., VII. 414, 


8 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


pressed their intention to recognize children of early 
settlers when they chose colonial officials,® few 
American-born Spaniards received appointments. 
Men from Spain were sent to govern, men who held 
themselves to be above the natives and were in turn 
disliked by the colonials. Ambrosio O’Higgins, one 
of the most progressive captains-general placed over 
Chile, was afraid to proclaim as his wife the woman 
he loved, even though she belonged to one of the 
proudest native families, since marriage with a 
colonial might damage his career. ““The condition of 
being a native of Chile is there regarded as some- 
thing worse than original sin,’ wrote José Antonio 
Rojas while journeying in Europe. “For baptism 
will free us from the latter while there is no escape 
from the former.’’?° 

Through underground channels the philosophies 
of the French revolution found their way slowly 
into the homes of the wealthier Chileans. Those 
who travelled in Europe learned that Spain was 
becoming a decadent nation. They brought back this 
news to Chile and circulated the French books that 
they had smuggled into the country. Many Chileans 
made a study of the teachings of Rousseau, Montes- 
quieu, and Voltaire. By 1800 small secret societies 
that talked of revolution were to be found in most 
of the larger towns,'! and it needed only an impetus 
from Europe to bring to the surface these fires that 
were smouldering in the hearts of so many colonial 
leaders. 


® Recopilacion de leyes de los reinos de las Indias, book 3, 
title 2, law 14. 

© Chisholm, op. cit., p. 55. 

™ Moulton, op. cit., p. 80. 


THE END OF A COLONY 2 


This impulse was given by Napoleon. Bonaparte, 
when in 1808 his French army overran Spain. 
Charles IV was induced to abdicate, and F erdinand, 
the heir apparent, to renounce his right to succession, 
while Joseph Bonaparte was placed on the throne and 
command was sent to Spanish America that allegi- 
ance be sworn to the usurper. To offset this, a junta 
formed by Spaniards at Seville entreated the over- 
seas colonies to remain loyal to Ferdinand VII as 
rightful king. In face of such danger, the Spaniards 
became more solicitous than they ever had been for 
colonial goodwill and even offered representation in 
the Cortes, the legislative assembly of the mother 
country. 

José Garcia Carrasco was governor of Chile at 
this time, a timid man who was incapable of taking 
decisive action in such a crisis, as he feared the San- 
tiago aristocracy, who refused to consider the de- 
mands of Napoleon. He first had correspondence 
with the sister of Ferdinand and wife of the prince 
regent of Portugal, then resident in Brazil, who 
desired to unite the Spanish-American colonies 
to the Braganza dynasty, but he could make no satis- 
factory arrangement with her.12 F inally, when be- 
cause of a warning from the neighboring viceroy of 
La Plata that revolution was threatening, he sus- 
pended elections for a representative to the Spanish 
assembly, the Chileans resolved to displace their 
captain-general and set up a government for them- 
selves. 

* Barros Arana, of. cit., VIII, 92. 


10 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


The crucial step was taken on September 18, 1810. 
Garcia Carrasco had imprisoned three of the leading 
colonials whom he feared. Loud protests from the 
Santiago cabildo caused him to promise that he 
would free them, but instead he deported them secret- 
ly to Peru. When the news reached Santiago, the 
royal audiencia joined the cabildo in requiring him to 
resign. A provisional junta was formed to govern 
in the name of Ferdinand VII until that unfortu- 
nate prince could regain his throne, but it was a 
shadowy allegiance proclaimed to a monarch who 
had an even more shadowy claim to a kingdom. The 
junta made immediate plans to call a congress elected 
by the people of the colony. Chilean colonial life was 
nearing an end and a nation was emerging. 


CHAPTER II 


THE BEGINNINGS OF A NATION 


The provisional junta that assumed control of 
Chile while elections were being held for the first 
Congress was well representative of the leading 
interests and sections of the country. Its guiding 
spirit was Dr. Juan Martinez de Rozas, a lawyer of 
Concepcion, the second city of the colony, and in it 
were relatives of the Larrains, the large family 
whose numerous branches caused it to be known 
as the “eight hundred.” Heartily behind the new 
government was the cabildo of Santiago that spoke 
for the aristocracy of the capital city. All omens 
were favorable for the success of the new project. 

The energy of the junta was seen immediately in 
the liberal decrees that were passed. A fixed system 
of taxation was established that stopped the farming 
out of revenues; slavery was abolished; restrictions 
on commerce were largely removed; provision was 
even made for elementary schools in each center of 
population.1 These were popular measures with men 
who were interested in Chile’s progress, and all 
through the country the new movement was accepted 
gladly. As long as Chileans were allowed to act for 
themselves there was little chance of returning to the 
old régime. Self-government seemed to have come 
to stay. 


*M. A. Tocornal, Memoria sobre el primer gobierno nacional, 
pp. 210-212. 


12 CHILE AND THE UNITED Staime3 


The part played by the United States in this 
sudden change in Chilean history was not so great 
as it seemingly should have been. Outside of con- 
tributing their share to contraband commerce, the 
citizens of the northern republic did little toward 
urging the colony to be rid of European control. 
American traders sold watches and charms that bore 
the picture of a woman wearing an arm-band in- 
scribed with the words, “American Liberty.”? A 
few colonials in Chile had French versions of the 
American Declaration of Independence. “But sym- 
pathy for the American revolution could only have 
come to a very few hearts,” according to Barros 
Arana, the Chilean historian.* 

As the work of the junta progressed, however, the 
United States became more concerned in affairs along 
the west coast of South America. When the text of 
a decree opening Chilean ports to the commerce of 
friendly foreign nations was sent to the Congress of 
the northern republic, it was accompanied by a mani- 
festo that asked for a “cordial alliance.”* But Presi- 
dent Madison and the American Congress were dis- 
posed to proceed with caution, and although a reso- 
lution was presented in the House of Representatives 
in December, 1810, to recognize as belligerents the 
South Americans who were in revolt, no action on 
it was taken.® 


2 Barros Arana, VII. 44. 

? Barros Arana, VII. 478. 

“FP. J. de Urrutia, Paginas de historia diplomatica, p. 60. 
® American State Papers, I. 538. 


THE BEGINNINGS OF A NATION 13 


Madison then dispatched Joel Robert Poinsett, 
of Charleston, as his personal agent to Buenos 
Aires and Chile, who was to inform the President 
as to conditions there, and if the junta seemed 
permanent, was to negotiate commercial treaties. 
British merchants were very anxious to prevent 
Americans from sharing in the new trade advan- 
tages, as both Madison and Poinsett well understood. 

The American agent was a world traveller and 
adventurer who had shortly prior to this South 
American expedition taken part in the Greek revolu- 
tion against Turkey.® He revelled in surroundings 
such as he found in the southern end of the new 
world. After negotiating a commercial treaty at 
Buenos Aires in the face of violent British opposi- 
tion, he left for Santiago, arriving there on the 14th 
of February, 1812. 

The situation was not so favorable here as he 
found it east of the Andes. The viceroy of Peru 
was not at all satisfied with affairs in his captaincy- 
general. Though Chile had indeed been made almost 
independent of him by the Spanish crown, he now 
dispatched a force by water to Valdivia to subdue 
the upstart colony. The new Congress had hardly 
assembled before the invasion from Peru became the 
absorbing problem to be solved. 

At Santiago a new leader, who belonged to one 
of the old families in the capital, had come to the 
fore. This was José Miguel Carrera, just recently 


hg Garcia Merou, Historia de la diplomacia americana, 
p. 260. 


14 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


returned from the peninsular campaigns in Spain, 
and the idol of the troops now gathering to fight the 
invaders. By a series of military coups, he became 
the directing genius of the executive committee that 
was organized by the Congress; and by the time of 
Poinsett’s arrival, he had dissolved the legislative 
body, because he believed that some of its members 
plotted to assassinate him.” In this way a military 
dictatorship had been established two years after 
the last royal governor had been expelled. 

Poinsett’s position was not entirely clear. The 
United States had no intention of recognizing the 
rebels until after he made his reports. Yet he was 
called by the State Department at Washington a 
consul-general as well as a confidential agent. His 
first instructions read that he should explain to the 
Chileans the mutual commercial advantages in trad- 
ing with his country. He was to let them understand 
that the United States had no desire to intervene in 
any struggle between the colonies and Spain, but if 
separation did occur, the northern republic would 
desire to cultivate the closest relations.® 

It was not at all certain that the revolutionary 
junta would officially receive Poinsett as consul- 
general, and the tribunal del consulado® did not care 
to accept his credentials when he came to Santiago. 

care Arana, Historia jeneral de la independencia de Chile, 
p. 


® Martin Garcia Merou, of. cit., p. 261. 


® This was an association of merchants resembling a modern 
chamber of commerce. Many Spanish colonial towns had 
them. For Poinsett’s conflict with the one at Santiago, see 
Barros Arana, Historia jeneral de Chile, VIII. 555. 


THE BEGINNINGS OF A NATION 15 


The members of the tribunal were Spanish merchants 
who were not entirely pleased with the length to 
which the new Chilean government had gone in 
making itself virtually independent of Spain. One 
argument advanced by them was that Poinsett had 
never been confirmed by the United States Senate. 
Only the interposition of Agustin Vial, secretary of 
Carrera’s latest junta, brought about a change. 

Although the position of the American agent 
seemed to be a delicate one, its difficulties gave him 
scant worry. He had been told on leaving Washing- 
ton to take all measures possible for aiding Chile that 
would not be incompatible with the position of neu- 
trality, but the latitude which he gave to the inter- 
pretation of these instructions was nothing short of 
astonishing. 

His experiences in Greece had not accustomed him 
to the position of neutral observer, and he quickly 
became an open partisan of Carrera. One of his first 
steps was to promise military supplies from the 
United States. The promise was not kept, because 
even had American manufacturers been so disposed, 
the new war with England demanded all their atten- 
tion. But lively hope was aroused among Chileans 
that the United States would soon join them in their 
struggle. 

Poinsett did not stop here, but accepted the posi- 
_ tion of authorized councillor for the Chilean govern- 
ment. At his home in Santiago, a provisional consti- 
tution was drafted wherein the political theory of a 
compact between king and people’ was set forth, 


16 CHILE AND THE UNITED STARS 


although allegiance was sworn to Ferdinand VII.?° 
Following this, he was offered a position as com- 
mander of a division in the army fighting the Peru- 
vian royalists, and though he could find nothing in 
his instructions to warrant it, he accepted promptly. 
When the invaders captured eleven American whalers 
and were on the point of sending them as prisoners 
to Callao, Commander Poinsett led his division 
against them and rescued the whalers.'? 

One of the greatest factors in furthering the 
influence of the United States at this time was the 
Aurora de Chile, the first newspaper in the country. 
Its editor was Camilo Henriquez, a gifted renegade 
priest, who had imbibed the doctrines of Rousseau 
and was a confirmed admirer of the United States. 
News from the northern republic appeared in al- 
most every issue of the Aurora and quotations from 
Boston papers, for New England was the only part 
of the United States known to any degree in Chile. 
The Declaration of Independence was now printed 
and spread abroad along with the inaugural address 
of Thomas Jefferson. 

“The United States,” wrote Henriquez on April 
30, 1812, “possesses a great people who have been 
freed from tyranny and are now offering refuge to 
many of our peninsular brothers who flee from 
French vandalism. They lag behind in painting and 
sculpture, but have abounded in material welfare, 


% Alberto Cummins, “El reglamento constitucional de 1812,” 
in La Revista Chilena, V (1913), 225. 

4 Charles J. Stillé, Life and Service of Joel R. Poinsett, 
pp. 27-29. 


THE BEGINNINGS OF A NATION 17 


in farming and manufacturing. Their greatest 
achievement is their marvelous advancement in 
schools. Their constitution has made their land an 
asylum for the oppressed.’’!? 

Henriquez was not the type, however, to agree 
long with any governing body, and by the spring 
of 1813 differences were rumored between him and 
the governing junta. The last issue of the paper 
appeared on the first of April in that year. No good 
reason was given for its demise, but five days after- 
wards an official newspaper, El Monitor Araucano, 
appeared. The Aurora made one lasting contribution 
at any rate: the United States was better known and 
the utterances of American statesmen had been pub- 
lished abroad in Chile.1% 

The Aurora was printed on a press brought from 
New York City by Matthew Hoevel, a prominent 
and interesting American of the early revolutionary 
period in Chile. According to report, his past record 
had not been above reproach. He came to South 
America as a clerk on an American ship owned by 
J. R. Livingston. When this vessel was seized by the 
Spaniards and illegally condemned, the young clerk 
saved the ship’s papers and went to Spain for Living- 
ston, where he obtained judgment. He then returned 
to Santiago with an order on the treasury of Chile 
from the Council of the Indies; but later, when 
ports were opened in the colony and Livingston sent 


“Julio Vicufia Cinfuentes, Aurora de Chile; reimpresion, 
pp. 93-101. 
_” The four statesmen most frequently mentioned were Frank- 
lin, Washington, Jefferson, and Madison. 


18 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


for his money, he received only a small sum. He found 
to his astonishment that Hoevel had spent most of 
it for his own use.14 

Whatever his past might have been, the former 
ship’s clerk was esteemed sufficiently in Chile to ob- 
tain a contract for the importation of a printing press, 
which arrived from New York early in 1812 with 
three American printers. Poinsett received such good 
reports of Hoevel that he made him vice-consul to 
act under him. Together they planned to influence 
Carrera to convert the government into a republic 
and break off all connection with Spain. 

The date set for this important change was the 
fourth of July, 1812, when Carrera decreed that 
Santiago should hold a celebration for the signing 
of the American Declaration of Independence. The 
Chilean leader was undecided how far he should go. 
Then, unfortunately, the printers of the Aurora took 
a hand. At home, Fourth of July celebrations meant 
drinking freely of all liquor within reach. That 
they might compromise themselves and their country 
in Chile did not occur to them. Coming to the palace, 
they insulted Poinsett and the latter had to be pro- 
tected by the police.1° The printers were imprisoned 
and Carrera declined to follow the American ex- 
ample. Poinsett severed relations with Hoevel and 
wrote home that he had discovered his former assist- 


“ Department of State, Bureau of Archives, undated report 
of Joel R. Poinsett. 

* Cinfuentes, op. cit., p. 14. The diary of William John- 
stone, one of the printers, reports only that the occasion was 
celebrated properly. 


THE BEGINNINGS OF A NATION 19 


ant to have been working secretly against the United 
States. 

Moreover, Captain Porter arrived at Valparaiso 
with the American warship, Essex, bringing with him 
certain British prizes captured at sea. The Chilean 
people were thoroughly sympathetic with the cause 
of the captain in the war of his country against 
England. For, in order to discourage further move- 
ments toward revolution, the royalist government in 
Peru had represented that England’s alliance with 
Spain would never permit British statesmen to back 
any Chilean resistance to the mother country. This 
was generally believed in Chile, whereas hope of 
American intervention had not been abandoned. 
Porter thus was allowed to sell his captured cargo 
and fit out his newly acquired ships to prey further 
on British commerce.'® 

But warnings came to Santiago from Buenos Aires 
that it was impolitic to vex the English too far by 
espousing the American cause. The authorities grew 
more cautious, and when Porter returned in 1814 his 
official reception was cooler. He was trapped by Bri- 
tish ships in Valparaiso harbor, “not a cable length 
from shore,” according to Poinsett. From the heights 
of the town, the Chilean populace applauded the game 
fight the American commodore was making against 
overwhelming odds, but Poinsett pleaded in vain with 
_ the Chilean commander of the fort at Valparaiso to 
fire on the British and save his countrymen. The 


* Barros Arana, Historia jeneral, IX. 220-222. 


20 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


Chilean officer stayed neutral, and after three days 
of uneven combat, Porter surrendered.17 

Meanwhile, a new leader was steadily gaining 
popularity in Chile and was threatening to replace 
Carrera in the affections of the army. Bernardo 
O’Higgins, son of the captain-general of 1789, had 
espoused the revolutionary cause. Backed by Mar- 
tinez de Rozas, who detested Carrera, O’Higgins 
also received the support of the jealous Larrain 
family. At first he and Carrera codperated and won 
several signal victories over the royalists. But in 1814 
the rivalry between them had grown intense. 

The time had come for Poinsett to leave. As soon 
as Porter surrendered and his captive crew returned 
to the United States, Captain Hillyer of the British 
navy proceeded to Santiago on a mission of media- 
tion between Chile and Spain. At his instance the 
Carrera government was forced to ask Poinsett to 
make immediate use of his passport and leave the 
country.‘® On his return to Washington, he was 
publicly congratulated by Madison for the skill and 
zeal he had shown in his mission. 

Shortly after his departure from Chile, the revolu- 
tionary forces were crushed in the battle of Rancagua, 
and both Carrera and O’ Higgins fled eastward across 
the Andes, while Chile once more submitted to the 
iron rule of Spain. The triumph of the Allies in 
Europe restored Ferdinand VII, who insisted upon 
all the old laws and restrictions in his colonies. To 


" Stillé, op. cit., p. 29. 


* Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Poinsett to 
Monroe, June 14, 1814. 


THE BEGINNINGS OF A NATION 21 


interested observers, among them the government 
at Washington, it appeared that Chilean indepen- 
dence would likely be deferred for some time. 

On the other side of the Andes the shattered rem- 
nants of the Chilean patriot army found a welcome 
at the headquarters of José de San Martin, who was 
acting for the provinces of Rio de La Plata in a vain 
effort to wrest Upper Peru from the viceroy at 
Lima. Three years after Rancagua he conceived the 
idea of striking at Peru from the south by way of 
Chile. It was the turn in the tide for the little cap- 
taincy-general, helpless under the renewed control of 
Spain. 

San Martin also disposed of the internal Chilean 
disputes in a peremptory way. As he admired O’Hig- 
gins and distrusted Carrera, the latter was sent to 
Buenos Aires under a guard of dragoons, while 
O’Higgins helped plan the invasion of his native 
country. In 1817, the two generals made an unex- 
pected entrance into Chile over the Andean pass of 
Uspallata—a remarkable military exploit which took 
the royalists completely by surprise. The ensuing 
battle of Chacabuco placed all but southern Chile in 
the hands of the patriots and O’ Higgins was chosen 
Supreme Director by a unanimous vote of the San- 
tiago cabildo. 

The liberal decrees of the earlier revolutionary 
period were now revived, but the main interest was 
the campaign which San Martin was conducting 
against Peru. For this a navy was needed, and re- 
calling with gratification the mission of Poinsett, 


22 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


Chile once more turned to the United States for help. 
Manuel Aguirre, who had been sent thither from 
Buenos Aires, agreed to act as a Chilean agent too. 

The American people were, on the whole, sympa- 
thetic with the revolutionary cause. Henry Clay had 
declared on the floor of the Senate that the battle of 
Chacabuco showed that Chile had become a nation. 
But Aguirre found the government at Washington 
carefully neutral. He had little success in buying 
ships and once was placed under arrest for violating 
the neutrality laws. One vessel which, according to 
Barros Arana, cost Chile more than it ever helped, 
finally reached Valparaiso in the summer of 1819. 
Another was delayed at Buenos Aires on account of 
a dispute over the building contract and the wages 
for the crew, and in the end was purchased by Bra- 
zil.®, 

The same failure was encountered when, encour- 
aged by Clay’s speech, Aguirre tried to gain official 
recognition for Chile. He was told by Secretary 
John Quincy Adams that the United States was will- 
ing to make a commercial treaty, but only the fact 
of independence combined with a moral right to it 
could authorize a neutral to give recognition to a 
new and disputed sovereignty.24 Monroe, who suc- 
ceeded Madison as President in 1817, determined to 
adopt the same policy as his predecessor and send 
agents to South America to observe before he took 


* Barros Arana, Historia jeneral, XI. 85. 
 Ibid., XI. 605. 
* Alejandro Alvarez, La diplomacia de Chile, p. 203. 


THE BEGINNINGS OF A NATION 23 


definite action. A commission of three was dispatched 
to Buenos Aires, of which Theodoric Bland alone 
crossed the Andes and visited Chile in the summer 
of 1818. 

Other representatives of the northern republic 
were on the ground before Bland, however. At the 
opening of the year the United States sent the war- 
ship Ontario to Chile and Peru to protect the grow- 
ing American commerce from the depredations of 
the Spanish fleet. Accompanying Captain Biddle, who 
was in charge of the vessel, was John B. Prevost, 
who was to act for the United States in all diplo- 
matic and legal questions that might arise. 

American vessels were by this time bringing into 
Valparaiso alone cargoes valued at more than a mil- 
lion dollars annually. But Prevost found that ships 
were being seized and officers imprisoned constantly 
by the Spanish navy for alleged violation of block- 
ading orders. On the ninth of April he enclosed in 
his letter to Adams a memorial from American mer- 
chants expressing their gratitude that the Ontario 
had remained longer in Valparaiso than originally 
planned. Otherwise, the merchants wrote, their ships 
in the port would have been confiscated and the sea- 
men impressed into the Spanish service, as had been 
done before.?? 

O’Higgins approached Prevost soon after the lat- 
ter arrived to find out the extent of American sym- 
pathy. The Director said that England had afforded 


“Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Prevost to 
Adams, April 9, 1818. 


24 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


his country considerable assistance up to this time, 
but he would have preferred to receive it from the 
United States. Prevost replied cautiously that his 
country wished to help, but could not be involved in 
a war when internal strife still disturbed the southern 
countries so constantly. “I emphasized the benefits 
which had come from American commerce,’ he 
wrote to Adams, “and showed him how Chile would 
never have won independence without these supplies. 
He finally admitted that I was right and that Chile 
must be satisfied with that for a time.”?% 

Bland took the same position when he came in 
the summer after Prevost and Biddle had left for the 
Oregon country. Chilean independence had been de- 
clared by O’Higgins on February 2, 1818. But 
Bland told the Director that his government had de- 
termined to keep strict neutrality during the war; 
that it regarded the conflict as between equals and 
not as a rebellion; that though the government was 
neutral, the people of the United States had ardent 
desires for Chilean success. 

This well represented the attitude of the Monroe 
administration. On December 2, 1817, the President 
wrote to Congress that so far the United States had 
been perfectly neutral. Its ports had been and still 
were open to both sides, he declared.** Bland, how- 
ever, did not fare as well as Poinsett in Chile, for 
he became involved in the Carrera quarrels and did 
not make a good impression on the government.?® 


* Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Prevost to 
Adams, February 13, 1818. 

* State Papers, First session, 15th Congress, p. 4. 

* Barros Arana, Historia jeneral, XI. 546, note. 


THE BEGINNINGS OF A NATION _ 25 


His report, therefore, did not encourage Monroe to 
recognize the new republic. 

When Prevost returned to Chile in the winter of 
1819, he reported a complete change in the attitude 
of the people there toward his country. With the help 
of ships bought in England, the Chilean navy was 
making its power felt along the coast of Peru. Lord 
Cochrane, a former member of the British Parlia- 
ment, commanded it and he was not inclined to be 
lenient with any infraction of his blockading orders. 
Whereas during the previous year Prevost dealt 
mainly with disagreements with the royalist navy, 
his countrymen now were constantly in trouble with 
the victorious Chileans. 

He found that American warships paid scant atten- 
tion to Cochrane’s blockade. Captain Biddle was con- 
tinuously bringing royalists into the besieged ports, 
at one time carrying a nephew of the viceroy into 
Callao, who brought military information concern- 
ing a projected invasion from Chile. Later on, an 
American merchant ship seized at Valparaiso was re- 
leased by force by Captain Downes, of the Mace- 
donian, though O’Higgins claimed that the captain 
had been given ample assurance by him that the 
vessel would receive fair treatment.2¢ 

“Our warships are carrying freight for the belli- 
gerents,” Prevost wrote Adams in March 1819, ‘and 
are so interested in making profits that they forget 
their real purpose in these waters.’27 Again, on the 


* Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Prevost to 
Adams, May 2, 1821. 


* Ibid., Prevost to Adams, March 20, 1819. 


26 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


third of July, he wrote: “The change in a year is 
remarkable. Now Chile’s flag dominates the ocean 
and all is confidence inland. Cochrane is capturing 
many American vessels as prizes and bringing them 
to Valparaiso.”’*8 

Prevost indeed found it necessary on several occa- 
sions to protest against the depredations of Cochrane 
on the sea. O’Higgins told him that he had to take 
the testimony of Chilean naval officers in these prize 
cases and distribute the money among the sailors, or 
else they might become lax in their efforts. For 
though the recent battle of Maipo had cleared most 
of Chile of royalist forces, Peru was still in dispute. 

The American agent was inclined to sympathize 
with the Chilean attitude in these cases. It was true 
that there was good room for argument as to the 
legality of Cochrane’s seizures and for the actual 
violation of blockading rules committed by American 
merchants. But Prevost felt that more consideration 
should have been given by his countrymen. “I de- 
plore such incidents,’ he wrote Adams on one occa- 
sion, “as they increase the ill will toward the United 
States. Chile is extremely sensitive to any action 
which shows us unsympathetic; she thinks that we 
ought to show partiality for her cause, though we 
are officially neutral.”’° 

Prevost was not sustained by his home govern- 
ment in this loyalty to the Chilean cause. His posi- 
tion that the troubles were natural incidents growing 


* Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Prevost to 
Adams, July 3, 1819. 


* Ibid., Prevost to Adams, September 13, 1819. 


THE BEGINNINGS OF A NATION 27 


out of the revolution and that it indicated no hostil- 
ity toward the United States was not well received 
at Washington. In the summer of 1824 he was re- 
called, after charges had been preferred against him 
by captains of American warships and masters of 
mercantile vessels. They were chiefly based on his 
negotiations with the new Peruvian government now 
finally independent of Spain, but they were all to the 
same end, namely that he showed no zeal in the pro- 
tection of American interests.*° 

Monroe’s message to Congress in March, 1822, 
showed that the United States was finally prepared 
to extend recognition. “When we regard the com- 
plete success that has attended the war in favor of 
the Spanish colonies,” the President wrote, “we are 
compelled to conclude that the provinces which have 
declared their independence ought to be recog- 
nized.”31 Another reason which Monroe did not men- 
tion was, that Spain had finally approved a treaty 
for the sale of Florida. On January 27, 1823, Heman 
Allen of Vermont was appointed first minister of the 
United States to Chile. 

This step was the first of its kind to be taken by 
any country outside of South America, and the 
United States was disposed to make much of the 
friendliness that was indicated therein. Its represen- 
tatives for many years took occasion often to remind 
the Chileans of their debt to the northern republic. 
But whatever help was afforded the new Spanish- 


* Tbid., Adams to Allen, November 11, 1823. 
1 American State Papers, IV. 818. 


28 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


American nation by this action of Monroe, claim 
could hardly be made that the United States_had as- 
sisted in the cause of Chilean independence. Except 
for the actions of Joel Poinsett in the earlier period, 
the Washington government was carefully neutral 
until the Florida treaty with Spain had been rati- 
fied and Chile had been virtually free of royalist 
troops for four years.*? 


“Cf. Benjamin Vicufia Mackenna, El ostracismo de los Ca- 
rreras, p. 47. The Chilean historian says: “With North America, 
any bare rock around which beat the ocean waves has always 
been worth more than the fate of foreign nations. The pos- 
session of Florida was a matter a thousand times more im- 
portant to the United States than the redemption of Spanish 
America.” 


CHAPTER III 


EARLY DEALINGS WITH THE NORTHERN REPUBLIC 


Elaborate ceremonies and military parades, in- 
cluding a salute of “twenty-two guns” (sic), wel- 
comed Heman Allen on his arrival at Santiago. The 
profuse Chilean cordiality embarrassed the simple 
Vermont farmer not a little. It seemed to him to 
savor of Old World trappings, and his natural cau- 
tion prompted him to decline with thanks the offer 
which was made to him of a house and a guard of 
honor, both to be paid for by the Chilean govern- 
ment. He even declined the invitation from O’Hig- 
gins to share the executive mansion, unless he were 
allowed to pay rent.' 

American prestige was at high water mark in 
Chile from all indications and the task before Allen 
seemed comparatively easy. He need only hold that 
position for his country and his other aims would 
be accomplished. These were chiefly to gain pre- 
ferential treatment for American commerce in the 
harbors of Chile and to secure payment for a few 
claims for damages that his countrymen had suffered 
at the hands of Lord Cochrane. 

But a troublous period of Chilean national life 
was about to begin. Though Bernardo O’Higgins 
had all the power in his hands, clouds of jealousy 
were gathering as the Spanish menace was removed. 


*Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Allen to Adams, 
April 29, 1824. 


30 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


The Director had gradually set up a military despot- 
ism in the nation; his army seemed to know no law 
but its own will. If Allen had given the word, the 
soldiers would have ousted a peaceable Santiago citi- 
zen from his house and converted it forthwith into 
the American legation.? Everyone considered O’Hig- 
gins a brave soldier but a poor executive.* Petty 
chiefs in other parts of the country were restless and 
Santiago was not at all satisfied. His retirement came 
without bloodshed, after he had made a dramatic 
appeal to his opponents in the city to remember what 
he had done for Chile. He went to make his home in 
Peru, where, for ten years or more, he was the center 
of plots to restore him. 

Anarchy followed that amounted at times to posi- 
tive chaos. Revolution and counter-revolution be- 
came the order of the day. It was not a unique situ- 
ation; the same thing was happening across the 
Andes and revolt was brewing in the wide domain 
of Simon Bolivar to the north. Accordingly Heman 
Allen and Samuel Larned, his successor, were blocked 
by the disturbances in all efforts they made for a 
commercial treaty or the settlement of claims. Eight 
presidents and nine foreign ministers spoke for Chile 
during Allen’s three years’ stay.* “My country wants 
no special favors,’ he told one of the transitory 
leaders. ““We have recognized Chile as an indepen- 
dent state and simply want to see you stay free and 

* Department of State, Bureau of Archives, same letter. 


® Ibid., same letter. 
“Tbid., Allen to Clay, May 14, 1827. 


DEALINGS WITH NORTHERN REPUBLIC 31 


independent.” “TI will fight for that with my life,” 
responded the chief with theatrical fervor, and on 
the following day resigned his office.® 

If any one figure stood out in the decade of the 
chaotic twenties, it was General Ramon Freire, He 
was sometimes president, at other times the power 
behind the throne. Political lines were obscurely 
drawn. It was a combat of personalities, rather than 
principles. In a vague sort of way Freire was a lib- 
eral and was generally opposed by the wealthier aris- 
tocratic classes, He was always cordial to the en- 
voys from the United States, and on state occasions 
gave the northern republic precedence in diplomatic 
honors.® 

Chileans shared with their neighbors a fondness 
for making constitutions, and new ones were pro- 
posed with every change of government. The two 
most worthy of note before 1830 were the Freire 
constitution of 1824 and the one adopted by the 
Pinto government in 1828. In the preparation of the 
first one, Freire asked Allen for his help, but the 
latter with his characteristic caution refused to inter- 
fere in domestic matters. He disliked some of its 
features so much, however, that he determined to 
give advice on the next one.? The opportunity never 
came, but Larned accepted the invitation to join 
the constitutional convention of 1826. 

At this time Freire again held the upper hand, 
although other men were nominal heads of the 
*Ibid., Allen to Adams, August 15, 1824. 


° Ibid., same letter. 
"Ibid., Allen to Adams, August 19, 1824. 


32 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


government. Larned was a member of the sub- 
committee to draft a document, and the general 
framework of the one he prepared was adopted. 
Everyone in the convention was anxious to follow 
the American model.* A federal form of govern- 
ment was provided, with emphasis on local autonomy. 
This was Larned’s chief contribution; every town- 
ship governed itself. Frequent elections and ac- 
countability of all officers to the voters who chose 
them were other features that showed the ideas of 
the American minister.® 

On paper it was admittedly as fine a constitution 
as an independent state had ever known. But Larned 
himself confessed later that it would never be suit- 
able to a new country that was filled with military 
lordlets and bandit soldiery. It presumed a peaceful, 
law-abiding people who had learned to control them- 
selves. The constitution on an American model 
brought no peace to Chile. 

When Larned was not busy framing fundamental 
laws, he was usually occupied with the varied tariffs 
and port regulations. Tariffs were high from the 
start, and Chile’s chief revenue came from import 
and export duties. These were levied according to a 
value assessed by a local inspector at Valparaiso, who 
usually favored the importer on account of the appli- 
cation of “a secret and irresistible influence always 


*J. Benavente, Etude critique de la constitution de la Répub- 
lique du Chile, p. 4. 


* Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Larned to Clay, 
April 11, 1826. 


DEALINGS WITH NORTHERN REPUBLIC 33 


within the latter’s means.’”’?° The Englishman, John 
Miers, in 1822 reported that on some goods the 
regular tariff rate was as high as 53 per cent, while 
the additional bribes made the situation intolerable. 
Heavy transit duties by mules to Santiago, where 
most of the goods were sold, made an added item of 
expense.?? 

Americans who did business in Chile were pre- 
vented from being consignees for goods from their 
country by a law that gave rebates of four per cent 
to all foreign goods consigned to native merchants. 
Flour was one of the principal commodities from 
the United States. A storage duty of twenty-five 
cents on every barrel was forcing American traders 
to take their cargoes to Lima.1* Now the large land- 
owners of Chile moved to exclude the flour entirely 
by an embargo on all imports that competed with 
local products. 

But the American commodity which fared the 
worst was tobacco. To obtain the necessary funds 
to run the government, Chile resorted to the old ex- 
pedient of farming out the tobacco monopoly. This 
“estanco,” as it was called, was bought by Portales 
and Company of Valparaiso, who immediately pushed 
for a law to prohibit the import of estanco goods 
from other countries.1 A private monopoly of such 
a commodity was quite unpopular and within a year 


* Ibid., Prevost to Adams, February 9, 1818. 
“John Miers, Travels in Chile and La Plata, p. 200. 


* Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Larned to Clay, 
April 11, 1828. 


* José Victorino Lastarria, Don Diego Portales, p. 7. 


34 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


the government took it over. But American tobacco 
profited little from the change, and still had to sell 
at the price fixed by the government agents, unless 
the traders resorted to smuggling. 

Larned struggled valiantly against these condi- 
tions. New claims were coming in from American 
ships that were being seized and searched for estanco 
goods. His personal efforts defeated the measure to 
keep out cargoes that would compete with Chilean 
farm products.‘ He also obtained the repeal of a 
decree that would require vessels to give bond not 
to land estanco goods secretly on the unguarded 
Chilean coast; but he was hampered by lack of a 
commercial treaty. It was not until 1828 that a gov- 
ernment promised to be sufficiently stable to fulfill 
any pact of that nature. Larned then presented a 
draft of one but found too many obstacles. A great 
stumbling-block was his demand that the tobacco 
monopoly be discarded. Agreement on this was never 
reached. In Washington, Juan Campino opened a 
Chilean legation in 1827, but he resigned his post 
and was shifted to Mexico when his government in- 
structed him to negotiate a treaty. It would be a one- 
sided affair, he contended, for Chile sent no exports 
to the United States.** 

A religious problem was emerging as well, that 
would be hard to settle in any treaty of amity and 
commerce. Many states of the American Union had 

™ Department of State, Burean of Archives, Larned to Clay, 
July 17, 1828. 

* Barros Arana, Historia jeneral, XVI. 173. 


DEALINGS WITH NORTHERN REPUBLIC 35 


laws discriminating against Roman Catholics; 
whereas even the Freire constitution of 1824 made 
Catholicism the state religion of Chile. Religious 
tolerance was not the order of the day. Though the 
archbishop of Santiago was expelled from the 
country for a time because of his own sympathy for 
Spain, other leading churchmen had favored the 
revolution from the outset. “A wicked and aban- 
doned clergy still rule the country,” Allen wrote in 
disappointment. “There are eight hundred of the 
miserable creatures in Chile and much time is de- 
voted to their ridiculous ceremonies.” 

Such a spirit of intolerance promised little good 
for the continuance of friendly relations. Allen made 
a strong protest against the clause in the Freire con- 
stitution that decreed a state religion. It could not 
fit in with republican government, he told the Chilean 
leaders. He made this complaint to Campino, as the 
latter was leaving for the United States, and accord- 
ing to Allen, Campino replied that everyone in the 
convention had opposed the measure but would not 
so declare for fear of assassination.1® 

The Pope was slow to recognize the new republic, 
but his nuncio was received at Santiago in 1824 as a 
diplomatic representative. Great deference was paid 
him by most of the consuls and other agents from 
Catholic countries, even though the representative 
from Buenos Aires threatened to leave because pre- 
cedence was given over him to this representative 


* Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Allen to Adams, 
May 4, 1824. 


36 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


from Rome.1? Allen refused to recognize him as a 
diplomat and would have nothing to do with him. 

Opposition of this sort to a faith so deeply rooted 
in the hearts of the Chilean people foreshadowed 
trouble, which soon appeared in the question of Pro- 
testant cemeteries. As the public burying-grounds 
were consecrated by the Catholic church, no heretic’s 
body could be interred there. The first man who 
realized the dangers implied in this was Bernardo 
O’ Higgins, who decreed that Protestant cemeteries 
be permitted in every important town. This brought 
criticism from all sides down upon the head of the 
Director, but he upheld his decree.1® When the state 
religion was declared in 1824, it seemed that the 
Protestants might lose this cherished right. But 
Freire privately told Allen to ask for its continuance 
in an official letter. The British government did like- 
wise and an ordinance was passed that granted the 
request.’® This did not mean, however, that opposi- 
tion had died out. Every Chilean government hesi- 
tated to include such a provision in a permanent 
treaty. 

High duties hampered American trade; religious 
differences were a stumbling-block to good under- 
standing. But the greatest danger yet to American 
prestige was the growth of the influence of England. 
The United States and Great Britain had many points 
in common in their relations with Chile. Smugglers 

“Department of State, Bureau of Archives, April 29, 1824. 


* Barros Arana, Historia jeneral, XII. 407. 


* Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Allen to Adams, 
October 8, 1824. 


DEALINGS WITH NORTHERN REPUBLIC 37 


from both countries had helped to break down the 
Spanish trade monopoly; their citizens had the same 
aims and the same grievances in the new commercial 
Jaws that came in the wake of independence; the 
warships and merchant ships of both had violated 
blockade rules on the South Pacific coast; both na- 
tions were interested in laws that would protect Pro- 
testants. But each was jealous of its prestige in Chile 
and desired to be the power which would lead in 
giving advice to, and obtaining influence in, the 
infant republic. 

The enmity between them had not died down ap- 
preciably with the close of their war in 1815. Com- 
missioner Bland tried to arouse opposition to Eng- 
land when he talked to O’ Higgins in 1818. He told 
the Director that he knew that the British Captain 
Shirreff was trying to arrange for mediation in 
Peru that would keep it under Spanish control. He 
hoped thereby to obtain the Chilean carrying trade 
for American ships alone, but his methods were 
criticized sharply by the Chilean press. The official 
Gaceta declared that England wished the expansion 
of its South American commerce too profoundly to 
pursue a course of that sort.?° 

Prevost was also concerned with the rise of 
British influence, but thought the reports of it ex- 
aggerated. The markets for Chile, he wrote Adams, 
were in China and the East Indies. England and the 

*® Gaceta Ministerial, May 16, 1818. There were four news- 
papers in Santiago by the time that Bland came to Chile. 


This was only six years after the first issue of the Aurora. 
None of them lasted any length of time. 


38 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


United States shared about equally in supplying ves- 
sels for this trade. “There is little room for fear that 
Chile will give special advantages to England,” he 
added. “They seem to understand her crooked policy 
here and to regard her with contempt.’ As late as 
1821, furthermore, he wrote that he could see no 
reason for the statements heard in some quarters 
about the great British influence on the Pacific coast. 
He found Chileans naturally well-disposed toward 
the Americans, but the trouble was that most of his 
countrymen in those regions were privateers and ad- 
venturers. They merited little respect. When they 
were of a better class, they always received the atten- 
tion that was due them.?? 

Heman Allen took particular pains to stress the 
part played by the United States as a friendly power. 
The reports of the executive message that contained 
the Monroe Doctrine reached Chile the same month 
as that in which the first American minister arrived. 
He found the Chileans under the impression that 
England and the United States were jointly respon- 
sible for averting from them the peril of the Holy 
Alliance, and he took care to refute this idea in his 
first conference with Rafael Egafia, the new foreign 
minister. “I warned him against considering the ar- 
rival of British consuls as an act of recognition,” 
he wrote.** He then gave Egafia an account of the 


* Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Prevost to 
Adams, June 10, 1818. 

™ Ibid., July 6, 1821. 

* British consuls had just come to Chile when Allen arrived. 
Prior to this they had left all commercial negotiations in the 
hands of naval officers. Barros Arana relates that the latter 
often offended the Chileans. 


DEALINGS WITH NORTHERN REPUBLIC 39 


proposal by the British minister, Canning, for joint 
intervention, and related how Canning had grown 
cold as soon as Richard Rush had suggested that 
England recognize the Spanish-American republics. 
“Egafia replied that he had not heard the true story 
of the Rush-Canning correspondence, and assured 
me that the government of Chile uniformly regarded 
us as its best and most powerful friend; that they 
would never give special advantages to any power 
before consulting us; that they were perfectly satis- 
fied in Chile with the American attitude toward their 
independence ; that he was planning soon to propose 
to the United States a treaty of alliance.”’24 This turn 
to the conversation was more than Allen expected. 
He let the discussion drop quickly and explained that 
he simply did not want the British government to 
gain credit for something it did not do. Later he was 
careful to point out that the Monroe Doctrine meant 
merely that the United States reserved the right to 
act as “its own interest might hereafter require.”2 

But if Allen was assured at the outset that his 
country was the most influential in Chile, he lost 
that idea soon. For where the United States relied on 
friendly diplomacy, England depended on the far 
more tangible help of loans and merchandise. The 
first Chilean government loan was floated in London 
in 1822, after two Americans, William Worthington 
and Jeremiah Robinson, had made valiant but futile 
efforts at separate times to interest American capital. 


* Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Allen to Adams, 
April 29, 1824. ; 


° Tbid., June 5, 1824. 


40 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


Robinson was even commissioned by the Chilean 
Senate to act as an agent in the United States for a 
loan of three and a half million pesos at twelve per 
cent but was unable to find a market.** Three British 
companies exploited the northern Chile copper 
mines. Native mine-owners customarily borrowed 
money from British mercantile houses at Santiago, 
because they could obtain better terms there than 
could be given them by Chilean merchants.27 “Our 
trade with Chile is trifling,’ Allen wrote soon after 
his arrival, “but British goods have inundated the 
market and most of the coin in the country goes in 
payment for them. Their commercial houses are in 
all ports and their agents have intermarried with 
the Chileans.’’*® 

When the invitation came from Bolivar for Chile 
to attend his Panama Congress, Allen made every 
effort to persuade the government to reject it. It was 
simply a project of England, he said, to make an 
alliance with the American confederation that was 
to be formed. Such a condition would actually result 
in making the new republics British colonies. But 
Chile was deaf to his protest and its Congress ap- 
pointed two delegates. Only lack of money prevented 
them from attending.”® 


* Alcibiades Roldan, Los desacuerdos entre O'Higgins y el 
senado conservador, p. 40. 

7 Basil Hall, Extracts from a Journal Written on the Coasts 
of Chile, Peru and Mexico, p. 75. 

8 Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Allen to Adams, 
May 4, 1825. Seven years before this, Prevost had reported 
that American commerce was three time more than the British. 

* Ibid., Allen to Clay, November 24, 1826. 


DEALINGS WITH NORTHERN REPUBLIC 41 


“This new government feels that it has recogni- 
tion from us,” Allen wrote later. “It now gives its 
favors to England and France so as to obtain recog- 
nition from them.”8° This was anything but the 
proper attitude for the infant republic to take, accord- 
ing to the ideas of all American representatives. It 
should feel its gratitude to them and show it when- 
ever occasion arose. It would have been hard enough 
to maintain a favored position on this basis with 
leaders as friendly as Freire and Pinto. The men who 
took control of Chile as a result of the revolution of 
1830 dealt a death blow to all such hopes. 


” Ibid., Allen to Clay, September 10, 1825. 


CHAPTER IV 


THE CONSERVATIVES IN CHARGE 


The dawning of the new year that closed the 
decade of the turbulent twenties showed slight 
promise of brighter times in Chile. The constitution 
of 1828 was simply unworkable, and liberal theories 
had plunged Chile into more serious warfare than 
ever. Joaquin Prieto had taken the field in the name 
‘of O’Higgins and his following had grown fast. 
Against him Freire was making a grim, determined 
resistance. It looked as if a period of petty banditry 
would be followed by the bloodier era of a real 
civil war. 

But despite the gloomy outlook that greeted the 
nation in 1830, peace was soon to come. The power- 
ful landowning elements, who had not been attracted 
to any particular leader before, fell in behind Prieto. 
The Catholic priesthood found a sympathetic hear- 
ing with the new general and threw all of its influence 
to his cause. The business men wanted a strong hand, 
which he seemed to promise. As his fortunes ad- 
vanced, Joaquin Prieto forgot the restless exile in 
Peru and began to fight on his own account." Freire’s 
desperate stand against this rising tide of conserva- 
tism was useless. The two armies met in one final, 
bloody conflict at the little town of Lircai, not far 
from the capital city, where Freire suffered a deci- 
sive defeat and the conservatives moved into the 
government positions to stay.” 


1Luis Galdames, El decenio de Montt, p. 60. 
? Ibid. 


THE CONSERVATIVES IN CHARGE 43 


The new party, which was destined to make Chile 
stand out as a peculiarly peaceful nation in a warring 
continent, was aristocratic in its leadership. It had 
little patience with extreme views of local self-gov- 
ernment. The proud old families, owners of most of 
Chile’s farming land, had welcomed a separa- 
tion from Spain but not a pure democracy in a coun- 
try where the “rich, the well-born, and the able” 
were so clearly separated from the mass of people. 

Foreigners called them “The Old Spanish Party,” 
a name used in reproach as signifying those who had 
not wanted to sever connection with Spain. This was 
as inaccurate as most political tabs are apt to be, 
but it was correct enough in indicating that those 
now in power were that upper stratum of whites to 
whom the mestizos and Indians were accustomed to 
give precedence. 

The standard of Prieto had rallied the soldiers, 
and he was the president finally inaugurated in 1833. 
But the real leader, as political questions began to 
be more important than military affairs, was Diego 
Portales, a business man of Valparaiso. His company 
had owned the estanco, and its failure to conduct bu- 
siness with the mushroom governments of the time 
had awakened Portales to the fact that he would 
have to be assured a steady administration before 
he could prosper in business.? He had little interest 
in politics and had held aloof from the quarrels that 
followed the downfall of O’Higgins. But he viewed 
the Prieto movement as Chile’s best chance for peace- 


* José Lastarria, Don Diego Portales, p. 30. 


44 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


ful progress, and when it finally succeeded, he joined 
the government to insure its permanent triumph. 
He retired from it as soon as possible to his own 
business again, but was soon recalled to administer 
the affairs of state while the military chieftain stood 
as the glorious figurehead of the new stability in 
Chile. 

The new constitution, adopted in 1833 was 
modelled after no particular frame of government 
in any other land. It was written to suit the needs 
of Chile, and especially to give the country a strong 
central government that could enforce law and order. 
It resembled that of the United States in guarantee- 
ing such individual rights as freedom of speech 
and of the press. It also provided for an elec- 
toral college to be used in choosing a president.* 
Its parliamentary system resembled the English, 
with its ministers responsible to the dominant party 
in the lower house. In its local administration it 
followed French principles closely.» Some of its 
features were not to be found in any constitutions 
outside the South American continent. Noteworthy 
among them was the provision that a mixed com- 
mission from the two houses of Congress should be 
in session whenever Congress was adjourned.® There 
was no arrangement for a vice-president. If the 
president died, or was removed, a member of the 


“Constitucién politica de la Republica de Chile, p. 30. 

* Speech of Benjamin Vicufia Mackenna in the Chilean Con- 
gress, July 4, 1864, quoted in D. J. Hunter, Sketch of Chile, 
part 2, page 16. 

°J. Benavente, op. cit., p. 72. 


THE CONSERVATIVES IN CHARGE 45 


cabinet should succeed him, who would then assume 
the title of Vice-President.” Nor could the president 
be tried for any offense during his term of office.® 

The Chilean constitution was a skillful combina- 
tion of presidential power and congressional checks. 
In times of stress, the president was empowered to 
assume extraordinary functions that made him a 
virtual dictator. The vice-president was omitted for 
fear such an official might worry the chief executive. 
Yet the mixed commission to watch him during the 
adjournments of the legislature, and the responsi- 
bility of his minister to the Chamber of Deputies, or 
lower house of Congress, removed the danger of 
one-man rule. Diego Portales, who inspired the 
document, knew that a firm central executive was 
needed in his country, but he had no intention of 
allowing him enough power to become a ruler with- 
out any checks. 

The wildest excitement had prevailed in foreign 
circles in Santiago the night that it was certain that 
Freire had lost Lircai. Crowds surrounded Tagle, 
the puppet president of the time, yelling, “Down with 
the English, the French, and the Americans; long 
live religion and Prieto.’”’® Many Americans had 
fought in Freire’s army, some of them holding high 
commissions. His defeat was gloomy tidings for 
them. The widespread report was that the priest- 
hood had been won to the Prieto cause by a promise 


" Constitucion politica de la Republica de Chile, p. 33. 
*J. Benavente, of. cit., p. 33. 
* Thomas Sutcliffe, Sixteen Vears in Chile and Peru, p. 241, 


46 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


that foreigners would be driven from the country. 
Imprisonment and exile were confidently expected 
by most Americans and Englishmen.?° 

“The Old Spanish party is inaugurating a reign 
of terror,’ wrote John Hamm, the new American 
minister. ‘‘Ecclesiastical influence restrains the press 
and suppresses education. It does not even allow trial 
by jury. Corruption and bribery fill the land. Span- 
iards exiled from other countries have come to Chile 
and hold high offices. The old monarchists are re- 
turned in full force.’’?? This was the manner in which 
the new order was accepted by most of the Ameri- 
cans in Chile. The land-owners had always been 
regarded as hostile to that type of democracy for 
which the United States stood; it was they who had 
wished to exclude American flour from the country 
because it competed with their own products. The 
old estanco men had been fought for five years by 
American commercial interests. Now a commercial 
treaty would have to be negotiated with their old 
opponents. Worst of all was the privileged position 
of the clergy, which resulted from the sudden turn 
of the tide. The new government promptly returned 
to the Church the property which had been seques- 
tered from it during the revolution, with one added 
provision, that primary schools be maintained on it.12 

An ugly situation was not long in developing in 
the Chilean island of Juan Fernandez near by, which 

* Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Hamm to Liv- 
ingston, February 2, 1832. 

* [bid., Hamm to Livingston, July 28, 1833. 

* Barros Arana, Historia jeneral, XV. 15. 


THE CONSERVATIVES IN CHARGE 47 


seemed to bear out the worst fears of the English- 
speaking population. Captain Paddock, of the Ameri- 
can whaler Catherine, became violently insane and 
killed with a jack-knife the governor of the island 
and four other men. The fury of the Chilean mob 
was intense, but officers saved him from mob-law. 
He was given from midnight to five in the morning 
to prepare a plea of insanity, an impossible demand 
on a prisoner so stricken. Paddock then was shot in 
the early morning hours and his body suspended on 
the mole for six hours.1% 

Not long after the execution of the American cap- 
tain, a presidential decree appeared ordering all 
foreigners to make ready for military service. Public 
protest meetings of British and Americans were of 
no avail. The government declared its determination 
to put the law into effect. One Sunday morning for- 
eign residents of Santiago were forced to go to 
military headquarters to be measured and registered, 
and then were ordered to appear at military parade. 
This indignity was not repeated a second time, but it 
seemed that the reported promise to the clergy was 
about to be fulfilled. 

As the excitement died down, however, Americans 
found that most of their fears were groundless. Even 
the clause in the constitution that forbade public 
worship of any but the Roman Catholic faith did 
not prevent the erection of private chapels by Pro- 
testants.** It was soon evident also that the new 


_ Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Hamm to Liv- 
ingston, February 2, 1832. 


* See chapter ix. 


48 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


stable government was able to negotiate a treaty of 
amity and commerce with more dispatch and regu- 
larity than was true of the régimes of past years, 
which had seemed to be so much more cordial toward. 
the United States. 

Diplomatic interchanges shifted back to Santiago 
when Campino left Washington for Mexico. Andrés 
Bello from Venezuela, one of the men whom Hamm 
had in mind in his letter decrying the new order,!® 
was chosen by Portales to represent Chile in the 
negotiations with Minister Hamm. Bello was one 
of the greatest of South American jurists, and ob- 
tained a treaty for Chile that embodied terms which 
the United States had refused to grant to other 
Latin-American nations. 

Three bases were suggested by the United States 
government for the commercial sections of the treaty. 
The first one, and the one preferred in Washington, 
was a reciprocity agreement by which Chile and the 
United States would grant to each other the privi- 
lege of importing into, or exporting from, the ports 
of the other on equal terms. If the latitude of this 
agreement seemed to be too great, a second sugges- 
tion was that the arrangement hold only when ves- 
sels of the foreign country carried the products 
raised in that country itself.1° Shippers of American 
flour, for example, would thus receive the same 

* Bello fled from Venezuela during one of its many revo- 
lutions of the period; see Miguel Luis Amunategui, Vida de 
Don Andrés Bello, p. 362. 


* Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Van Buren to 
Hamm, October 15, 1830. 


THE CONSERVATIVES IN CHARGE 49 


privileges in Chile that local traders did who dealt 
in that commodity. Both of these suggestions were 
based on the hypothesis that Chile had as important 
a trade in American ports as the United States had 
in South American waters. Campino was right; the 
interest was one-sided because Chile had no mer- 
chant marine. The practical effect of either one of 
the two arrangements would have been to give 
Americans all the privileges allowed Chileans them- 
selves in the ports of that Latin republic. 

Bello, accordingly, turned a deaf ear to any but 
the third American suggestion, which was simply to 
agree that the United States would be accorded the 
treatment of a “most favored nation” ; in other words, 
that no foreign nation would receive commercial 
favors not granted to the United States. With reluc- 
tance Hamm consented. But Bello’s next proposition 
threatened for a time to suspend all further nego- 
tiations. For the Chilean spokesman insisted that 
even on this third basis, it must be understood that 
Chile would give its sister republics in Spanish 
America preferential tariff rates not allowed to the 
United States.17 

Treaties had already been made by the northern 
republic with Colombia, Brazil, Mexico, and the 
Central American Federation. In every case, the 
Latin-American negotiator had made an attempt sim- 
ilar to that of Bello, but each time the United States 
had been successful in resisting.18 The very fact that 


* Bello did not include Brazil in his exceptions. 


“Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Van Buren to 
Hamm, October 15, 1830. 


50 CHILE AND THE UNITED STAGES 


such an arrangement had been sought by so many of 
the southern republics showed that there was not the 
idea of kinship among all nations of the New World 
that was being proclaimed so loudly by American 
statesmen. The Spanish Americans seemed to feel 
that a peculiar relationship existed among them which 
was not to be shared by their northern neighbor. 

But Chile had an abler negotiator than its fellows. 
Hamm?’s protests were of no avail. Clause two of the 
treaty gave the required exceptions in favor of the 
other Spanish-American states. The Chilean Con- 
gress went even further than this, and provided in an 
explanatory convention, ratified in 1834, that any 
republics formed in the future from the colonial 
dominion of Spain would also receive the exceptional 
favors.1® 

The theory upon which this was based was unsat- 
isfactory enough for American statesmen. But there 
was also a practical fear. Of course, the whole clause 
was useless if the United States had treaties with 
all the new republics such as Colombia and Mexico 
had signed. But no agreements of any kind existed 
between the northern republic and Peru, Bolivia, or 
the Argentine Confederation. It was Peruvian sugar 
particularly that might be admitted at lower rates 
into Chilean ports under some special arrangement 
foreseen by American merchants.*° This would have 
been a serious blow to American sugar-growers, and 
the developments of the following years proved that 


* Treaties and Conventions of the United States, I. 131. 


* Department of State, Bureau of Archives, McLane to 
Hamm, September 5, 1834. 


THE CONSERVATIVES IN CHARGE. 51 


their fears were well-founded. Within a short time 
negotiations were started by Chile to grant just such 
special favors to the Peruvian sugar-planters.?? 
Bello succeeded in gaining his point because the 
United States needed the treaty in order to protect 
the American community there. Hamm also be- 
lieved that it would help him considerably to have 
the matter out of the way so that he might pursue 
the arduous task of pressing American claims ;?? for 
none of these had yet been allowed and claimants in 
the United States were calling for vigorous action. 
In the religious sections of the treaty the Chilean 
negotiator was far more tractable. Liberty of con- 
science was assured to the citizens of each nation who 
resided in the country of the other. But it was added 
that this would be permitted so long as the foreigners 
obeyed all the laws of the nation. Since the constitu- 
tion adopted the following year”? forbade the public 
worship of any other than the Roman Catholic faith, 
this clause in the treaty did not grant complete free- 
dom of worship. According to another clause, for- 
eigners were to be allowed their own burial-grounds 
and these were not to be molested; thus the ceme- 
teries provided for by O’Higgins were secured. 
Twelve out of the thirty-one articles dealt with 
the question of blockade regulations and contra- 
band of war. The latter was defined in a limited way 
so as to mean only arms and munitions of war. Prize- 


7 Ibid., Pollard to Forsythe, October 14, 1835. 
* Ibid., Hamm to Livingston, May 28, 1832. _ 
* The commercial treaty was drafted in 1832. \ 


52 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


courts alone should judge seizures; the principle that 
free ships make free goods was admitted and the 
flag of either nation protected the ship, its cargo, 
and the non-combatants thereon.** All of these 
clauses had for their purpose the protection of Ameri- 
can vessels from future Chilean seizures. They 
showed what the chief interest of American diplo- 
macy was growing to be. Chile was no more a state 
which might attract a sentimental interest as a sister 
republic with a similar story of independence won 
from a tyrannical mother country. It was rather a 
government that might be made liable for damages 
to insistent American claimants. 

“We have made the error of allowing foreigners 
to help win independence for us,” wrote the corres- 
pondent of a Valparaiso newspaper in 1838. “They 
should be tolerated no longer in government offices 
but Chileans put in their stead.”?> To which El 
Valdiviano Federal of Santiago replied: ‘““We would 
show the basest ingratitude if we were to disown 
our gallant helpers who have done so much for Chile. 
May more of them come!’’?é 

The wish of the Santiago editor was being ful- 
filled without trouble. More of the foreigners were 
coming from England, France, and other countries 
of western Europe, as well as from North America. 

“Tt is interesting to compare the provisions here with the 


Macedonian case that originated in 1820 and is described in 
chapter vi. 


> Thomas Sutcliffe, op. cit., p. vii, quotes El Cura Monardes 
of Santiago, March 1838. 


* Ibid. 


THE CONSERVATIVES IN CHARGE 53 


The esteem with which their country was regarded 
meant a good deal to these immigrants. Chileans 
were quite sensitive to all attempts by a stronger 
nation to impose its will on their own small country. 
Foreign colonies therefore were quick to feel any 
changes that might occur in diplomatic relations. 

As far as Americans were concerned, five years 
of conservative rule relieved their fears of exile or 
imprisonment. But they had to accept the permanent 
triumph of the “Old Spanish Party.”’ It had come to 
stay and opposition was dying fast. In concluding a 
treaty of amity and commerce, the United States had 
again taken a step forward in the course of friendly 
relations that no other power outside of South Amer- 
ica had done. Another link was added to its claim 
that its friendliness should give it a preferred posi- 
tion in Chile. To what extent such diplomatic effort 
would counterbalance the commerce and money of 
England was a question that was to be decided within 
the coming ten or twelve years. 


CHAPTER V 


FACING TOWARD EUROPE 


In the year 1831 Charles Folger, of Nantucket 
Island, loaded the ship Criterion with a cargo for 
South America, part of it being whaling apparatus. 
Storms drove him into Halifax, where he sold his 
damaged ship. The cargo, however, was unsalable; 
and Folger chartered the British ship Trusty, which 
was cleared from Halifax by John Crooks, a British 
citizen, who sailed on it as master of the vessel. Oil 
was obtained with the whaling apparatus off the 
Chilean coast that amounted to ten thousand dollars. 
A mutiny of the British crew, backed by Crooks, 
developed at Talcahuano, where the Trusty stopped 
to buy a new anchor. Folger, fearing for his life, 
appealed to the British consul. This official, on the 
testimony of Crooks and the crew, seized the vessel 
on the ground of illegal navigation and command. 
He claimed that investigation would be made further, 
but that the decision lay exclusively in his hands. 

Excitement ran high in the foreign colonies. The 
incident had brought to a head the growing rivalry 
between British and American interests. Hamm pro- 
tested to the foreign office in Chile that the cargo 
was American and should not be held by Great 
Britain, and referred the whole case to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Chilean courts. 

This last step was, of course, pleasing to the 
Chilean government, which was extremely sensitive 


FACING TOWARD EUROPE 55 


on the question of foreign jurisdiction within its 
territory. It adopted the American view and finally 
induced the stubborn consul to surrender the ship 
to the local authorities. The case was decided in favor 
of Folger and no appeal was made. “It is a great 
victory for American commerce,’ wrote Hamm 
exultantly to his home government. 

But Folger still waited to receive his property. 
Time passed for any appeal to be made and still it 
was not delivered. On calling at the foreign office, 
Hamm was informed that a judge at Valparaiso 
had violated his instructions and the Supreme Court 
would have to give a decision before anything could 
be done. To this the American minister replied that 
Chile would be held responsible for all damages. 
The following day he was gratified to learn that 
orders had been given to deliver ship and cargo to 
Folger. 

British resentment had been particularly aroused 
because the judge had declared that Folger had not 
violated the navigation laws of Great Britain. Con- 
sequently the Portales government issued a procla- 
mation to the effect that it did not sanction the views 
of the jurist in question. The latter had evidently de- 
termined the case on its merits without regard to 
the countries involved. On account of the pressure 
brought by British interests, he was finally forced to 
resign his office. 

Such were the difficulties surrounding the govern- 
ment of a small counry whose commercial interests 


*Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Hamm to Van 
Buren, November 30, 1831. 


56 CHILE AND THE UNITED Stage 


lay in the hands of men from powerful foreign lands. 
The case may have been settled in favor of the 
American, but it was British influence that showed 
its hands so strongly that a judge was forced to step 
down from his chair. 

England’s hold on Chile was becoming more ap- 
parent every year. Recognition was extended in 
1831. In the following year, a conversion of the 
Chilean debt was made with Baring Brothers of 
London that brought an end to unsettled financial 
conditions in the small republic.? In 1836, England’s 
annual trade was valued at four million dollars, 
whereas the commerce of the United States on the 
whole western coast of South America totalled no 
more than twenty-five hundred thousand.* 

The next step in British commercial control was 
to acquire a monopoly in the carrying trade to and 
from Chilean ports. This came as the result of build- 
ing steamboats and, curiously enough, through the 
unparalleled vigor of an enterprising citizen of the 
United States. William Wheelwright, of Newbury- 
port, Massachusetts, was the most famous foreigner 
of the period in Chile. His name stands there for 
railways, steamships, city lighting and water plants, 
and discovery of coal fields. He was one American 
whom Chile honored, and a large statute in Valpa- 
raiso preserves the memory of his work. 

Wheelwright moved to Valparaiso from Guaya- 


? Horace Rumbold, Le Chile, p. 37. 

? Paul Campbell Scarlett, South America and the Pacific, 
p. 300; W. S. Robertson, Hispanic-American Relations With 
the United States, Appendix II. 


FACING TOWARD EUROPE 57 


quil, in Ecuador, when Chile started the deliberate 
effort of aiding its chief port by favorable legisla- 
tion. It was made the capital of a province separate 
from Santiago; special measures to promote its 
development were devised; nowhere else in South 
America was such wise legislation framed to favor 
a commercial city. The American business man 
arrived in 1829, the same year that Andrés Bello 
made Chile his home. 

Wheelwright was interested at the time in the 
coastwise trade of Chile, Peru, and Ecuador. His 
first line of steamboats ran along the mining coast of 
north Chile. One distinctive mark of his career was 
his activity in developing all the places where he 
traded in as many ways as possible. By means of a 
system of iron water-piping, he brought pure drink- 
ing water to Valparaiso and also introduced gas 
lighting there as well as in Copiapé and Callao. At 
many desert places he set up machines for distilling 
drinking water, so that the stations along his shipping 
route became livable. He explored central Chile and 
found coal, saltpeter, borax, and lime. The west 
coast of South America he bettered by means of 
. dikes, ferries, beacons, warehouses, piers, and 
dredges.® 

His steamship project, finally achieved, was to 
extend his line to Panama, where a short railway 
would connect with an Atlantic port. There Euro- 
pean boats could land goods for his ships to carry 

“Isaac Strain, Cordillera and Pampa, p. 17. 


*Juan Bautista Alberdi, La vida y los trabajos de William 
Wheelright en la América del Sud, p. 38. 


58 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


along the Pacific coast. After many years of dis- 
appointment, during which he was considered insane 
by many foreign consuls, he obtained from Chile 
the exclusive privilege of steam navigation along the 
west coast for a period of ten years. By 1836, 
Bolivia and Peru had granted him the same conces- 
sions. Ecuador finally followed suit, but Colombia 
was not interested for some time.® 

As he could not obtain coal at reasonable prices 
from England, he used the south Chilean coal that 
had hitherto been considered valueless. Soon no other 
was used on Chilean railways. A big lighthouse at 
Valparaiso was his next achievement, and he then 
turned his attention to improvements in tariff regu- 
lations and postal laws. 

But the company he formed to give him the finan- 
cial backing necessary for his steamboat enterprises 
was a British concern. He sought capital first in his 
home country, but on account of lack of money or of 
foresight, no American investors could be interested. 
England, however, was seeking a shorter route to 
Australia and instructed its consuls in Peru and 
Chile to examine the best means of connecting the 
British Isles with the west coast. English merchants 
at Callao and Valparaiso approved Wheelwright’s 
plans unanimously and the latter, much encouraged, 
went to London for money. There, in 1840, the 
Pacific Steam Navigation Company was formed.” 
All of Wheelwright’s ships were built in England 


‘Juan Bautista Alberdi, La vida y los trabajos de William 
Wheelright en la América del Sud, p. 249. 


" Ibid., p. 588. 


FACING TOWARD EUROPE ay 


and flew the British flag. In fact, after a time, com- 
plaint was made by South American passengers that 
both the food and the regulations of the ships were 
all made for Englishmen who rarely used them. 
When the ten-year monopoly granted Wheelwright 
expired, the Pacific Steam Navigation Company fol- 
lowed the policy of buying out all competitors. Up 
to 1870 it was the only line that connected Europe or 
North America with the South American west coast. 
Railways began to absorb the attention of Wheel- 
wright as soon as his steamboat line was well estab- 
lished. His first road was opened in 1852 between 
Caldera and Copiap6 in the mining region of the 
north. Its locomotives were from the United States, 
and the Campbell Brothers who planned the work as 
engineers also came from Wheelwright’s native 
land. Another prominent American who was one of 
the early builders of Chile was Henry Meiggs, whose 
genius and energy brought to a successful comple- 
tion the railway between Valparaiso and Santiago, 
after Wheelwright had started it. When a banquet 
held at Llai-Lilai, in 1863, celebrated the ending of 
mule travel between Chile’s two largest cities, these 
four Americans were the guests of honor.’ To their 
country also Chile sent for bridge models and work- 
men to construct the bridges over the Chilean rivers. 
The Maule was the first to be crossed. by a wooden 
bridge made in the United States.° Twelve years 
before the railroad between Santiago and Valparaiso 
changed the whole mode of travel, the monopoly of 


§ Thid., p. 588. 
® Discursos parlamentarios, III. 105, 


60 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


the transit between these two cities was held by the 
American Stagecoach Company, owned and managed 
by B. F. Morse from the northern republic.1° 

Manuel Carvallo, one of the Chilean ministers to 
the United States in the middle of the century, made 
extensive studies of what had been done there in 
the way of agriculture. His reports to his home 
government caused it to send for many agricultural 
implements from the United States, as well as for 
a few experts to further the cultivation of wheat 
in the central part of the country. 

In engineering and scientific matters, then, Ameri- 
can influence was still strong by the middle of the 
century. An astronomical mission from the United 
States came to Chile in 1852 for certain observations, 
where it was welcomed by the government and sold 
many of its instruments. Its mission led to the 
founding of the National Observatory.12 

In other fields, the impression of the United 
States was slight. It was the British who introduced 
new methods in education, when in 1821 James 
Thomson came from across the seas at the invitation 
of O'Higgins to start the Lancasterian school system. 
The country adopted it with enthusiasm at first, but 
after the Director’s removal, interest languished and 
the whole new system was abolished.'% 


* Mrs. G. B. Merwin, Chile through American Spectacles, 
D/3s 
™ Memoria del jefe del gabinete 1848, p. 2. 


“Diego Barros Arana, Un decenio de la historia de Chile, 
II. 406. : 


* Barros /Ardna, Briers jeneral le Chile, XIII. 601. 


FACING TOWARD EUROPE 61 


Chile was dependent on church schools for most 
of the instruction for its young men until 1842, 
when a normal school was opened in Santiago. The 
University of Chile came into existence the follow- 
ing year. Domingo Fausto Sarmiento, a fugitive 
from Argentina who became a prominent statesman 
in Chile, travelled extensively in the United States. 
There he met Horace Mann and was attracted to the 
American school system.'* But his recommendations 
sent to Santiago were not adopted. 

France, Spain, and Italy were the guides in art 
and literature. Spanish plays were given almost ex- 
clusively on the Santiago stage; French novels and 
French paintings were popular; Italian opera com- 
panies began to come to Chile and set the vogue in 
music.1° In culture, then, Chile leaned strongly to- 
ward the Latin countries of the Old World. Even 
in its immigration policy this was shown, when spe- 
cial efforts were made by the government to attract 
European immigrants provided they were of the 
Roman Catholic faith. 

The new Latin-American republic was thus facing 
toward Europe in commerce, in finance, and in the 
arts as well. The same trend was noticeable in the 
realm of diplomacy during the second administra- 
tion of Prieto, when Chile went to war with Peru 
and Bolivia. 


“José Guillermo Guerra, Sarmiento, su vida y sus obras, 
p. 133. 

* Antonio Tfiiquez Vicufia, Historia del periodo revolucio- 
nario de Chile 1848-51, pp. 212-220. 


62 CHILE AND THE UNITED States 


Andrés Santa Cruz, soldier-president of Bolivia, 
had taken advantage of revolutions in Peru, and 
in 1835 made himself head of a confederation be- 
tween the two countries. He then became interested 
in Chilean politics and particularly in the schemes 
of General Freire, who was at that time exiled in 
Peru. He further alarmed the Prieto government 
by adopting commercial measures that would ad- 
vance Peruvian ports at the expense of Valparaiso.7® 
In the winter of 1836 Chile declared war on the 
ambitious chieftain, and Argentina followed the 
next year. 

Threatened by a circle of jealous neighbors, Santa 
Cruz struck quickly. Argentine armies were stopped 
at the Bolivian frontier and by 1838 were in retreat. 
An attempt by Chile to drag Ecuador into the con- 
flict was thwarted; Diego Portales, the prime mover 
of the whole fight against the Confederation, was 
slain by mutinous soldiers in the village of Quillota. 
In the autumn of 1837 an invading army from Chile 
was surrounded in southern Peru and forced to 
make peace at the conqueror’s terms.‘? 

But the Prieto government persisted. The treaty 
signed by its unsuccessful general was repudiated 
and a new army was sent into Peru the next year. 
At the same time Callao was blockaded by the 
Chilean fleet. This meant renewed trouble with mer- 
chant vessels from other nations, but now American 
ships observed the blockade rules, as they had not 


** Strain, op. cit., p. 17. 


* Ramon Sotomayor y Valdes, Chile bajo el gobierno del 
jeneral Joaquin Prieto, II. 188-300. 


FACING TOWARD EUROPE 63 


done in the times of Lord Cochrane. It was England 
and France that ignored them once more. The British 
went so far as to seize for a short period one of the 
Chilean warships in Callao harbor.18 The war ended 
suddenly in 1839, when Chile defeated the armies of 
the Confederation at Yungai and Santa Cruz fled in 
complete rout. His escape to Ecuador on a British 
warship further embittered the Chilean government 
toward England. 

All of these occurrences made the history of at- 
tempted mediation in the war more difficult to under- 
stand from an American viewpoint. Hostilities had 
not yet begun when Santa Cruz suggested the joint 
mediation of England, France, and the United States, 
but Chile rejected it. When news of the death of 
Portales reached Peru, the Confederation again ac- 
cepted American mediation to be effected on board 
a warship of the United States. Once more Chile 
declined. Then when the Chilean army was captured 
in southern Peru, it was under the auspices of Great 
Britain that the treaty was signed. Throughout the 
whole war Chile and Argentina experienced diffi- 
culty in disregarding the insistent appeals of Eng- 
land to make peace. 

After Santa Cruz had escaped with the aid of 
the British navy, England emphasized its disregard 
for Chilean feelings by making a peremptory demand 

* Tbid., III. 428; Department of State, Bureau of Archives, 
Pollard to Forsythe, September 29, 1839. Pollard wrote that 
the British seized the whole Chilean navy, but Sotomayor y 


Valdés, who gives a more extended account, mentions the 
seizure of only one ship. 


64 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


that Chile withdraw its army from Peru. The mat- 
ter was mentioned by Foreign Minister Enrique 
Tocornal to Major Pollard, who followed Hamm 
at the American legation. The Chilean official was 
so outraged at the British attitude that he suggested 
the adoption of a joint policy by American coun- 
tries with reference to such actions on the part of a 
European power.!® Pollard avoided making any 
definite pledge of united action for his country, and 
expressed his opposition to an American league such 
as Tocornal appeared to want. But for the nonce at 
least his mind was set at rest as to Chile’s partiality 
for European powers. 

A few days after this conversation, the celebration 
of Chilean independence was observed at an official 
banquet. Upon his arrival Pollard was astonished to 
find the guest of honor to be the very British captain 
who had seized the Chilean warship in Callao harbor. 
He himself was placed at the other end of the table. 
Pollard sat restlessly during the first course, then 
walked slowly to the President’s chair, turned ab- 
ruptly on his heel and left the room. He would not 
accept the profuse apologies offered him the next 
day. “It confirms what I have said before,” he wrote 
to Washington. “These states have no gratitude. The 
Chileans fawn on those who kick and cuff them 
most.”’?° 

Pollard had made speeches repeatedly in Chile on 
its debt to his country. He had cited its lead in 

” Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Pollard to For- 


sythe, April 10, 1839. 
» Tbid., September 29, 1839. 


FACING TOWARD EUROPE 65 


extending recognition, its determined stand against 
the Holy Alliance, its commercial treaty, its efforts 
to induce Spain to accept the results of the revolu- 
tion.21 But he left in disgust after a six-year stay. 
The power of British gold and British goods out- 
weighed all arguments he might adduce for Amer- 
ican leadership in the affairs of this particular Latin 
republic. 

The ascendancy of Europe became complete with 
the election of Manuel Montt, the first civilian prest- 
dent of Chile. General Bulnes, hero of Yungai, was 
chief executive for ten years after Prieto retired. 
During his administration the trend toward perma- 
nent government by a small ruling clique was evi- 
dent. Presidential appointees held key positions in 
the Chamber of Deputies and directed legislation. 
Montt was head of the Bulnes cabinet. The determi- 
nation of the latter to make his favorite minister 
succeed him seemed almost like dynastic succession. 

“The love of much power causes those administer- 
ing the government to turn their sight from the 
United States and look to European monarchs for 
political guides,’ Pollard had observed in 1836. 
When Montt was inaugurated in 1851, this view 
could have been taken with even more justice. A 
landowning oligarchy whose sympathies were thor- 
oughly European was ruling the country. The charge 

England was the first government to suggest to Spain that 
the latter take this step. Then in 1831 and in 1834 the United 
States made overtures at Madrid on the same matter. Neither 


country was directly instrumental in the final extension of 
recognition. The first Chilean minister went to Spain in 1838. 


66 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


made by Montt’s opponents that he would increase 
the influx of European capital was accepted by him 
without demur. He welcomed it and wanted it to 
stay.2* By the middle of the century in politics as 
in all else, Chile was facing toward Europe. 


“Domingo F. Sarmiento, Don Manuel Montt (pamphlet). 


CHAPTER VI 


DISREGARDING THE UNITED STATES 


“Chile is the only country in which I have travelled 
in Asia, Africa or the two Americas where Amer- 
icans are not loved and Englishmen despised,” wrote 
Captain Isaac Strain, a United States traveller, in 
1849.* Disregarding the bias that his patriotism 
may have caused, his comment on Chile was accurate 
enough and only partly explained by the influences 
that England was able to exert on its own behalf. 

While a European country was asserting its as- 
cendancy in this Latin republic of the New World, 
the United States was finding it ever more difficult 
to preserve the ordinary relations of friendship that 
exist between most nations. The vexatious subject 
of American claims was becoming more pressing as 
each minister failed to make any headway. Long 
after all other powers had reached satisfactory agree- 
ments, the claims of the United States still remained 
in dispute. Diplomacy of all types known was em- 
ployed by American ministers, from the mild art of 
cajolery to the most insolent threats, but the wrong 
note seems to have been sounded at the wrong time. 
In some cases the negotiations were prolonged until 
everyone concerned with the incident had died. The 
claim of the ship Good Return, searched for estanco 
goods in 1832, was settled by an American minister 


* Strain, op. cit., p. 121. 


68 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


who was born two years after the search was made.” 
In the famous Macedonian case that originated in 
1819, a Boston attorney in 1909 was still making 
inquiries as to the proper persons to receive the fund 
which he was empowered to distribute to heirs of the 
claimants.® 

At the time of the inauguration of Manuel Montt, 
the principal claims pending were those which had 
arisen from seizures by Lord Cochrane, and which 
grew out of searches and detentions in Chilean ports. 
Concerning the former class, the reasons offered by 
Chile for the admiral’s actions were based usually 
upon the alleged fact that American captains were 
acting for Spanish merchants in Lima, or else were 
engaged in contraband trading. In regard to the 
other cases, it must be admitted that American mer- 
chants were not always careful of the Chilean port 
laws and the payment of customs duties. On the 
other hand, Chilean officials were apt to search 
American ships without cause; and the methods 
taken in their searches caused delays and depreciation 
of cargo which proved quite serious to the ship- 
owners. 

Two incidents which serve as interesting examples 
of this were the cases of the Franklin and the Good 
Return. A sailor from the latter went ashore at 
Talcahuano and sold some tobacco, an estanco prod- 


2 Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Logan to Fre- 
linghuysen, November 10, 1883. 


‘Tbid., Robert Gardiner to Secretary of State, January 7, 
1909. 


DISREGARDING THE UNITED STATES 69 


uct, not listed in the manifest given the customs au- 
thorities by the captain. In consequence, both ships 
were searched and tobacco was found on them, but 
only in quantities sufficient to supply the needs of 
the sailors, to whom it was as essential as bread. 
The ships were dismantled for five months during 
the search and then released by order of the master 
of the port, ‘“‘no charges having been made.””* 

The outstanding claim of all was that of the Mace- 
doman, a merchant ship which sailed from Boston in 
1818 for a trading voyage to South America with a 
cargo owned by Ellery, Perkins, and other citizens 
of the United States. The Macedonian reached Peru 
and disposed of its goods for $145,000. Of this 
amount sixty thousand dollars was sent by Captain 
Eliphalet Smith to Guamey, where it was placed 
temporarily on a French boat, La Gazelle. Smith fol- 
lowed with the remainder of the money. Lord Coch- 
rane, who was bombarding Callao at the time, seized 
Smith and made him sign over his claim for the 
money in his possession, and sent orders meanwhile 
for the confiscation of the other part held on the 
French vessel. 

The first American minister to make any headway 
with this claim was Major Pollard, who through a 
judicious mixture of blandishments and threats, ob- 
tained an agreement from Chile to pay $104,000 in 
full settlement to the Boston merchants. Both sides 
were satisfied and by 1840 the dispute seemed to 


* Discursos parlamentarios, VI. 458. 


70 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


have reached adjustment.® Then, in 1841, the Boston 
company submitted an entirely new claim. Cochrane 
had seized, through his land forces, another sum of 
money from Captain Smith in 1821. This occurred 
in the valley of Sitana, north of the port of Arica, 
which was not under blockade by the Chilean navy. 
Smith had landed at Arica a cargo that he had 
bought in Canton and had made three hundred per- 
cent profit on all goods sold there. He was going 
north toward Lima when the money was taken from 
him by Colonel Balderrama, who turned it over to 
Cochrane. The latter used it to pay his soldiers. In 
this matter both parties acted irregularly from the 
standpoint of law. Neither went to a prize court to 
place its case there. Cochrane distributed the money 
to his men without any prior condemnation proceed- 
ings. Smith appeared before a magistrate in the town 
of Arequipa, deposed the testimony of three wit- 
nesses, made a few protests to the Chilean govern- 
ment through captains of American men-of-war, and 
then dropped the matter for twenty-five years.® 
Even with these complications, the affair appeared 
to be possible of speedy settlement until Chile ob- 
tained from its representative at Lima certain papers 
purporting to show that Smith had acted as agent for 
two royalist merchants in the Peruvian capital. This 
had been the contention of Prevost at the time of the 
seizure, and it had been based on the report of the 
* John Bassett Moore, History and Digest of International 
Arbitrations to Which the United States Has Been a Party, 


p. 1450. 
® Tbid., p. 1468. 


DISREGARDING THE UNITED STATES 71 


fiscal (procurator) for Peru on that occasion.” Smith 
and Ellery had made a vigorous protest at Washing- 
ton about the commissioner’s attitude, a protest with 
which Secretary Adams sympathized, and Prevost 
was soon recalled. The report of the fiscal, however, 
seems to have been forgotten in all the negotiations 
with Pollard, and was not unearthed until 1842. 

Unfortunately the success of the Whigs in the 
United States brought Mr. Pollard home and sent 
John Pendleton to Chile when matters reached this 
crucial stage. Pendleton believed that the whole 
trouble lay in the fact that the American minister 
had been too timid. Disregarding a word of caution 
from Secretary Daniel Webster, he demanded an 
instant settlement. His tone became so offensive 
finally that Chile made a vigorous protest and Pendle- 
ton went home.® William Crump who succeeded him 
was so excessively polite that nothing whatever was 
done toward a settlement, though Chile expressed 
to Secretary Calhoun, his chief, its appreciation of 
his tact and courtesy. 

Administrations again changed in the United 
States and James K. Polk sent his personal friend, 
Colonel Seth Barton, to Santiago. This old soldier 
started a new wrangle over the Macedonian case; ac- 
cused the city administration of Santiago of stealing 
his carriage horses; tried to arrange for the crew 


"Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Prevost to 
Adams, June 19, 1824. 


* Discursos parlamentarios, I1. 372. 


* Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Barton to Buch- 
anan, August 8, 1848. 


72 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


of an American warship to come from Valparaiso 
to his legation for a visit so as to overawe the police ; 
and finally entered into an uproarious quarrel with 
the archbishop of Santiago over marriage with a 
Chilean girl. He left Chile abruptly in 1849, claiming 
his life to be in danger, and the legation was closed 
for almost a year.*° 

The new minister, Balie Peyton, arrived just be- 
fore the election of Montt.‘! With the Macedomian 
dispute at its height, his hands seemed full enough; 
then a revolt started against the new president. The 
younger politicians had grown restive under the con- 
tinued dominance of the conservative party directed 
by a few powerful families. Through their ministers, 
both Bulnes and Prieto had been able to direct the 
Chamber of Deputies, and through their tremendous 
appointive power, they had been able to control the 
choice of their successors. Even the guarantee of 
freedom of the press was curbed by giving subsidies 
to all those newspapers which favored the govern- 
ment. Only one daily, El Mercurio of Valparaiso, 
was able to exist without them.’? 

A similar situation had been broken up in France 
in 1848 when the Guizot ministry was overthrown 
by a revolution in Paris. The direct effect of this on 
Chile was seen in 1851, as soon as it was known 
that Bulnes had succeeded in securing the election of 


*© See chapter ix. 
" The United States had wanted to send Pendleton again. 


” Diego Barros Arana, Un decenio de la historia de Chile, 
II. 248. 


DISREGARDING THE UNITED STATES 73 


Montt.*? Talcahuano became the center of the revolt, 
and out of a number of generals, José Maria de la 
Cruz became the recognized leader. Bulnes at once 
assumed command of the government forces and at- 
tacked de la Cruz at Longomilla River. A drawn bat- 
tle was the result, but the revolutionary leader agreed 
to accept the election of Montt if amnesty were 
granted to his followers.'* Thus hostilities ended. 
They had lasted less than a year. 

British and French residents had been divided in 
the struggle and many had entered both armies. 
- But Americans were almost a unit for de la Cruz, 
who represented to them a protest against the mon- 
archical trend of Chile’s conservative rulers. Two 
bodies of American volunteers fought in the de la 
Cruz army without pay. For a time, it seemed that 
they might forfeit their lives, but the amnesty pro- 
visions were extended to include them as well as the 
natives.’° The revolution was thus the origin of a 
batch of new claims, coming just as the old ones 
were growing more confused. 

Suddenly an unexpected change took place in all 
the relations between the two countries. Gold was dis- 
covered in California and the new villages that grew 
overnight into large towns, even into cities, had to be 
fed. It proved a golden opportunity for Chilean 
farmers, who now began to export flour to the new 
American state. They knew a prosperity that had 


* Antonio Ifiquez Vicufia, op. cit., p. 290. 

“ Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Peyton to Web- 
ster, December 22, 1851. 

* Ibid. 


74. CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


never been theirs before. Money was borrowed on 
the strength of future exports; with it palatial 
homes were built and speculative enterprises of all 
kinds were started. By 1852 Chile was feeding Cali- 
fornia, and exports had reached the high water mark 
of four million dollars.*® 

The effect on the government’s attitude was soon 
apparent. All bitterness about claims was forgotten; 
the American participation in the revolution was 
overlooked. In 1850 Chile gave notice that it wished 
to terminate the old commercial treaty.17 In two 
years, with Andrés Bello as its representative once 
more, it was considering entrance into a new pact on 
the basis asked by the United States in 1832, to wit, 
that the ships of each nation should have the same 
privileges in the ports of the other as were granted 
to native vessels. No more exceptions for South 
American states were demanded.'* Even a stipula- 
tion by Peyton that additional religious privileges be 
granted Protestants in Chile only retarded negoti- 
ations for a short time. 

But the mushroom prosperity collapsed within five 
years. On the eastern seaboard of the United States 
it was found that kiln-dried flour could pass the 
equator twice without damage. This enabled Amer- 
ican farmers in the east to ship their flour to Cali- 
fornia. Clipper ships were then built in the northern 


© Boletin del ministerio de relaciones exteriores, 1875, p. 575. 

“ Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Barton to Buch- 
anan, April 25, 1848. Barton wrote that Chile had not even 
asked from Spain the exceptions in favor of other American 
states that had been wrung from the United States. 

* Ibid., Peyton to Clayton, May 27, 1850. 


DISKEGARDING THE UNITED STATES 75 


republic that could make the trip from New York 
and Boston to San Francisco more quickly than 
Chilean boats could go from Valparaiso.1® Finally, in 
the west those who failed to find Eldorado turned to 
agriculture, and by 1855 California and Oregon were 
practically feeding themselves. The sudden decline of 
the Chilean trade brought on a serious financial 
panic. Country homes half-built were not finished. 
The bitterness toward Americans, though unfounded 
this time, was more intense than could have been 
caused by any number of diplomatic mistakes. 

But this was only half of the California problem. 
The western gold-fields had been a lodestar for 
Chilean boys. One American traveller reported that 
it seemed to him everyone he met in Valparaiso was 
going to California.*® These Latin youths found the 
pace. of the new country too fast and puzzling for 
them. Few of them succeeded. They were outwitted, 
cheated by an alien government that knew little of 
the legalities, and failing to find sudden wealth 
turned desperadoes. With Mexicans and other Span- 
ish Americans, they formed a considerable colony at 
Chiletown, where they held up immigrants passing 
through to the gold fields and planned any number 
of marauding expeditions. Finally, vigilance com- 
mittees of Americans took the matter in hand and 
with a certain degree of right on their side, burned 
Chiletown.?? 

* Ibid., Bigler to Seward, May 17, 1861. 

* Strain, op. cit., p. 4. 


* Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Starkweather 
to Marcy, May. 29, 1855. 


76 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


The two Chilean consuls in California had no idea 
how to handle the situation. By the time that they 
would reach the places of disturbance, injured Chile- 
ans had either left or were too intimidated to give 
testimony. At home the cry was raised to demand 
large claims from the United States to offset the 
Macedoman and other cases. But data could not be 
obtained. The best that Chile could do was to fur- 
nish facilities for the return of all its wandering 
youths to the home soil.?? 

These events brought a quick end to negotiations 
for a new treaty. Bello now wrote into the draft a 
clause providing for the protection in each country 
of the citizens from the other who were engaged in 
mining. When the treaty was submitted to the United 
States Senate, the mining clause was struck out. On 
its return thus amended, Montt refused to submit it 
again to the Chilean Senate and the whole matter 
dropped.?* Most European nations now had com- 
mercial treaties with Chile, but none could be formed 
by the United States. 

“The press here teems with lampoons against the 
United States,” reported Minister Starkweather in 
1855. “The government can hardly restrain a show 
of hostility. Any politician who says a good word for 
the United States has his fate sealed forthwith. 
There is widespread talk of expelling all Americans 
from Chile.”?* For to bitterness on the part of 

™ Discursos parlamentarios, V1. 45. 

Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Bigler to Cass, 


June 15, 1858. 
*% Tbid., Starkweather to Marcy, May 29, 1855. 


DISREGARDING THE UNITED STATES 77 


private citizens and misunderstandings in official 
quarters, a deep-seated fear of the ambitions of the 
northern colossus was now added. Chile first became 
impressed with the danger of American expansion 
when the United States warred with Mexico in 1846. 
Though an official position of neutrality was care- 
fully kept, the people were loud in sympathy for 
Mexico and the press denounced the powerful in- 
vader of a Spanish-American nation.?® 

A few years afterwards it was discovered that the 
United States was drafting a treaty with Ecuador 
that included a cession of the Galapagos Islands to 
the former. Official Santiago was at once alarmed, 
for this was much nearer to its boundaries than 
Mexico. A delegation was sent to Quito to insist 
upon the exclusion of any such clause. The mission 
was completely successful and the treaty was changed 
to omit the cession.?® Chile felt that its intervention 
alone had prevented further American expansion. 

Nothing provoked such widespread indignation, 
however, and such determined opposition as the ex- 
ploits of William Walker. This American adventurer 
operated from California and descended upon the 
Central American coast to colonize Nicaragua. He 
soon became embroiled in the politics of that region 
and as president of Nicaragua warred with neighbor- 
ing states. Public opinion in the United States was 
divided concerning his aims, and he was allowed for 
a few years to fit out several expeditions from the 


ae Ferrocarril, September 30, 1859; El Mercurio, July 28, 


*® Discursos parlamentarios, V. 277. 


78 ©. CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


northern republic for his private ventures. But Eng- 
land fought him consistently, since he interfered with 
its plans of expansion in British Honduras. Its hos- 
tility, joined to that of the Vanderbilt interests, 
finally broke Walker. He was executed in Nicaragua 
after surrendering to a British naval officer.?* 

The criticisms expressed by the extreme northern 
Whigs in the United States, who saw everything 
from the angle of the slavery question, confirmed 
Chile in its belief that the northern republic had 
officially connived at Walker’s exploits.?8 The direct 
result was a Congress held at Santiago in 1856. All 
Latin-American states were invited to it, but long 
distances and poor transportation cut down the at- 
tendance to delegates from Peru, Chile, and Ecuador 
only. These signed a treaty for the union of the 
Spanish-American republics providing among other 
things that all persons who conducted filibustering 
expeditions from any country were to be treated as 
pirates. Each signatory was to go to the aid of 
another in repelling filibusters from its shores.?® The 
Spanish-American union did not materialize, but the 
treaty registered the dread of American expansion 
that so many republics in South America felt. 


* William O. Scroggs, Filibusters and Financiers, pp. 270- 
276. Vicufia Mackenna claimed in a speech at Cooper Union 
in New York City in 1866 that Walker was captured on a 
Chilean warship. 

7 Scroggs, op. cit., pp. 49-51. The biographer of Walker 
shows clearly that Walker’s aim was not the extension of 
slavery, but mere adventure. 

»” Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Enclosure in 
letter of Astaburuaga to Seward, November 6, 1861. 


DISREGARDING THE UNITED STATES 79 


Meanwhile the Macedonian dispute was shifted to 
Washington, where Manuel Carvallo went to arrange 
for its settlement. All efforts were futile; no sugges- 
tions that he made could be found suitable to the 
Boston merchants who had inherited the claim. Then 
Carvallo married Miss Elizabeth Causten, of Ohio, 
whose father was engaged as an attorney for some 
of the American claimants, and through this kins- 
man the Chilean agent obtained the confidential let- 
ters of Prevost condemning the American case.%° 
When he presented these in triumph at the State De- 
partment, a wrangle followed that closed the door to 
friendly settlement. Carvallo left the United States 
in 1853 denouncing the American attitude. 

Discussions were now resumed in Santiago, where 
finally the Bigler-Urmeneta protocol was signed, sub- 
mitting the claim to arbitration by the King of the 
Belgians. His decision, given in 1858, was distinctly 
a compromise and satisfied both parties. Three-fifths 
of the money in the Sitana seizure was adjudged to 
belong to American citizens; the rest, the property 
of the Peruvian merchants. The seizure of three- 
fifths was unlawful and Chile should pay this amount 
to the American claimants. As the claim was not ad- 
vanced until 1841, interest at six per cent, the legal 
rate in Massachusetts, was due also from that date, 
but not before. 

It was well that one large claim was settled, for 
the following year saw the making of many new 
ones. Young Chileans were by no means satisfied 


* Ibid., Carvallo to Clayton, August 8, 1849. 


80 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


with the de la Cruz agreement of 1851, whereby the 
elder statesmen stayed at the helm. With smothered 
discontent they saw Manuel Montt reélected in 1856, 
but his evident plan to make his favorite minister, 
Antonio Varas, succeed him was too much. If every 
president chose his successor, elections would become 
a farce. Rebellion broke out in 1859 with more 
intensity than ever. 

Again Americans welcomed the revolutionary 
cause and enlisted in the armies against Montt. John 
Bigler, the minister at the time, could scarcely main- 
tain his own neutrality. “If it had not been for the 
direct interference of British warships in 1851, 
Montt would have been overthrown,” he wrote to his 
government. “They may do it again, for Montt has 
favored British interests consistently, giving the 
South Pacific Steamship Company a favorable mail 
contract without previous notification to other diplo- 
mats. He has negotiated recently for a seven million 
dollar loan in London. The present revolution is to 
liberalize the government and prevent monarchy. I 
believe that English and French navies are planning 
to interfere directly. We should not stand for this.”*? 

The conservatives were shaken this time. The 
revolution was quelled, but only after Varas had re- 
nounced all ambitions for the presidency and the gov- 
ernment had shown its favor to Joaquin Pérez, a 
colorless candidate who was not feared by any group. 
The revolutionaries had won a compromise, but 
Montt was not overthrown and reprisals on Amer- 


* Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Bigler to Cass, 
April 15, 1859. 


DISREGARDING THE UNITED STATES 81 


icans who fought against him began at once. Houses 
were entered forcibly; property was confiscated ; 
Americans were thrown into prison. Claims for dam- 
ages from these incidents lasted for half a century 
and threw into confusion a claims convention forty 
years later. 

In this connection, the case of George Cotton was 
typical. He came to Chile just as the revolt of 1851 
started. From all conversations in Talcahuano where 
he stayed, the Cruz movement seemed a fight for 
democracy. The adventurer needed no further excuse 
than this to enter the war and was made paymaster 
for the rebel army. The money he used came from 
the Talcahuano customs house, and after the rebel- 
lion was put down Montt demanded that he make a 
refund. He refused, however, and made the matter 
a subject for diplomatic protest. The American lega- 
tion was ignored in the case, and Cotton was finally 
forced to pay. In 1859 it was not known how active 
he was in fomenting more trouble. But he was seized 
and thrown into prison on suspicion. Drastic meas- 
ures failed to wring any confession from him, but 
only the strongest complaint from Minister Bigler 
prevented his execution. He was finally released, a 
broken man.*” 

Additional trouble at Valparaiso occurred when 
the American Consul, Trevitt, gave shelter to fugi- 
tives of the revolutionary army. He was instructed 
from his home government to release them, but his 
house was entered by the local police before he acted. 


* Ibid., Bigler to Cass, January 31, 1860. 


82 “CHILE AND THE UNITED Sites 


Trevitt gave personal resistance and repelled the in- 
vaders. Later the fugitives were surrendered to the 
city authorities. Secretary Cass readily admitted that 
consulates were not asylums for political refugees. 
But he considered that Trevitt’s rights had not been 
regarded and insisted that his exequatur, which the 
Chilean government had withdrawn, be restored. A 
flat refusal met every demand he made, however, 
and a new consul was finally sent from the northern 
republic. 

The decade of the fifties marked the most bitter 
period, save one, in Chilean-American relations. 
Every claim produced strenuous argument; every 
diplomatic action of the United States in Latin Amer- 
ica caused alarm at Santiago; every internal discord 
in Chile was marked by American enthusiasm for 
the losing cause. Anything like American ascend- 
ancy no longer existed. If only the usual diplomatic 
amenities could be observed, American ministers had 
reason to feel happy. 


CHAPTER VII 


EUROPEAN MENACES AND AMERICAN SENTIMENT 


For forty years or more Chile had been secure 
from external perils. The threat of the Holy Alliance 
in 1823 had been dissipated by the hostility of Eng- 
land and the United States. The fancied fears of 
American aggression had come no nearer to material 
menace than a project to buy islands off the coast of 
Ecuador. The only possible threat from South 
America itself had been the vaulting ambition of 
General Santa Cruz, whose confederation had been 
broken by the power of the Chilean army. 

But by the middle of the century, a new Napoleon 
had come to preside over the destinies of France. 
With the advent of the ’sixties, this nephew of 
the man who first caused Chile to rebel against Euro- 
pean rule began to look greedily at the domain Spain 
had lost. The incessant revolutions in the republic 
of Mexico had plunged that unlucky land into a 
morass of debts impossible to pay. Its largest credi- 
tors were in England, France, and Spain, and in 
1862 these nations sent warships to enforce collec- 
tion. With the fleet, Napoleon dispatched an army 
that was destined to found another European mon- 
archy in the New World. Ina short time, Maximilian 
of Austria was declared Emperor of Mexico. 

This unexpected act of France had been preceded 
by a return of the Spanish monarchy to a Caribbean 
island. The petty Dominican Republic had been in 


84 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


constant revolution since it became independent of 
Spain. These conditions were followed by even un- 
happier ones when the Negro state of Haiti on the 
western end of the island extended its sway over the 
inhabitants to the eastward. After many years of 
African domination, the Dominican Republic had 
again freed itself and now voted to be taken under 
Spanish protection. Its invitation was promptly ac- 
cepted at Madrid and another European country had 
regained territory in the new world. 

The fear of American aggression was suddenly 
forgotten in Chile in face of these renewed menaces 
from overseas. The claim that all republican nations 
of the New World were bound by kindred aims and 
ideals had heretofore fallen on deaf ears when diplo- 
mats from the United States had proclaimed them. 
When Pollard asked in 1835 why his country could 
not be taken into the family of American nations 
with reference to dispensing commercial favors, he 
was told that a common heritage and a common 
poverty brought the Latin countries on the western 
continent together in a kinship that the United States 
could not share.? 

But an entirely new note was now to be heard in 
the parliament and press of Chile. “This paper has 
always pointed out the difference between despotic 
and monarchical Europe and republican America,” 
wrote Manuel Matta in the Voz de Chile. “Yankee 
diplomacy, which we today salute by that name, 


Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Pollard to For- 
sythe, May 12, 1835. 


EUROPE AND AMERICA 85 


should preside over and preponderate in the councils 
of American governments and people.”? ‘Europe 
offers Austria a slice of the New World for Venice,” 
said Ambrosio Montt in the Chamber of Deputies in 
1862. ““We are weak and can only protest this, but 
we can never applaud it. Republicanism in America 
is difficult but monarchy is impossible. Were this 
giant [the United States] not compelled to suffocate 
its internal rebellion, I feel certain that Napoleon 
would not be near Mexico.’ 

For the southern states of the northern republic 
had just begun at that time their own struggle for 
independence. It was believed confidently in Chile 
that the United States would have shown active op- 
position to all of these European movements, had 
it been unoccupied at home. An ingenuous theory 
was soon adopted that only the men south of Mason 
and Dixon’s line had ever desired to gain territory 
at the expense of their Latin neighbors. “A reaction 
has come in favor of the United States,” wrote the 
semi-official Ferrocarril in 1862, a paper that had 
led in condemning the northern republic a few years 
before. “What has caused this reaction? There were 
two heterogeneous elements fighting for control in 
the United States and all of the absorbing tendencies 
were to be found in the south. We now see that if 
this nation did not possess a large enough army to 
quell a rebellion, or a strong enough navy to blockade 


*Voz de Chile, May 20, 1863. 


*Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Enclosure in 
Nelson to Seward, June 26, 1862. 


86 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


the southern coast, it must not have been planning 
the war we thought it was on South America.”* 

It was easy enough for Chileans to believe this, 
for most of the Americans who had come to their 
country in the past years had been New England 
traders. Their idea of the big republic had been 
gained almost entirely from men of the northern 
states. Likewise, such a theory allowed all those who 
formerly feared the colossus to be consistent, now 
that their dislike had changed to enthusiasm. Thomas 
Nelson, the minister of the Lincoln administration, 
became quickly popular; Chile applauded when Rus- 
sia sent a warship to New York City, presumably to 
defy French intervention in favor of the South; it 
celebrated the fall of South Carolina before the army 
of Sherman and the surrender of Lee at Appomattox. 

But the practical test of the new theory was soon 
to come. The European menace moved nearer and 
Chile itself was involved in war. In 1864, as the War 
for Southern Independence was drawing to a close in 
the United States, a small fleet sailed from Spain to 
the eastern Pacific supposedly on a scientific expedi- 
tion. It had no sooner reached Peruvian waters than 
it abandoned its guise of explorer and seized in the 
name of the Queen of Spain the Chincha Islands 
with their valuable guano deposits. Two reasons 
were given for the action, that Peru still owed the 
citizens of Her Majesty for damages incurred in its 
war for freedom, and that Spain had never recog- 


* El Ferrocarril, April 30, 1862. 


EUROPE AND AMERICA 87 


nized the Peruvian republic anyway.® Commissioners 
then came from Madrid to Lima to settle the dispute 
and claimed that they had to leave the country hur- 
tiedly to escape assassination. This determined Spain 
to retain the islands, and more ships were sent to 
hold them. 

The anomalous part of the situation was that no 
declaration of war had been made by either nation. 
Peru rejected an offer of Spain that the islands be 
abandoned if the government at Lima consented to 
pay three million dollars. It followed this by passing 
in the Chamber of Deputies a resolution that all 
Spanish aggression would be resisted by force. But 
no attack was made on the Spanish fleet since a Con- 
gress of South American states then in session at 
Lima was hoping to avert hostilities. 

Chile assumed at once an attitude of official neu- 
trality but made no attempt to restrain its masses 
from popular demonstrations against Spain. A body 
of volunteers sailed from Valparaiso in the steamer 
Dart and landed at Peru to help fight the European 
monarchy. Chile claimed that it had no reason to 
stop them as no state of war actually existed. It re- 
fused to muzzle the anti-Spanish papers, because 
freedom of the press was guaranteed in the constitu- 
tion. It placed a contraband on Chilean coal for the 
use of warships when Spain tried to obtain fuel at 
_ Valparaiso because a state of war did exist de facto, 
if not de jure; yet it permitted horses to be sent to 


* The second reason was later repudiated at Madrid. 


88 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


Peru in large droves because it was only a maritime 
conflict.® 

A vigorous Spanish protest was made at Santiago 
and explanations were given for all charges pre- 
ferred by the Spanish minister. He said that he was 
fully satisfied and it seemed no trouble would arise. 
Suddenly a fleet appeared in the harbor of Valpa- 
raiso, bringing an admiral of the Spanish navy to re- 
place Minister Taveira in all negotiations. The latter 
was at once repudiated and Spain soon declared war 
on Chile. 

It was an unusual sort of war. Peru did not enter 
until the next year, although its troubles had been 
the origin of the struggle. Ecuador and Bolivia then 
joined and Spain was faced by a hostile alliance. It 
seemed that a bloody combat was sure to follow, but 
though the war dragged on for six years, there were 
few encounters and the loss of life was negligible. 

The European monarchy had concentrated its 
naval strength in the war area and promptly declared 
the whole Chilean coast under blockade. This was not 
possible to sustain and finally was reduced to Val- 
paraiso alone. Meanwhile, Chile’s small navy had 
scored when the Esmeralda captured the Spanish 
Covadonga and brought it triumphantly home to be 
turned into a Chilean warship. This victory was fol- 
lowed by the entrance of the other allies and soon 
afterwards the unhappy Spanish Admiral Pareja 

* Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Nelson to Seward, 
March 31, 1865; Counter-manifest of the Minister of Foreign 


Affairs of Chile on the Present War between that Republic and 
Spain, 1866. 


EUROPE AND AMERICA 89 


committed suicide when he saw his whole campaign 
failing. He was succeeded by the fiery Méndez 
Ntifiez, who moved at once to bombard Valparaiso. 

The war was now passing into its third year as 
Méndez Nujfiez threatened the first serious action 
that had been taken. In the beginning it was expected 
by most Chileans that active aid would be obtained 
in the United States as soon as the southern states 
of that republic had been disarmed. But the enthusi- 
astic ideas of the early ’sixties in regard to the atti- 
tude of the northern states were due to undergo 
revision. 

Disillusionment had first come in the matter of 
claims before the Spanish war began. Chile had been 
led to believe that the Lincoln government would 
cancel all the outstanding ones and had rejected every 
effort of the Buchanan administration to reach a so- 
lution of any of them.’ When the popular Mr. Nel- 
son presented them in the midst of all the acclama- 
tions of sympathy for Lincoln’s cause, there was 
occasion for some pause in the wave of enthusiasm 
that had been sweeping the country. 

The next rebuff was the refusal of the northern 
republic to attend the Congress held at Lima, in 
1864, to discuss the new European dangers. There 
had been no reason, in fact, to expect that the United 
States would depart from its traditional policy of 
joining in no foreign wars; but the idea that the 
northern states had always had political views en- 


"Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Bigler to Cass, 
April 30, 1860. 


90 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


tirely opposed to those that had governed the nation 
before 1860 had taken possession of the Chilean 
mind in a way that was difficult to fathom. With 
utter astonishment and dismay the Chileans heard the 
Johnson administration proclaim a neutrality as com- 
plete as that uttered by Madison and Monroe. 

Benjamin Vicufia Mackenna was sent to the 
northern republic to arouse sentiment in favor of 
Chile. An added duty fell to him after his arrival, 
that of buying warships. His first surprise came 
when he failed to sway the American press. “I wrote 
them,” he reported, “to request that they make some 
statement urging their country to join Chile in this 
common struggle against European monarchy. In 
nearly ever paper there appeared editorials next 
morning on the subject of ‘no entangling alliances’. 
They do not seem to go deeply into any political mat- 
ter. Generally there is a partiality for Chile because 
it is another republic, but there is no conception of 
the real issues involved in the war.’’® 

Further disappointment awaited him when the 
purchase of warships was attempted. Negotiations 
had been opened between the United States and Eng- 
land in regard to the Alabama affair. It would not 
have been seemly for the complainants to permit 
their own citizens to fit out Chilean Alabamas to 
fight Spain. Vicufia-Mackenna was rebuked sharply 
for recruiting members of the former Confederate 
army for his country and for employing southerners 


* Benjamin Vicufia Mackenna, Diez meses de misién & los 
Estados Unidos de Norte América, p. 249. 


EUROPE AND AMERICA 91 


to guard the ships which he planned to send from 
New York harbor. At one time he was arrested for 
violating the neutrality laws. That the Chilean emis- 
sary returned home in bitterness of spirit is not sur- 
prising. 

His book describing his adventures in the United 
States gives the first detailed Chilean account of 
American life taken from actual observation. He was 
impressed by the fact that all the people smoked and 
put their feet up on the table when they talked to him. 
To be arrested in the United States, he remarked, 
was as common as eating breakfast. The most con- 
stant word that the Americans used was humbug. 
Sunday observance was acclaimed everywhere but 
was nothing but humbug. So likewise was the Mon- 
roe Doctrine. “It is simply used in times of election,” 
he wrote. “As an international question, it is only a 
strategem . . . to acquire prestige among weak na- 
tions of America. . . . All Chile expected help from 
its big brother, but as a neutral, it really helped Spain 
who needed no aid, where Chile needed all.’’® 

The last vain hope was dispelled when the bom- 
bardment of Valparaiso was put into effect. A short 
time prior to this incident, another change of Amer- 
ican ministers took place at Santiago which brought 
some confusion. Thomas Nelson had taken such a 
partisan attitude on behalf of Chile that he had kept 
its people in high hope of American intervention. 
The Spaniards felt that his influence had done more 
than any other thing to cause Chile to reject all com- 


"ibid., p. 211. 


92 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


promises. His attitude seems to have met with full 
approval at Washington, if it were indeed under- 
stood. But a resolution of the United States Con- 
gress had asked that former generals in the war 
against the southern states be rewarded for their 
services. General Judson Kilpatrick was accordingly 
sent to Santiago and the unwilling Mr. Nelson had 
to leave. 

Kilpatrick preserved a much more correct position 
of neutrality for his country, but made valiant efforts 
to stop the bombardment when Méndez Ntifiez gave 
notice of his intention to carry it into effect. Through 
him the Spanish admiral submitted his terms to 
Chile, demanding that his flag be saluted first by the 
warships of the republic. Chile declined to consider 
such a proposal and suggested in return a naval duel 
to be held in the open seas between an equal number 
of ships, with the American Commodore Rodgers as 
umpire.’® Its result would determine the outcome of 
the war. So relatively minor were the matters in dis- 
pute between the two nations that it seems surpris- 
ing that no agreement could be reached; but the 
sensitive pride of each prevented any yielding. 

With the knowledge that he could effect no direct 
settlement, Kilpatrick then called together the diplo- 
matic corps. Again he failed because the British 
and French refused to cooperate in averting the 
bombardment. The American minister did not be- 
lieve that it would be wise to take upon himself the 

* Pedro de Novo i Colson, Historia de la guerra de Espana 


en el Pacifico, quoting a letter from Vicente Villalon to Ad- 
miral Méndez Nunez, p. 304, note. 


EUROPE AND AMERICA 93 


whole responsibility of checking the Spaniard, and 
accordingly the naval vessels of the United States 
left the harbor on the morning that the firing 
began.14 

The bombardment of Valparaiso was the only 
serious incident in a war that soon stopped from 
sheer inertia. Toward the end of 1866 the Spanish 
fleet sailed back to Europe after a repulse at Callao 
by the Peruvian squadron. The Chilean government 
was interpellated in Congress as to whether a state 
of war still existed,!? yet four years more were to 
pass before even an armistice could be signed. The 
contest was now shifted to the arena of diplomacy, 
and the interest, to the rivalry between England and 
France on one side and the United States on the 
other. 

In January, 1867, the two European nations 
brought forward a project for an indefinite truce. 
After all it was these neutrals who had suffered most 
in the war. Their trade had been stopped by the 
Spanish blockade regulations ; their houses along the 
Valparaiso wharves had been damaged by the Span- 
ish guns; the uncertainty for four years more was 
to keep their commerce from its legitimate growth. 
More than that, the prestige of settling a war in 
South America would redound to their credit and 
work against the influence of the United States 
which the close of its internal struggle had enhanced. 


“Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Kilpatrick to 
Seward, April 16, 1866. 


“El Ferrocarril, October 25, 1867. 


94 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


The northern republic, on its part, soon followed 
suit with a suggestion that an armistice be signed 
that would immediately precede a conference at 
Washington. This offer, Chile soon saw, was not as 
satisfactory as the European. For in it one of the 
two sensitive belligerents would have to suggest the 
armistice and no one guaranteed that it would be 
kept. Bolivia and Ecuador agreed that these were 
valid objections and that the Franco-British proposi- 
tion was distinctly the better of the two.'* 

All attempts at mediation of any sort were held up 
until the close of 1868 because of the war spirit in 
the belligerent countries. Chile demanded revenge for 
Valparaiso and President Pérez was roundly con- 
demned for lack of vigor in prosecuting the war. 
Trade with Spain was banned on all the wast coast. 
But Ecuador was determined to bring the whole 
matter to some conclusion. Unlike its allies, it de- 
pended chiefly on Spanish commerce for its pros- 
perity. Its insistence won and all countries were 
persuaded to come to an agreement whereby trade 
with Spain might be reopened. 

The two offers were still pending, with the Amer- 
ican the less satisfactory. But the remembrance of 
recent menaces from all of western Europe was yet 
deep in South American minds. It was agreed at 
Lima in 1869 to accept the American offer, provided 
that a guarantee of the armistice be given by the 
United States.1* This was a triumph for the di- 


48 Viemoria del ministerio de relaciones exteriores de Chile, 
1869, p. 9. 
o BDI. es Op) Ds 


EUROPE AND AMERICA 95 


plomacy of the northern republic and showed that it 
held a prestige which its consistent neutrality had 
not destroyed. The Franco-British offer was not 
considered seriously at any time; the American pro- 
posal was simply amended to meet South American 
desires. This was a far cry from the times of Santa 
Cruz when England was the only country that could 
force Chile to listen to offers of peace.1® 

“We have no desire to be a regulator nor to enter 
into alliances with any power,” Seward wrote Kil- 
patrick in 1866. “Peace is the unwavering policy of 
the United States. On the other hand, we maintain 
and insist with all the decision that is compatible 
with our existing neutrality that the republican sys- 
tem which is accepted by the people in any of the 
South American states shall not be subverted by 
European powers. We concede to every nation the 
right to make peace or war for other than political 
ambitions as it thinks right or wise.’”!® 

Such was the policy of the United States in the 
beginning of its history as a mediator. The Wash- 
ington conference, held up again by a Bolivian revo- 
lution, sat in the spring of 1871 and signed an in- 
definite armistice. Chile still asked for reparations 
and no definite treaty of peace could be concluded. 
American suggestions brought an agreement to the 
effect that peace be made separately by each of the 
Allied powers. Chile did not ratify its treaty with 
Spain until 1884. 

* See chapter v. 


* Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Seward to Kil- 
patrick, June 2, 1866. 


96 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


The prestige thus gained by the United States was 
increased even more through the heroism of Dr. 
Thomas Root, who followed General Kilpatrick in 
the American legation at Santiago. As a physician he 
acted promptly in the smallpox scourge that struck 
the city in 1872. The sanitary measures that he rec- 
ommended were generally adopted in the municipal 
hospitals. He also gave free treatment to numbers 
who did not like those institutions. Others were in 
charge of young Chilean doctors who acted under 
his direction. He was finally stricken with the disease, 
himself, but from his bedside still instructed his 
protégés in their work.!? 

When the United States replaced him with another 
war hero who needed a position, Chileans regretted 
his departure as they never before had regretted that 
of any American diplomat. A street was named in 
his honor and ovations were given him as he left. 
The northern colossus had reached the summit of its 
prestige in the hearts and minds of the Chilean 
people at the time when the war clouds of their 
greatest international struggle were beginning to 
gather. 


* Tbhid., Root to Fish, September 9, 1872. 


CuaptTer VIII 


THE EMERGENCE OF TACNA-ARICA 


The war with Spain had been useless and foolish, 
for sensitive pride alone stood in the way of a solu- 
tion. The War of the Pacific that raged ten years 
later along the west coast of South America belonged 
in quite another category. Three countries sacrificed 
the lives of thousands of their citizens in order to 
possess the rich nitrate fields that lay on their com- 
mon borders. The victor would gain a source of 
revenue that insured a steady income to its govern- 
ment, and thus taxes would be reduced; the loser 
would be forced to seek other measures for raising 
money and would remain a poor country. This, and 
this only, was the basis of a four year war, one 
of the bloodiest in South American history. 

It had been agreed by the nations that had freed 
themselves from Spain in the early part of the cen- 
tury that the colonial frontiers of 1810 should re- 
main the boundaries of the new countries. Since 
Spain had drawn many of those loosely, the agree- 
ment paved the way for many international quarrels, 
but none of them became serious until the disputed 
provinces proved to hold riches concealed in their 
soil. No better example of this could be found than 
in the province of Antofagasta claimed by both 
Bolivia and Chile. 

The southern boundary of Antofagasta touched 
Chile at the 25th parallel and the disputed region 


98 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


extended northward to the 23rd. This was Bolivia’s 
only outlet to the sea. Further north, extending for 
two more parallels, was the Peruvian district of Ta- 
rapaca. In these territories were to be found most of 
the nitrate fields that are yet known to the world. 
Arica and Tacna, two other provinces of Peru, were 
directly north of Tarapaca. It was along this coast 
of six parallel lengths that the War of the Pacific 
raged. 

Bolivia had had the ill luck to be ruled by a num- 
ber of buffoon presidents who had entered into ar- 
rangements that the people did not understand. In 
1866, when it joined Chile to fight Spain, the two 
countries agreed to hold Antofagasta under a sort 
of dual ownership whereby they would divide equally 
the export taxes of the province. Bolivia adminis- 
tered the upper half, and Chile the lower. Chilean 
business men, backed by British capital, then pushed 
into the nitrate fields of the entire region and estab- 
lished oficinas (plants)! throughout the Bolivian 
sphere. An additional treaty was therefore signed in 
1874, providing that duties on the export of nitrates 
would never be raised.” 

Meanwhile the enterprising Chileans had pushed 
even further and were working the nitrates of Tara- 
paca. Revolutions had plunged Peru so deeply into 
debt that in 1873 all of the products of its rich nitrate 
province were made a state monopoly. Later all 


*This term applies either to the mines themselves or to the 
offices and buildings connected with the business. 


* The Case of Peru in the Matter of the Controversy Arising 
out of the Question of the Pacific, Appendix, p. 6. 


EMERGENCE OF TACNA-ARICA O98 


mineral deposits in that region were mortgaged to 
European purchasers of Peruvian government bonds. 
Foreseeing trouble with Chile, whose nationals in 
Tarapaca had received scant consideration in these 
manoeuvers, Peru made a secret alliance with Bolivia 
in 1873 that provided for military assistance on the 
part of either country if the other were attacked by a 
third.? 

The fire that was thus laid broke into flames in 
1878, when the Bolivian Congress ratified a conces- 
sion given four years before to a Chilean nitrate 
company. For the ratification was made on condi- 
tion that the concern pay an additional tax, based 
on its exports, to the Bolivian treasury. When it 
refused, its property was confiscated.* At once Chile 
declared war. Its armies had hardly left for the dis- 
puted area when Peru attempted mediation. This 
was answered by an inquiry into the pact of 1873. 
When the envoys from Lima failed to explain the 
treaty satisfactorily, Chile also declared war on Peru 

From a military standpoint the allies were seem- 
ingly at a great advantage. The Peruvian army alone 
was double the size of the force that Chile could 
muster. But French officers had trained the soldiers 
of the latter to an efficiency not known in the other 


*Tbid., p. 34. Peru claims that another reason for the secret 
treaty was that Chile was trying to induce Bolivia to join in 
an attack on Tarapaca. Then Antofagasta would go to Chile 
and the captured province to Bolivia. The treaty of 1873 pre- 
vented this agreement. 

“Ibid., p. 45. Bolivia contended that this was a private ar- 
Cae with one company and did not break the treaty of 

4, 


100 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


two countries. Chile struck quickly before the allies 
could unite, and in two months its armies were at the 
frontiers of Peru. 

Again foreign interests were injured, especially in 
the mining region, and trade with the entire west 
coast was also thrown into confusion. American com- 
merce had not advanced with the years ; it was chiefly 
the European that suffered. Consequently the efforts 
to close the war would logically emanate from 
Europe, unless American diplomacy opposed foreign 
intervention as it had done a decade before. England, 
France, and Germany began almost immediately to 
seek a solution and invitations were sent to the 
United States to join, but the Hayes administration 
refused all overtures from abroad and set itself 
rigidly against European interference.® In this way 
the northern republic assumed the whole burden of 
bringing the struggle to a close. If it failed, the 
combatants must fight on until one side or the other 
sued for peace. Mediation in the Spanish war had 
been difficult but always possible, since the actual 
suffering was slight. But hatreds had been aroused 
in the War of the Pacific that made a peace-maker’s 
lot unenviable. The settlement of a war of this sort 
was as delicate a situation as American diplomacy 
had ever handled. Everything depended on the char- 
acter of its ministers, who should have been men 
trained and skilled in international law. 


"Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Acting Secretary 
Seward to Pettis, August 18, 1879. 


EMERGENCE OF TACNA-ARICA 101 


Yet even if the Department of State had been dis- 
posed to send representatives of this type, its hands 
were practically tied. The southern republics of the 
New World had always been regarded as places 
whither American politicians of small caliber might 
be sent when they deserved reward for party serv- 
ices.° Consequently to the war area where American 
prestige was at stake as it had never been before in 
this continent, went incompetent men who had no ex- 
perience in the delicate matters which they would be 
forced to handle. Desirous of obtaining personal 
reputation that would assure them permanent berths 
in diplomatic work, they each became jealous of any 
progress another minister might luckily make. In- 
stead of cooperating to obtain the prestige that their 
country desired, they quarrelled with one another 
until their rivalries became notorious. American 
mediation was doomed from the start, on account 
of the type of men that the United States employed. 

The first serious trial of mediation was made at 
Arica in 1880 by the appointees of Rutherford B. 
Hayes. It had been preceded by an abortive mission 
of Judge Newton Pettis, the minister to Bolivia, who 
had gone to Santiago, though not instructed to do 
so, and had found that Chile was unwilling to give 
up any part of its conquests. This self-imposed mis- 
sion was characterized by Secretary Evarts as “un- 

* Ibid., Logan to Frelinghuysen, September 13, 1883, in which 
is contained a good description of some of the trials that meet 
the American diplomat and now he tries to secure enough money 


= last him for some time. This is partly quoted in Chapter xi, 
elow. 


102 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


authorized and rash,” but Pettis was congratulated 
for sounding out the terms of a possible peace.” 

The Arica conferences were initiated by Judge 
Isaac Christiancy, accredited to Peru. He claimed to 
have read an official dispatch from Chile that had 
been intercepted by Peruvian soldiers, to the effect 
that the victorious southern nation was ready for 
peace. Fearing that Europe might forestall him, he 
followed the footsteps of Pettis and visited Santiago 
in August of 1880. Under instructions from home, 
his colleague there, Thomas Osborn, had been care- 
fully working his way toward preparing Chile for 
peace. He was now reluctantly forced to introduce 
another visitor to the foreign office when he knew 
that the time was not ripe.® 

War spirit was then at its height in the country. 
All Antofagasta had been cleared of the Bolivians 
and Peru had been driven from Tarapaca. Chile held 
the richest nitrate fields of the world in military oc- 
cupation, and the demand that conquests be kept was 
made by all parties in the nation. On the other hand, 
the allies had not yet been demoralized. There was 
still determination at Lima and La Paz to recover 
the lost provinces. 

At Santiago Judge Christiancy was informed that 
the cession of these rich territories would have to be 
made the basis of peace ; but for unexplained reasons 
the American envoy seemed to understand that Chile 


"Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Evarts to Pettis, 
September 19, 1879. 

* Ibid., Osborn to Evarts, September 2, 1880. Osborn writes: 
“Mr. Christiancy has come and gone. What he could have ex- 
pected to accomplished here passes my comprehension.” 


EMERGENCE OF TACNA-ARICA 103 


would not insist upon this. Excitement ran high in 
the nation in regard to the Christiancy mission, and 
to quiet the war party who had complained more 
than once that the government was too ready for 
peace, Foreign Minister Huneeus publicly denied that 
any mediation had been accepted. This was true, 
inasmuch as all the conversations had been unofficial. 
Christiancy, however, wrote to the commander of 
the Chilean army that was marching toward Lima 
and asked him to suspend operations since his gov- 
ernment had consented to talk peace. His letter found 
its way to the press and a cabinet crisis at Santiago 
resulted.® Chile nevertheless accepted mediation in 
October, but entered the conference disgusted at the 
way negotiations had been conducted. 

As Christiancy did not expect Chile to insist upon 
cession of territory, he obtained the acceptance of 
Peru without any mention of this demand by its 
enemy, a body of whose troops had landed mean- 
while in northern Peru and made a destructive raid. 
“We accept the American offer,” wrote Foreign Min- 
ister Barinaga to Christiancy, “out of deference to 
the United States, but we feel that the Chilean in- 
vasion would justify our refusal.”!° Thus a second 
belligerent unwillingly agreed to talk peace. 

Charles Adams, who succeeded Judge Pettis at La 
Paz, was questioned as to the steps that would be 
taken if the negotiators could not reach an agree- 
ment. He assured the Bolivians that the United 


* Ibid., Barinaga to Christiancy, November 22, 1880. 
” Ibid., Barinaga to Christiancy, September 14, 1880. 


104 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


States would urge arbitration in that case, and wrote 
Osborn that he had made such a promise. When he 
received no answer from Santiago, he assumed that 
Chile understood this and permitted Bolivia to enter 
with an expectation that its enemy would be per- 
suaded to arbitrate. 

In this atmosphere of distrust and misunderstand- 
ing the conferences opened on board an American 
warship in the port of Arica. Osborn, as chairman, 
disappointed his colleagues by taking the position that 
the United States was there merely to act in the role 
of presiding officer and would take no part in the dis- 
cussions, not even consenting to be arbiter if asked 
to do so. Chile at once presented the demands for 
cession of conquered territory; otherwise it refused 
to consider peace. But the allies would not listen to 
this, and negotiations proceeded no further. Thus the 
Arica conference failed because there had been no 
careful preparation in advance by the representatives 
of the mediating power. Each one had acted for him- 
self and distrusted his colleague."} 

Chile had never ceased military operations. In the 
summer before the futile peace conference was held, 
Peruvians had been disastrously routed at Tacna, and 
the port of Arica after long resistance surrendered to 

“ Even after the conference was over, the ministers quarreled 
about the message to be sent to Washington announcing failure, 
Osborn refused to wire that Chile had rejected American arbi- 
tration. Christiancy hesitated for a time about sending his own 


cablegram including this statement, and did so only when the 
Peruvian government agreed to pay for dispatching it. 


EMERGENCE OF TACNA-ARICA 105 


Chilean armies.!2 The navy of Chile now held undis- 
puted control of the coast and after a six months’ 
blockade, Callao fell on December 6. An expedi- 
tionary force under Patricio Lynch then entered 
Lima early in 1881, Piérola, the president of Peru, 
having fled to Arequipa. With the conquered nation 
on the brink of anarchy, Chile turned its attention to 
establishing a government there which would agree 
to ceding Tarapaca. Soon one was formed under 
Francisco Garcia Calderén, who was thought to be 
in complete understanding with the invaders, and a 
Congress was allowed to meet at a village near Lima 
to represent the will of the Peruvian voters. 

It was difficult to believe that the new leader was 
the spontaneous choice of his countrymen, and Chris- 
tiancy was instructed to determine this before he ex- 
tended recognition. European countries were waiting 
for him to take the initiative, but he decided that 
there was nothing to show that such a step should be 
made. In the meantime President Garfield had been 
inaugurated in Washington and a new minister was 
waiting to come. As Judge Christiancy did not wish 
the incoming administration to feel that he was re- 
luctant to leave, he suddenly changed his mind. Be- 
fore even Chile had recognized the new government, 
he presented his credentials to Garcia Calderén.!% 
This act, prompted by such an unusual reason, was 


“This caused a protest from the Peruvian delegation as to 
meeting in Arica; but they consented when Chile insisted. 


* Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Christiancy to 
Blaine, June 28, 1881. 


106 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


due to involve the United States in the gravest diffi- 
culties. 

Garfield brought to the Department of State his 
close friend, James G. Blaine, a man deeply inter- 
ested in South American affairs. Blaine was con- 
cerned with the growth of American trade in the 
New World and determined to build it up in a way 
that would rival that of the European powers. As an 
aid in attaining his goal, he adopted the plan of a 
sort of union of American republics, which was to 
be headed by the United States and would preserve 
peace in all the western hemisphere.!* Since the prob- 
lems created by the War of the Pacific stood in his 
way, his first energies were bent toward their definite 
solution. 

Blaine believed firmly that the New World repub- 
| lics should renounce from the start the European 
idea of gaining territory by conquest. His instruc- 
tions to the new ministers who were now sent from 
Washington to the warring countries in the south 
were, that all persuasions and influence possible should 
be brought to bear upon Chile to take money instead 
of land. He was not certain that Peru could pay an 
indemnity, in which case he was willing that Chile 
should retain the nitrate areas, but he was opposed 
to its attitude as shown at Arica. He also instructed 
his envoys to let it be known that the United States 
would not permit intervention from Europe. 

The task that a new minister to the South Amer- 
_ ican west coast would have to face was that of per- 


™* James G. Blaine, The Foreign Policy of the Garfield Admin- 
istration, p. 1. 


EMERGENCE OF TACNA-ARICA 107 


suading a conqueror to abandon his spoils without 
protest. But if Hayes and Evarts had been unfortu- | 
nate in their choice of personnel, the situation forced 
on Blaine was far worse. The last troops of the 
American army of occupation that had been con- 
trolling the conquered southern states of the Union 
were withdrawn in 1877. This meant that renewed 
pressure was brought to bear on all Republican ex- 
ecutives to take care of the generals now out of em- 
ployment. Whatever Blaine may have thought of | 
sending military men to handle as intricate a situation 
as that which now faced him in Peru and Chile, he 
had little choice in the matter. , 

Accordingly, Judson Kilpatrick returned to Santi- 
ago. He had not handled affairs badly before, but 
unfortunately he became violently ill as soon as he 
arrived the second time. For short periods he was 
able to conduct business, but most of the time, he lay 
at the point of death. As appropriations for a secre- 
tary of the legation had been cancelled by Congress 
a few years before, his wife was the only one who 
could help him. He was finally compelled to trust to 
his close friends in Chile, among whom were mem- 
bers of the Cabinet, to aid him in writing his official 
correspondence.'® Kilpatrick died within less than 
half a year after his arrival, leaving matters in the 
utmost confusion. 

The minister to Peru was General S. A. Hurlbut, | 


who had been with the Federal army in New Orleans. 

* Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Kilpatrick to 
Blaine, August 30, 1881; Kilpatrick mentions Luis Aldunate as 
one of the friends. 


108 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


The conditions at Lima when he arrived were some- 
what similar to those he had left in Louisiana, but 
his position was entirely different. He became a vio- 
lent partisan of the Peruvian cause and was indig- 
nant at the military measures adopted by Patricio 
Lynch. 
» Garcia Calderon did not reach an understanding 
with Chile as he had been expected to do. A secret 
‘agreement that he had made when he assumed his 
high office bound him to assent to the cession of 
Tarapaca. But the new president was also head of 
the Compafiia Salitrera, which had been given valu- 
able concessions in the nitrate fields by a former 
government in Peru.’® He had of course never 
agreed to permit Chile to cancel contracts made by 
its conquered enemy and on this point he stood firm. 
As soon as he arrived, Hurlbut began a lively cor- 
jrespondence with Patricio Lynch. Interpreting 
‘Blaine’s instructions according to his pleasure, he in- 
formed the Chilean general that his country would 
not tolerate any cession of territory until Peru was 
allowed to attempt a payment in money instead. 
“Such a course would meet with decided disfavor on 
the part of the United States.’’?7 He then assured 
Garcia Calderon that he would never permit Peru to 


* Department of State Bureau of Archives, Logan to Freling- 
huysen, March 8, 1883. Logan writes that Chile understood all 
of this before Blaine began to be so indignant about the im- 
prisonment of Garcia Calderon. According to Logan, the 
Peruvian promised his business associates that he would compel 
Chile to buy them out at a high price. 


* Tbid., Hurlbut to Blaine, October 26, 1881. 


EMERGENCE OF TACNA-ARICA 109 


be dismembered and urged him to resist the Chilean 
demands. The Peruvian needed little urging and 
negotiations stopped. Lynch seized the treasury of 
the new government and commanded its president to 
resign. When Garcia Calderén refused and issued 
paper money made in the United States, he was ar- 
rested and taken to Santiago. 

The situation required the finesse and suavity of a 
Talleyrand, but General Hurlbut pursued his own 
course regardless of consequences. He wired the gov- 
ernment of Buenos Aires to urge it to recognize the 
new Peruvian executive. He assumed at his personal 
tisk the receivership of a Peruvian railway then 
under Chilean control, with a view of handing it over 
eventually to a group of American capitalists. He 
wrote to Piérola to urge him to combine with Garcia 
Calderén “against the common enemy.” The fugitive 
complained that his rival should never have been 
recognized. “Garcia Calderén will not consent to the 
cession of Tarapaca,” Hurlburt replied. “It remains 
to be seen if Piérola will do likewise.’’!8 

This convinced all parties that the Garfield admin- 
istration would fight the Chilean terms. Both Peru 
and Bolivia were now in extremities and the glitter- 
ing hope of American intervention suggested so 
clearly by Hurlbut was their only reason for resist- 
ing further the demands of their enemy. In Santiago 
Kilpatrick assured the government of Chile that 
Hurlbut was not instructed to act as he did and 


* Ibid., enclosure in Martinez to Blaine, October 24, 1881. 


110 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


showed the written directions from Blaine. Hurlbut 
retorted by charging that Chilean officials censored 
, all of Kilpatrick’s dispatches. Again United States 
ministers were at loggerheads, while Pértrremained 
in chaos clinging to the delusion of active American 
aid. 

Money-making schemes by American and Euro- 
‘pean capitalists added to Blaine’s problems. Bolivia 
suggested an American protectorate, in exchange for 
which it would turn over all of its industries and 
revenues to business men from the United States.1® 
Old claims whose validity had been denied by all of 
the governments of Peru were now revived. For ex- 
ample, Jean Cochet, a Frenchman, had discovered 
the commercial qualities of guano forty odd years 
before, and one of the ephemeral legislatures of Peru 
voted him a third share in all of the proceeds from 
any sales of the product that came to the govern- 
ment. American capitalists, however, had now bought 
the claim and had computed its interest in a way that 
would give them financial control of the whole coun- 
try. Another claim, by Théophile Landreau, also of 
France, based on the discovery of new guano beds, 
had mounted likewise to fantastic proportions, and 
was pressed at this time by Americans. Blaine paid 
no attention to the Cochet heirs, though their attor- 
ney insisted that he had been promised help from 
both the Secretary and Minister Hurlbut. But in- 
structions were sent to the American representative 


* Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Cabrera to 
Evarts, February 18, 1881. 


EMERGENCE OF TACNA-ARICA 111 


to insist on the inclusion of the Landreau claim in 
any negotiations for peace.?° 

The most serious difficulty was offered by French 
owners of Peruvian government bonds to whom the 
nitrates of Tarapaca had been mortgaged. They 
formed a company, the Crédit Industriel, which had 
an agreement with Piérola to handle the exclusive 
sale of all the nitrates and guano mined in any 
province of Peru. As Blaine stood so firmly against 
European intervention, they now appealed to him for 
an American protectorate. He rejected their plan, but 
was embarrassed by the fact that Levi P. Morton, 
his minister at Paris, headed a concern that was to 
act as selling agent for the Crédit Industriel in the 
United States.?4 

Such were the complications that Blaine faced with 
the impulsive Hurlbut and the dying Kilpatrick to 
help him. He determined now to take the aggressive 
Step of sending a special mission to undertake the 
task of mediation, and chose_as its head William 


Henry Trescot. This envoy was to insist that cession - 


of territory was not to be made the basis of a treaty. 


* House Reports, 47th Congress, 1st session, VI. xii. Blaine 
said that the reason he pressed his claim was that the House of 
Representatives had adopted a resolution instructing him to do 
so. But the Senate reported adversely on the same resolution 
on the ground that it lay in the executive sphere. France had 
always refused to make it a diplomatic matter. 


* Ibid., p. xxi. At the congressional investigation of these 
acts, Blaine and Hurlbut were completely exonerated of any 
participation in the schemes of American capitalists, but a 
doubt was expressed as to the wisdom of Hurlbut’s enthusiasm 
for the Peruvian cause. Morton was cleared of blame for any 
unlawful acts, but reproved for having connections with the 
firm while he was a minister to France. 


112 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


He was also to threaten a rupture of diplomatic rela- 
tions with Chile if it did not give satisfactory reasons 
for the arrest of Garcia Calderon, which Blaine con- 
sidered an affront to his country. Trescot’s third duty 
was to issue invitations for a meeting at Washington 
that would found the union of American republics. 
Each one of these items was to meet strenuous re- 
sistance from Chile. 

But an unforseen and unhappy incident in Wash- 
ington saved the victorious southern republic. Gar- 
field was assassinated and Chester A. Arthur suc- 
ceeded him in the White House. Blaine’s retirement 
followed shortly. To the Department of State came 
Frederick T. Frelinghuysen, who saw no reason for 
involving the United States in a dispute that did not 
directly concern it. Trescot was at Panama when the 
cablegram reached him announcing the retirement of 
Blaine. When he arrived at Santiago, he received let- 
ters directing him to defer any invitation to an inter- 
national conference and to omit from the list of his 
duties the protest about Garcia Calderon. Trescot 
had to deal with a new administration in Chile also. 
It followed the general policy of its predecessor, but 
brought to the foreign office José M. Balmaceda, one 
of Chile’s most gifted statesmen. 

Two unfortunate occurrences prevented the Amer- 
ican commissioner from fulfilling even his limited 
duty of persuading Chile to make peace without 
anneéxations, In fie first place Kilpatrick had died, 
as noted above. His last dispatches stated that he had 
been given assurances by both the outgoing and the 


EMERGENCE OF TACNA-ARICA 113 


new administration that Chile would no longer insist 
on a cession of Tarapaca. Balmaceda and members 
of the former cabinet now denied that any such 
promise had been made. They told Trescot that Kil- 
patrick’s physical condition must have led him into 
delusions. These dispatches had been the chief reason 
why Trescot hoped for success. Chile was as resolute 
as ever and now demanded Tacna and Arica also. ° 

Trescot was further embarrassed by happenings in 
Washington. The United States Congress had de- 
manded all of the correspondence to date that dealt 
with the War of the Pacific. It was then made a 
matter of public record at Washington. It gave the 
written testimony of Hurlbut’s indiscretions; it 
‘showed the confidential letters from American minis- 
ters to Peru and Bolivia under both Evarts and 
Blaine, in which annexation to the United States was 
recommended for both countries; it laid bare the 
schemes of American capitalists and the instructions 
to press the Landreau claim; it showed how Blaine 
had adopted a policy of aggressive action which 
Frelinghuysen had abandoned. 

All of this was duly cabled to Balmaceda from the 
Chilean legation in Washington, and he knew more 
about the new American policy than Trescot did him- 
self. The unfortunate American commissioner was 
at the mercy of the clever Chilean, who revealed his 
knowledge of the published records as suited his con- 
venience. Trescot worked for five months against all 
these odds, and left for home in the spring of 1882 
without accomplishing anything. 


114 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


It was Frelinghuysen’s turn now to make peace. 
The general attitude of the new administration was 
expressed in Arthur’s message to Congress of De- 
cember 1882: 


“A special mission was sent to express the hope that 
Chile would accept a money indemnity and relinquish her 
demand for territory. This recommendation, which Chile 
declined to follow, this government has not assumed to en- 
force; nor can it be enforced without resort to measures 
which would be in keeping neither with the temper of our 
people nor with the spirit of our institutions. The power 
of Peru no longer extends over its whole territory, and in 
the event of our interference to dictate peace would need 
to be supplemented by the armies and navies of the United — 
States,’’22 


The Peruvians saw that American intervention 
was not to be expected. Now that it was evident that 
Arthur would not use force, they suggested to Chile 
that France be invited to mediate, an offer that Chile 
flatly rejected.** “The passing of Blaine means the 
dawning of a new era,” wrote Chilean minister 
Martinez from Washington. 

Frelinghuysen thereupon sent Major Logan to 
Santiago, a man who had been there before and had 
been in Latin-American diplomacy for several years. 
His military envoy to Peru, however, General Part- 
ridge, was as inexperienced as Hurlbut. The latter 


* Congressional Record, 47th Congress, 2nd session, p. 7. 


“Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Logan to Fre- 
linghuysen, February 1, 1883. Dreyfus Brothers, of Paris, had 
taken over a greater part of the Peruvian bonds for which 
mineral wealth was mortgaged. Their attorney, Jules Grévy, 
had become president of France, and Chile was afraid that he 
was planning forcible intervention. Piérola was in France at 
the time also and was plotting a return to Peru. 


EMERGENCE OF TACNA-ARICA 115 


had died suddenly of heart-failure as he was leaving 
for home to attend a Congressional investigation of 
his acts. His last blunder was a public proclamation 
to “The Notables of Lima” declaring that the United 
States opposed any dismemberment of Peru. “Union, 
under whomsoever may be elected, will destroy the 
pretext of Chile that she cannot make peace because 
of disorder in Peru; and it will give to the United 
States an advantage which they require and of which 
they will know how to take advantage.’’24 

Partridge soon had to be recalled. The Garcia Cal- 
deron government, which was still recognized by the 
United States as the legitimate one in Peru, was be- 
ing conducted by Lizardo Montero, its vice-president. 
As the health of the new minister was uncertain, he 
refused to follow Montero to the village of HuarAz 
and remained at Lima where no government existed. 
While Logan was trying to make Garcia Calderén 
himself agree to the Chilean terms of peace, Part- 
ridge wrote to the Peruvian captive to reject all 
mediation and deal directly with Chile. At last he 
recognized Montero and astonished Frelinghuysen by 
calling a meeting of the diplomatic corps, at which a 
proclamation was issued demanding an immediate 
peace. 

Chile was well content to let matters rest as they 
were. Its military expenses were being paid by cus- 
toms receipts and by levies on the wealthy citizens of 
Lima; the cessation of Peruvian trade had stopped 


* Ibid., enclosure in Trescot to Blaine, December 12, 1881. 


116 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


all competition with Chilean flour, which had reached 
higher prices than it had ever known before.?® 

All of this made Logan’s work difficult. The 
United States was reconciled to the cession of Tara- 
paca by this time, and was trying to persuade Chile 
to buy Tacna and Arica, instead of seizing the terri- 
tory outright. An arrangement to this effect was 
made at one time, but Garcia Calderon’s Congress in 
session at odd intervals rejected it. Logan wrote to 
Montero begging him to accept. “The United States 
paid Mexico fifteen million dollars for an area far 
more profitable than this for which Chile offers ten,” 
he argued.?® The analogy thus given to a former 
action of the United States was a shock to Peru. 
“Logan acts as an agent of Chile,” its minister com- 
plained at Washington. 

Chile was persuaded to deal once more with the 
captive Garcia Calderon. Logan was allowed to take 
him outside the country on parole so that he might 
confer with his Peruvian associates. Ten different 
propositions suggested by the American minister 
were rejected by one or the other of the parties in- 
volved. Garcia Galderon insisted that Chile should 
assume all Peruvian debts in Tarapaca. As he grew 
less amenable, Chile turned to the idea of seizing 
Tacna and Arica without any payment at all. 

Bolivia was ready to make a separate peace and 
give up Antofagasta. But Adams and Massey, the 


*Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Logan to 
Frelinghuysen, November 6, 1882. 

* Tbid., enclosure in Logan to Frelinghuysen, December 12, 
1883. 


EMERGENCE OF TACNA-ARICA 117 


American ministers, had persuaded it not to do this 
while a hope of intervention from their country 
lasted. Then Montero visited La Paz and the old 
alliance with Peru was confirmed. It was understood 
that Bolivia’s price was the cession to it of Tacna 
and Arica." Peace seemed far away during the 
spring of 1883. 

Then in the autumn of the same year a new gov- 
ernment in chaotic Peru suddenly gathered momen- 
tum when General Iglesias marched into Lima. It 
was quickly seen that his campaign was backed by 
Chilean soldiers and that the conquerors had at last 
found a man who would agree to all their terms. On 
October 20, 1883, he signed the treaty of Ancén with 
representatives of Chile. In it Bolivia was ignored 
entirely. Tarapaca was ceded outright. Tacna and 
Arica were to be held by Chile for ten years. Upon 
the expiration of this period a vote should be taken 
by the inhabitants to decide which should possess the 
provinces permanently; and it was stipulated also 
that the victor should pay ten million pesos to the 
loser for the territory thus acquired. This is 
the clause that has yet to be fulfilled, because the 
plebiscite was not held in 1893 as specified. The first 
official suggestion of a vote by the inhabitants came 
from Logan, who had tried to induce Garcia Calde- 
ron to consent to a similar arrangement. According 
to the American envoy, he had been prompted to 
offer it by Luis Aldunate, the foreign minister who 
succeeded Balmaceda.** Aldunate did not deny this 


“ Ibid., Logan to Frelinghuysen, December 27, 1882. 
* Ibid., enclosure in Logan to Frelinghuysen, Sept. 29, 1882. 


118 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


and the troublesome clause possibly originated with 
the Chilean statesman. The United States, however, 
played its important share in the part of the treaty 
that kept one phase of South American politics in a 
turmoil for so many years. Beyond this, however, the 
United States did not participate in the treaty of 
peace, for the northern republic still upheld Garcia 
Calderon. Logan even induced Chile to permit the 
captive to sign the pact, but the stubborn Peruvian 
refused.?® Peace had come without any American 
participation. 

The clause dealing with European bondhigliters 
was ratified in the face of objections from the United 
States. It provided that Chile should distribute to 
these creditors fifty per cent of the proceeds that 
would accrue from the sale of a million tons of 
guano. Some of them were satisfied but others ob- 
jected. Frelinghuysen feared it might mean European 
intervention. But his earnest protests were of no 
avail. “The treaty was eventually concluded,” he 
wrote to Roustan, the French minister to Washing- 
ton, “in terms at variance with those which the 
United States had amicably counselled.’’%° 

So ended a period of blundering and meddling on 
the part of American diplomacy. The United States 

* This was in the summer of 1883, when Chile first made at- 
tempts at peace with Iglesias and a protocol was reported to 
have been drafted. Logan tried from then on to persuade his 
government to recognize Iglesias and leave Garcia Calderon. 


In the final peace treaty, Chile would not even consider Garcia 
Calderon. 


*° Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Frelinghuysen to 
Roustan, April 17, 1884. 


EMERGENCE OF TACNA-ARICA 119 


had prevented any European mediation, but had been 
unable to bring about peace during four years of mis- 
ery for Bolivia and Peru. Chile defied the wishes of 
the northern republic at every turn, while Peru had 
been induced to hold out until Tacna and Arica as 
well as Tarapaca were probably lost. The United 
States shouldered a responsibility in the War of the 
Pacific which it seemed unable to handle. This was a 
poor beginning for a Pan-American understanding 
wherein headship would be conceded to the powerful 
republic of the north. 


CHAPTER IX 


LIBERALISM TO THE FORE 


While Chile was fighting its way into the ranks 
of the stronger South American nations, a change 
was slowly taking place in its internal politics that 
ended in the triumph of the Liberal parties by the 
time that the Treaty of Ancon was signed. This 
did not mean any radical transformation in the 
government. Though it involved a certain extension 
of the suffrage, the wealthy landed gentry still 
directed the policies of the country; even the same 
families continued to hold high positions. Liberal- 
ism was as vague a word in the political history of 
Chile as it is in that of most countries. But one 
definite sign of its victory was the growth of reli- 
gious toleration. This was particularly important for 
the Protestants in the country, and in that way the 
domestic political contest was closely associated with 
the interests of British and American residents. 

The Conservative party that won the battle of 
Lircai in 1830 inaugurated a policy of repression 
that in ten years put an end to all political opposi- 
tion. The strong position of the Catholic clergy in 
its councils was to be seen in Article 5 of the Con- 
stitution of 1833, that declared Roman Catholicism 
the state religion and forbade the public worship of 
any other.’ Clerical influence in the government re- 


* Constitucién politica de la Repiiblica de Chile, p. 9. 


LIBERALISM TO THE FORE: 121 


mained undisputed through the administrations of 
Prieto and Bulnes, a period of twenty years. 

This did not mean an oppression of Protestants, 
however. A certain measure of toleration was always 
allowed. It was never understood that the religious 
clauses of the constitution forbade private chapels, 
and one was established by the Anglican church in 
Valparaiso in 1837. “It was not allowed to have a 
steeple,” writes one American observer of a later 
date, “but it could easily be recognized as a church.’’? 
Protestant schools were also unmolested and a few 
existed in the chief cities. By a law of 1834 non- 
Catholics were permitted to bequeath property to 
their heirs. Ten years later another measure was 
passed by Congress making marriages legitimate be- 
tween parties that did not belong to the state church. 
This assured Protestant children all civil rights, 
provided that their birth was registered with the 
parish priest. 

One great source of injustice that remained was 
the consecrated cemetery. Protestant burial grounds, 
it will be remembered, had been provided for by 
O'Higgins, and a right to have them upheld in the 
commercial treaties with England and the United 
States. But only in Valparaiso were there enough 
dissenters from the Catholic faith to support such 
private cemeteries. No person who died outside the 
Catholic church in Santiago could be interred there, 
as the few Protestants in the city could not muster 
enough funds for a burying-ground of their own. 


* Mrs. G. B. Merwin, of. cit., p. 117. 


122 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


The hardship that such situations imposed on 
British and American residents was brought to pub- 
lic attention in 1853 when a baby two months old, 
child of Captain Nat Burgess, of the United States 
Navy, died in Talcahuano. Because it had not been 
baptized, it had to be buried at sea. The curate of 
the township declared that the body could have been 
disinterred at any time if the parents had insisted on 
a burial on land, as it was no better than the carcass 
of a dog.® 

Another source of vexation was the attitude taken 
by state as well as church toward the intermarriage 
of Protestants and Catholics. Children of such unions 
were regarded as illegitimate, even if the marriage 
took place in foreign legations belonging to Protes- 
tant countries. American ministers had often pro- 
tested at the inclusion of their own homes in this 
ban and had tried in vain to reach an agreement with 
the Chilean government about it. The matter did not 
become a serious bone of contention, however, until 
Seth Barton was sent to Santiago by the administra- 
tion of James K. Polk. 

Barton became infatuated with Isabel Astabu- 
ruaga, who belonged to one of the richest and oldest 
families of the Santiago aristocracy. A chance meet- 
ing one morning in one of the parks of the Chilean 
capital was soon followed by a formal introduction 
arranged through the young friends of the sefiorita, 
who were delighted by such an unexpected romance. 
Soon the couple announced their engagement over 


* Department of State,. Bureau of Archives, Peyton to 
Clayton, August 30, 1853. 


¥ 


LIBERALISM TO THE FORE 123 


the strong protest of the Astaburuaga family.* At 
first it seemed that a dispensation might be granted 
_by the Catholic church since Barton, though a Pro- 
testant, expressed his willingness to permit all chil- 
dren born to them to be confirmed in the Catholic 
faith. But the archbishop of Santiago doubted the 
sincerity of such promises and hesitated to give his 
consent. 

While prospects for the wedding were thus placed 
in doubt, reports reached Chile from the United 
States that the American minister had been divorced 
shortly before his departure from his home. Sefio- 
rita Astaburuaga had been told of this by Barton 
at the time of the engagement and one morning 
related the story of the divorce while confessing her 
sins to the archbishop. As society circles began to 
discuss this new development, Barton’s temper, which 
he had controlled so far, overcame him, and he ac- 
cused the archbishop publicly of violating the secrets 
of the confessional.’ His language became more ex- 
travagant and intemperate when that prelate insisted 
that three witnesses would have to testify that Barton 
was legally free to marry according to the laws of 
the United States. The American took this to be an 
insult to his honesty and also a slur on his country; 
his credentials from the Department of State, he 
held, were sufficient evidence that he would tell the 
truth.® 


* Antonio Ifiquez Vicufia, op. cit., pp. 239-242. 

"Rumors of the divorce were already abroad, so that it is 
doubtful whether Barton’s charges were well founded. 

° Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Barton to Clay- 
ton, April 18, 1849. 


124 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


This introduced an international feature to the 
case that was now becoming a scandal. Abusive letters 
were interchanged between the archbishop and the 
American minister. Coming at the time that the 
Macedonian dispute was at its worst, the situation 
was too much for Foreign Minister Manuel Vial to 
handle. Failing to receive any dispensation, the couple 
were finally married in the American legation by a 
chaplain of the United States Navy, whose warship 
was stationed at Valparaiso. Vial was further em- 
barrassed by receiving an invitation to the wedding 
which included the entire cabinet. He tried to com- 
promise by declining for the cabinet but making an 
informal call with his wife during the reception.? 
This only made matters worse and Barton foolishly 
demanded a public explanation of his conduct. 

Mrs. Barton now moved to the American legation 
with her younger sister and defied all protests of her 
relatives. A month and a half after the wedding, 
she received a letter from the archbishop beseeching 
her to leave a man to whom she was not wedded ac- - 
cording to the rites of the Catholic church, and to 
return to her faith and repent. She handed this letter 
to her husband, who became more excited than ever 
and again gave the matter an international aspect by 
demanding that ‘Rafael Valentin, so-called arch- 
bishop of Santiago,” be brought to trial for insulting 
the wife of an American minister. He was told that 
the government of Chile had no authority over a 
church dignitary in the exercise of his spiritual func- 


"Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Barton to Clay- 
ton, April 18, 1849. 


LIBERALISM TO THE FORE 125 


tions. Barton particularly resented the fact that the 
government’s reply took occasion to praise the moder- 
ation of the churchman. ‘He wrote my wife that he 
who worships God under a belief he knows to be 
false sacrilegiously scoffs at divinity,” he replied to 
Vial. “He thus accuses the whole American nation 
of hypocrisy, this Jesuitical reprobate. Sir, commen- 
dations such as you write of this man are offensive 
to me; and in the future I shall expect that they be 
not repeated.’’® 

Chile instantly demanded Barton’s recall at Wash- 
ington, declaring that he had violated all the courte- 
sies of diplomatic usage. “There is as great a dis- 
tance between noble energy and insolence as there 
is between vulgarity and circumspect dignity,” Min- 
ister Carvallo wrote to Secretary Clayton in convey- 
ing this request of his government. “As in all Catho- 
lic countries,” he continued, “the holy institution of 
matrimony has not been degraded in Chile to the 
extreme of allowing it to be easier to obtain a divorce 
and ruin a family than to effect the abrogation of a 
contract for rent.’’® 

Clayton was disposed to uphold his excitable 
countryman. “The very difference in national customs 
to which you refer,” he replied to Carvallo, “makes 
Mr. Barton’s behavior accountable. The Archbishop 


*Ibid., Barton to Clayton, April 26, 1849. 


*Ibid., Carvallo to Clayton, July 20, 1849; Barros Arana 
claims that James Buchanan had told Carvallo confidentially in 
1848 that Barton was too close to President Polk for anything 
to be done in the matter. Clayton was Secretary of State 
under Zachary Taylor, who succeeded Polk. Cf. Barros Arana, 
Un decenio de la historia de la Repiblica de Chile, U1. 564. 


126 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


may have acted from conscientious motives but so 
did Barton, viewed from his antecedents.” The State 
Department expressed regret, however, at any viola- 
tion of diplomatic courtesy. It was spared making a 
recall by the decision of the American minister to 
close the legation on his own account. He had failed 
to arrange for a visit from Captain Shubrick of the 
United States Navy with his crew, which he had 
counted on to overawe the Chileans. Fearing that 
the church planned to kidnap his wife, he left for 
the United States.1° 

The Barton affair occurred in the last years of the 
Bulnes administration and did not help the position 
of Americans in Chile. Manuel Montt, who be- 
came president in 1851, was quite favorable to the 
British, who were also Protestants. Though he was 
elected by the party that still included clerical fac- 
tions, he believed in the extension of foreign invest- 
ments such as the British could supply. He ran 
counter to the Catholic church when he asked ah 
Jesuit teachers to resign from the National Institute. 
Shortly afterwards the Supreme Court upheld the 
appeal of two canons who were suspended from their 
offices by the Archbishop of Santiago. The prelate 
refused to recognize the decision and left the coun- 
try in order to escape banishment. Thus Montt lost 
the support of the Catholic hierarchy, and for the 
first time the powerful Conservative party was split. 


* Isabel Astaburuaga Barton died of cholera in New Orleans 
in less than a year after she came to the United States. Her 
younger sister was then cared for by the Chilean legation and 
sent home in a short while. 

* Barros Arana, op. cit., I. 318. 


LIBERALISM TO THE FORE 127 


The effects of the rupture were seen in the with- 
drawal of the Varas candidacy after the revolution 
of 1859. Montt had formed a personal following 
called the ‘National Party” and was still strong 
enough to push to success the candidacy of Joaquin 
Pérez in 1861. But the clericals united with their old 
Liberal opponents who returned to the country when 
Pérez showed that he was more tolerant than Montt. 
The new coalition won the congressional elections of 
1864, and the Liberals controlled the national legisla- 
ture for the first time. At once the whole question 
of religious toleration was raised. 

The church party found that its withdrawal from 
the ranks of its former political associates had so 
weakened it that it would never be able to control 
Chile again. It retained the name Conservative, but, 
had to unite with the factions that would promise it 
the most favors. Finding that it was impossible to 
retain Article 5 of the constitution without some 
modification, it skilfully arranged a compromise. 
The Liberals wanted to erase the whole clause; the 
Nationals, to leave only the first part that guaranteed 
a state religion. The clericals succeeded in passing 
merely an interpretation to the effect that the clause 
did not forbid private chapels and schools for dis- 
senters. This was simply confirming a condition that 
already existed. It was a signal victory for Manuel 
Tocornal, the able Conservative leader.!2 Burial laws 
and bans on intermarriage remained intact. 


In his speech in the Chamber of Deputies on August 1, 
Manuel Tocornal admitted that Protestants might be annoyed 
by existing laws. “All I have to say,” he concluded, “is that 
Chile does not need teachers that teach her how to doubt.” 


128 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


But the fight had only started. The Pope became 
involved when the government of Chile awoke to 
the fact that one of its penal laws was being violated 
consistently by high church dignitaries. They had 
been forbidden to proclaim any bull or decree of the 
Vatican before it was first sanctioned by the govern- 
ment. They had done so with impunity for years, 
though the law provided for heavy fines and im- 
prisonment. When it was found that the Liberals 
intended to enforce such a code, the clericals intro- 
duced an amendment that would exempt decrees 
dealing only with spiritual matters. 

The question involved was fairly trivial but it was 
taken as a test of strength. For the more important 
laws that would remedy burial and marriage condi- 
tions were soon to be brought up, and according 
to Chilean law either house could reject a measure 
of the other by a two-thirds vote.'* The position of 
the new president, Federico Errazuriz, was also in 
doubt. He had been elected by a Conservative combi- 
nation with some of the Liberal factions and was also 
a relative of the Archbishop of Santiago. Before the 
question was brought to a vote, a decree of the arch- 
bishop excommunicated all who by word or act 
worked against the Holy Catholic Church. The wives 
of the legislators took alarm and brought all manner 
of pressure to bear in favor of the clerical amend- 
ment. The archbishop in his robes waited outside 
the legislative building to hear the results. The 
amendment was twice passed in the Senate and voted 


* Constitucion politica de la Republica de Chile, p. 28. 


LIBERALISM TO THE FORE 129 


down in the Chamber; the houses were deadlocked 
on all further religious questions.1* Errazuriz never- 
theless favored even more toleration. Both he and 
Anibal Pinto, the minister whom he wished to suc- 
ceed him, were excommunicated for their political 
views. 

Another result of the new Liberal success had been 
a constitutional amendment that no president could 
hold office for more than one term. Beginning with 
Joaquin Pérez, no president had been reélected, as 
had been the case heretofore with all the former 
Conservatives who had held the office. Yet the pa- 
tronage power of the executive gave him con- 
trol over coming elections.*® Errazuriz followed in 
the footsteps of Prieto, Bulnes, and Montt. 

The president became an avowed Liberal before 
his term expired and his influence established beyond 
dispute the ascendancy of the party of that name. 
It now split into several factions, however, and Chil- 
ean politics drifted from the two-party system of 
England and the United States to the confusion that 
characterized Italy and France. Every candidate for 
the election of 1876 was tagged “Liberal,” but rivalry 
was as bitter as it had ever been. Finding much oppo- 
sition to Pinto, Errazuriz originated the party nomi- 
nating convention. Chile had never had one before 
and Errazuriz organized it after the American model, 

“ Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Logan to Fish, 
November 2, 1874 


* The president appointed the municipal officers who in turn 
prepared the list for qualified voters. 


130 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


as outlined to him by Minister Logan.1® The con- 
vention succeeded in eliminating one of Pinto’s oppo- 
nents, Miguel Luis Amunategui, but Benjamin 
Vicufia Mackenna refused to attend. The clericals 
attached themselves to the latter, and once more two 
candidates held the field. 

Errazuriz won and Pinto accordingly became pres- 
ident during the strenuous years of the War of the 
Pacific. The opposition, still actively supported by 
the Conservatives, became the extreme war party 
that refused to consent to giving up any conquests 
and criticized Pinto for wishing to make peace at 
Arica in 1880. When the time came in 1881 for 
another presidential election, it turned to General 
Baquedano, hero of the campaigns in Antofagasta, 
Tarapaca, and Tacna. But again the government 
Liberals won. Domingo Santa Maria, the most radi- 
cal man yet to be president, was inaugurated shortly 
after the Chilean army entered Lima. 

The new executive soon showed after peace came 
again to his country that he was heartily in favor of 
religious reform. When the Pope opposed the ap- 
pointee of the government for the archbishopric of 
Santiago, Santa Maria expelled the apostolic dele- 
gate. He next demanded that cemetery and mar- 
riage laws be considered by the Congress. Errazuriz in 
1871 had by executive decree set aside parts of every 
public cemetery for Protestants. Under the urging 
of Santa Maria, Congress now declared all Catholic 


* Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Logan to Fish, 
September 9, 1875. 


LIBERALISM TO THE FORE 131 


cemeteries state property. When many rich parish- 
ioners reclaimed in their own name the land which 
they had given their church for interring its dead, 
all private burial grounds were closed.17 Turning 
next to marriage laws, the Congress decreed that the 
civil ceremony would be required to make any union 
legitimate, while couples might dispense with the 
religious function if they so desired. 

At each new development the clericals grew more 
frantic. Presbyterians in 1873 and Methodists in 
1879 had started mission work and were growing 
in numbers, particularly among the poor in the cities. 
The Catholic church now excommunicated all who 
might submit to the civil marriage laws and forbade 
its members to bury their dead in any of the state 
cemeteries. During the latter part of the Santa Maria 
administration, many scandals resulted from police 
interference with secret burials by night in the closed 
private grounds.18 

Santa Maria was a stronger executive than Chile 
had possessed for twenty years. The bitterness that 
he aroused among devout Catholics was serious 
enough, but he added fuel to the flames when he 
openly advocated the candidacy of his minister, 
José M. Balmaceda, to succeed him. According to 
Walker Martinez, the Conservative leader, liberal- 
ism in Chile had come to mean only skepticism in 
religion and Caesarism in politics.!® The election of 

“Carlos Walker Martinez, Historia de la administracién 
Santa Maria, p. 197. 


* [bid., pp. 197-225. 
me LUsd opie l: 


132 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


1886 was close and the rivalry so keen that it looked 
as if revolution might again follow in its wake. 
But the victory of Balmaceda was accepted by his 
opponents and Chile once more showed its ability for 
peaceful self-government. 

The new president had begun his political career 
as an ardent advocate of the rights of the Church, 
opposing the first movements for toleration in 1865.?° 
But by the time he entered the Santa Maria cabinet, 
he had changed radically. As Minister of the Interior 
he was responsible for the odious cemetery laws. In 
his first message to the Congress he asked for com- 
plete separation of church and state. Cabinet crises 
caused him to withdraw this measure, however, and 
in return the Church reconsecrated the cemeteries 
and recognized the civil marriage laws.*? 

Thus, although Balmaceda had been hated by the 
churchmen more than any of the Santa Maria min- 
istry, his presidency seemed for a while to have 
brought about a better feeling in the country. But 
taxes on exports of the newly acquired northern 
provinces were making the government wealthy. All 
of the Liberal politicians felt that they should have 
a share in the new prosperity. Balmaceda found him- 
self at the head of an unwieldy party that was clam- 
oring for spoils. He spent money lavishly on public 
improvements and worked consistently for more 


* Carlos Walker Martinez, Historia de la administracion 
Santa Maria, p. 238. 


1 Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Roberts to Bay- 
ard, May 3, 1888. 


LIBERALISM TO THE FORE 133 


primary and secondary schools through the country. 
But he could not hold the Liberals together. 

Toward the close of his administration the presi- 
dent showed that he was as firm a believer in the 
power of the executive as Santa Maria had been. 
He wished to have his cabinet independent of the 
approval of the Congress; he stood for an extensive 
broadening of the suffrage by lowering the property 
qualifications for voters; and he urged the increase 
of local self-government. According to the view of 
leaders in the Congress who did not belong to his 
particular branch of the Liberal party,-the president 
was trying to found a federal union with the national 
legislature reduced to impotence. 

As usual the crucial test was the next presidential 
election. True to custom, Balmaceda backed an official 
candidate, Enrique Sanfuentes, whom he made head 
of a cabinet chosen while Congress was not in ses- 
sion. The legislature that met in June, 1890 censured 
this ministry and forced Balmaceda to choose a can- 
didate more non-partisan in character. The president 
then declared publicly that he had withdrawn from 
all participation in the coming election. But his oppo- 
nents did not believe him and withheld the appropria- 
tions for the coming year. The special session called 
in October to consider money matters proceeded im- 
mediately to impeach the old ministry. In disgust 
Balmaceda adjourned the session and raised taxes 
by executive decree. 

He had tried to compromise by working with min- 
istries that were taken from all the Liberal factions; 


its 
e 


134 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


he had called conventions to unite the party behind 
him ;?? but the congressional majority would have 
nothing to do with him. He now chose a cabinet ex- 
clusively from his friends, and the leaders in the Con- 
gress resorted to revolution in January, 1891. It was 
the first serious outbreak since 1859, and was to 
develop into a civil warfare such as the country had 
not known since Lircai. Balmaceda had gone too far, 
and Chile again rebelled against efforts of a presi- 
dent to determine the choice of a successor. 


™ Proclamation of Balmaceda, January 1, 1891, in letter of 
Egan to Blaine, February 3, 1891. 


CHAPTER X 


AT LOGGERHEADS WITH THE COLOSSUS 


The Chile that was in the throes of revolution 
again after thirty years of internal peace differed 
materially from the nation that had become restive 
in 1859 under the iron hand of Manuel Montt. A 
tremendous change had taken place in the north 
where the mining region lay. Chilean wealth no 
longer depended on a dubious market for wheat and 
other products of the soil in the central section. Ex- 
port taxes on the abundant nitrates seized from 
Bolivia and Peru filled the coffers of the nation. Its 
rich men, even though they retained their estates 
around Santiago, were investors in the northern 
mines. The center of wealth in the nation had shifted 
to the north. 

England still dominated the Chilean market. The 
promise of better business conditions in the nitrate 
fields when the progressive Chileans extended their 
administration there was not lost on the British 
investor, and as usual he was first in the field after 
the War of the Pacific. He was now compelled to 
watch a new competitor, however. Germans were 
forming colonies in southern Chile, were receiving 
strong backing from their government for banking 
and trading enterprises, and were threatening the 
monopolies that Great Britain had held. 

American business had made no further progress 
in the country. All of Blaine’s plans for increasing 


136 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


the export trade of the United States had gone awry 
with the failure of his mediation in 1881. Now, in 
1889, this same American statesman who was so 
anxious to make his country a rival of the European 
nations on the west coast of South America was 
brought back to the head of the State Department, 
and once more he was faced by a condition of war 
in the region where he wanted to push American 
commerce. The choice of a minister was again an 
important factor in his chances for success. 

Blaine was no longer hampered by war veterans 
seeking diplomatic posts, but the Irish vote in doubt- 
ful eastern states was being courted assiduously by 
his party, and it may well have been a deciding factor 
in his choice of Patrick Egan for the Santiago post. 
Egan had only recently arrived in the United States 
and had brought with him the traditional Irish hatred 
of all things British.1 This he carried with him to 
Chile, where he made many enemies among the Eng- 
lish residents. He also committed the fatal mistake 
of so many of his predecessors by becoming a parti- 
san in Chile’s internal quarrels. 

He was attracted by Balmaceda’s proclamation on 
New Year’s Day of 1891, which asserted that the 
parliamentary system was incompatible with repub- 
lican ideas. This seemed to him a contest between 
American and British ideas of government and he 
became interested forthwith in the president’s cause. 

+E. L. Godkin, “Our Treatment of Chile,’ in The Nation 


(October 29, 1891). In many of Egan’s dispatches he com- 
plained of the abuse heaped upon him by English residents. 


TROUBLE. WITH THE COLOSSUS: 137 


Balmaceda quickly caught this sympathy from an 
American minister and took especial care to show his 
favor for the United States. “From references to 
the archives,” Egan wrote to Blaine in the winter 
of 1891, “T perceive that the present good feeling on 
the part of the government toward United States 
citizens and United States interests presents a very 
agreeable contrast to that shown in 1851 and 1859.”2 

It did seem at that time that the attitude of Egan 
was precisely the proper one to turn Chile away from 
European influence and toward the United States. 
Balmaceda had the situation well in hand. The navy 
went over to the revolutionary cause, but the army 
remained loyal to the president. In March a naval 
bombardment of Iquique in Tarapaca was followed 
by its occupation by the Congressional forces, who 
made the port their government headquarters and 
then confiscated the revenues of the nitrate regions. 

But central and southern Chile remained under the 
control of Balmaceda throughout the spring. Al- 
though a revolutionary junta stayed the whole time 
in Santiago, and so many of the prominent families 
sympathized with its cause that it was never un- 
earthed by the police, it accomplished little. In March 
the national convention of the Liberal party, now 
purged of all opponents to the chief executive, nomi- 
nated Claudio Vicufia for president. The congres- 
sional leaders in Iquique could make no progress and 
the cause of the revolution seemed a lost one. 


* Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Egan to Blaine, 
February 13, 1891. 


138 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


The Germans and the English were openly against 
Balmaceda. His decrees closing the ports of northern 
Chile aroused loud protests from these two groups of 
foreigners, and they definantly disobeyed his orders. 
A German squadron of four cruisers and one iron- 
clad left China for Chile in January to uphold the 
rights of its merchants to leave the closed ports with 
their goods. And England threatened to take the 
same procedure. Managers of British nitrate plants in 
Tarapaca promised workingmen two dollars a day 
as long as they served in the Congressional army, and 
threatened to discharge them if they did not. British 
firms also contributed liberally to the congressional 
cause. John Thomas North, the “nitrate king,’ was 
reported to have given a hundred thousand pounds.® 
“The hostile spirit of England and Germany must 
show every Chilean patriot that he should cultivate 
close commercial relations with the United States,” 
exultantly wrote Egan. 

As the months passed, Balmaceda was cleverly 
drawing American prestige to his cause, until the 
whole country accepted it as a fact that the United 
States was siding with the executive. Any complaints 
from Egan were satisfied promptly at the foreign 
office. The American consul at Valparaiso reported 
in amazement the uniform courtesy of all local 
officials in fulfilling his requests. 

In April offers of mediation by England and Ger- 
_many were accepted by the Congressional party and 
the same proposal from the American, French, and 


* Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Egan to Blaine, 
March 17, 1891. 


TROUBLE WITH THE COLOSSUS 139 


Brazilian ministers was made to Balmaceda. The 
president refused to consider the British and German 
offer, but agreed to the other if the United States 
took the lead. A deputation of nine men came from 
Iquique under guarantee of safe-conduct to Santiago 
and parleys were opened under American auspices. 
But Balmaceda blocked negotiations from the be- 
ginning by refusing to submit terms. His position 
could not allow him, he said, to do more than listen 
to proposals from the other side. The revolutionists 
demanded the repeal of all decrees issued since New 
Year’s Day and a general amnesty that would include 
the restoration of civil service positions to all who 
rebelled. If this were acceded to, the Congressional 
leaders would lay down their arms and return to 
continue the session adjourned in the autumn. These 
stipulations the president declared impossible of ac- 
ceptance, and mediation failed. 

Still Egan hoped for a truce, and through Rear 
Admiral McCann, then stationed in Iquique harbor, 
he tried to sound the Congressional government as 
to its ideas on the matter. Unfortunately he wrote 
McCann that the Balmaceda régime could not be dis- 
turbed and intimated that the cause of the revolution 
was hopeless. “Unused to diplomacy,” as McCann 
confessed later, the admiral showed the letter when 
talking to Isidoro Errazuriz at Iquique headquar- 
ters.* Egan’s attempt went for naught, but the revo- 
lutionists were further convinced that the American 
minister was hostile because he expected them to lose. 


*Ibid., Egan to Blaine, June 27, 1891. 


140 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


Being sadly in need of munitions, the Congres- 
sional party sent Ricardo Trumbull to the United 
States to buy rifles. To a protest from Balmaceda’s 
minister in Washington against this mission, Blaine 
replied that shipment of munitions was not contrary 
to the neutrality laws of the United States. But since 
there was uncertainty as to the status of the Congres- 
sional emissary, Trumbull shipped his purchases 
secretly across the continent to San Francisco from 
New York. The guns were then loaded on an Amer- 
ican ship, the Robert and Minnie, which had been 
chartered by him, and which at once set sail for 
the Catalina Islands. 

The steamer Jtata was at that time in San Diego, 
gathering provisions before it started back to Chile 
in the service of the Congressional forces. It had 
come to the United States to receive the rifles and had 
on board a number of Chilean soldiers. But at San 
Diego it had removed its cannon and handed to cus- 
toms officials a false manifest. Suspicious of its in- 
tent, the Federal authorities placed a United States 
marshal on board to detain it.? Then it suddenly de- 
parted for the Catalina Islands, taking along the 
American official, whom it dropped at a point on the 
coast. In due time, having received the arms, it set 
out for Chile. 

Whether its action in loading the rifles from the 
other ship constituted a violation of the neutrality 
laws was a debatable question, but two warships 


° Minutes of the United States and Chilean Claims Commis- 
sion, 1901, p. 214. 


TROUBLE WITH THE COLOSSUS 141 


from the United States were detailed to follow the 
Itata. They were told to avoid trouble if the boat 
were met by a vessel from the Chilean navy. The 
Itata reached Iquique without trouble, where a pro- 
test from Washington had preceded it. The Congres- 
sional leaders were not minded to make an open 
break with the northern republic, and Errazuriz 
promised that the ship would at once be put in the 
custody of the United States navy. It could not be 
asserted, however, that the [tata had broken any law 
until a trial had been held in California. Errazuriz 
agreed without contest that the vessel and its officers 
be taken back there, but urgently requested that the 
five thousand rifles so badly needed might be left with 
Admiral McCann until the case was decided.* The 
decision of Blaine that the guns must be returned 
with the ship confirmed the opinion in Congres- 
sionalist circles that the United States favored Bal- 
maceda. 

Other incidents heightened the resentment of the 
revolutionary party. The cable line of the Central 
and South American Telegraph Company, an Amer- 
ican concern, extended from Galveston to Valparaiso. 
Its operation on the southern end below Iquique was 
now stopped by the authorities in control there. Bal- 
maceda was supplied with all news from the outside 
world by a British line running across the Andes. 
The American company was prevented from laying 
a rival telegraph connection to Buenos Aires because 


°Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Errdzuriz to 
Blaine, June 5, 1891. 


142 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


so many Chileans owned stock in the British line. 
Through Egan’s efforts, however, Balmaceda con- 
sented to pay for a connection between Callao and 
Valparaiso made in the open seas that would avoid 
touching at Iquique. When this was done, it was 
taken as another open effort to further the success 
of the president. 

Finally, news was brought to Valparaiso early one 
August morning by Rear Admiral George Brown on 
the American warship San Francisco, that the Con- 
gressionalists had effected a landing at Quinteros. It 
was the beginning of a new campaign conducted by 
the revolutionaries after they had received munitions 
from Germany. The news was important for Bal- 
maceda’s army, since they did not know whether the 
landing was actually to be made or if the movement 
was a feint. Valparaiso newsboys soid papers that 
day calling, “News of the fleet brought by the San 
Francisco.” La Gaceta Comercial, the Balmaceda 
organ in the city, stated that all knowledge of the new 
naval movements had come from Admiral Brown. 
This officer protested that his visit had been one for 
his own information and that the news of the landing 
reached the city before he returned.‘ But whatever 
his share in the matter had been, he was accused 
from that time of being a Balmaceda spy. Though 
Admiral Brown’s account of the incident may be ac- 
cepted without reservation, the Balmacedists do not 
appear to have been specially desirous to preserve the 
reputation of the United States as a neutral. 


"Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Brown to Egan, 
enclosed in Egan to Blaine, September 17, 1891. 


TROUBLE WITH THE COLOSSUS = 143 


This was eight days before the war unexpectedly 
closed. The new rifles from Germany were superior 
to any guns that the president’s army possessed, and 
they quickly decided the issue. Officers and their 
brigades deserted Balmaceda daily. Finally, at Placil- 
las, on the 28th of August, a decisive victory was 
won by the Congressional forces. The way to the 
capital was opened to them. Rioting and looting 
reigned all afternoon there as the victorious army ap- 
proached. Balmaceda took refuge in the Argentine 
legation, for he knew that further resistance was use- 
less. Believing that it would be a confession of guilt 
to flee or to submit to a trial by his foes, he com- 
mitted suicide in his place of refuge on the 19th of 
September. Thus the most serious civil strife that 
Chile had known came to a close in less than nine 
months. 

It was an unhappy turn of affairs for the Amer- 
ican minister. The United States had again chosen 
the losing side. A provisional government established 
under Jorge Montt took the position that there was 
no quarrel with the northern republic over past inci- 
dents ; but the masses who seemed to be heartily in 
favor of the victors recalled the tata and Quinteros 
incidents with bitterness. In addition, Egan was em- 
barrassed by the presence of some eighty Balmacedist 
refugees in the legation. 

Claudio Vicufia, who was to have been inaugu- 
rated in September, escaped the country on an Amer- 
ican warship with other high officials among ‘the 
Balmacedist ranks. The demand that they be put off 


144 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


the vessel and given over to the police was refused 
by Egan. He now took the same position in regard 
to the men who were still in his home at Santiago. 
At great expense, he housed and fed them all, and 
worked to obtain safe-conducts for them from the 
new government of their enemies. 

Egan was not backed by precedent in his conten- 
tions, for in the revolutions against Manuel Montt 
American officials had twice been ordered from 
Washington to release refugees who had come to 
them. Secretary Lewis Cass had written on one oc- 
casion, however, that the attitude taken by Chile 
toward other nations in the same matter would de- 
termine his own decision. Blaine assumed the same 
view, and received the information from Egan that 
all the legations had welcomed refugees except the 
British. Even the British minister had found two 
hiding in his home without his knowledge. But only 
Egan and the Spanish minister retained any refugees 
long. In a few days the other legations were emptied, 
some of the unfortunates surrendering themselves 
for trial and others hiding elsewhere. 

Egan was confronted in the foreign office by M. 
A. Matta, a man as excitable and quick-tempered as 
himself. Blaine backed his representative in insist- 
ing on the right of asylum when he heard that other 
legations had been tacitly granted it; but Matta con- 
tended that a different situation existed when the 
refugees were submitted to the courts for criminal 
prosecution, and refused to discuss permission for 
them to leave the country under safe-conduct before 
they were brought to trial. 


TROUBLE WITH THE COLOSSUS 145 


There was no open trouble over this until the 22nd 
of September, when only fifteen men remained in 
the American legation. Then rumors of a Balma- 
cedist plot filled Santiago, and it was widely reported 
that the chief conspirators were the refugees in 
Egan’s home. Police and plain-clothes men were sta- 
tioned at all approaches and visitors were often ar- 
rested and taken to the police station. Two of Egan’s 
servants were imprisoned over night. “We expect 
prompt action on Chile’s part against disrespect to 
the American legation,’” Egan was wired from 
Washington. ‘Free access to it must be granted.’’® 

Charges flew back and forth. Egan complained that 
the lowest class of peons were stationed to watch his 
house and that they constantly were insulting its 
inmates; that visitors and men who had business 
with him were molested by the police. Matta denied 
the truth of all such statements, charging in re- 
turn that refugees cursed and pelted the agents of 
the police in discharge of their duties. A mass-meet- 
ing in the city condemned Egan for sheltering men 
who conspired to overthrow the government, and the 
legation had to be protected by a special cavalry 
guard that night. The American minister denied the 
existence of any plots and demanded that his servants 
be left alone. The Chilean government replied that 
cards issued by him to his employees were used by 
dozens of people. 

In the midst of the quarrel, which was growing 
more intense every day, news came of an attack on 


* Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Acting Secretary 
Wharton to Egan, September 26, 1891. 


146 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


American sailors in the streets of Valparaiso. One 
hundred and fifty seamen on the warship Baltimore, 
stationed in the port, had been kept in their quarters 
for some time. But leave was granted to them on the 
16th of October and most of them wandered into 
town that afternoon. Trouble started about six 
o’clock in the evening in the True Blue saloon, where 
one of the crew of the Baltimore had an altercation 
with a Chilean sailor. A fight ensued as the American 
and a companion went out on the street. Surrounded 
by a Chilean mob, they fled for shelter, and during 
the riot that resulted, even after the police arrived, 
one of the Americans was killed and the other seri- 
ously wounded. During the evening four more of 
them were wounded and one Chilean citizen. Thirty- 
six of the crew of the Baltimore were detained by 
the police, but were discharged later in the night 
when no evidence against them was found.® 
Captain Schley, commanding officer of the Balti- 
more, held an investigation the next morning. His 
report stated that the attack was brutal and unpro- 
voked. It included the serious charge that the Val- 
paraiso police were implicated. According to the testi- 
mony given Schley by the crew, Charles Riggin was 
killed by the police who were supposed to disperse 
the mob. Other sailors deposed that they had been 
“nippered” by cat-gut cords after being arrested and 
were dragged to the police station. Schley himself 
bore witness to the fact that up to 5:30 he had been 


* Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Report of Cap- 
tain Schley, enclosed in Egan to Blaine, October 28, 1891. 


TROUBLE WITH THE COLOSSUS 147 


on shore and had found all of his men sober and 
well-behaved. Blaine accepted this investigation as 
fully accurate and demanded through Egan a prompt 
and full reparation.!° 

The United States was itself involved at this time 
in explanations to Italy for the Mafia incident in 
New Orleans and to China for an attack on coolies 
in Colorado. But the difference in the Valparaiso 
affair, it pointed out, was that the Chilean attack 
was clearly on the American uniform. The northern 
republic took the view that as the riot had occurred 
in various parts of the city so nearly simultaneously, 
it was evidently planned beforehand and so must 
have been due to enmity toward the country instead 
of to individual seamen. 

Matta resisted the demand from Washington for 
reparation as firmly as he did the appeals for safe- 
conduct. He could not recognize boards of investiga- 
tion other than the Chilean courts, where a trial of 
the case was now being held. The proceedings to 
which he referred were being conducted by Judge E. 
Foster Recabarren in Valparaiso and were secret. 
They were similar to the actions of a grand jury in 
the United States and slowness was as characteristic 
of one as of the other. But the American government 
complained constantly of the delay. 

At first the sailors from the Baltimore who were 
brought before Foster’s court were not allowed to 

have officers with them who might act as counsel. 
Lawyers were given them by the court, and they were 


* Tbid., Wharton to Egan, October 23, 1891. 


148 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


required to sign certain written statements in Spanish 
which they did not understand. Captain Schley finally 
obtained the consent of the judge to the admittance 
of an American officer who could speak Spanish and 
who might act as an interpreter for his men. But 
Foster refused to consider publishing the testimony 
until he was ready to hand down a complete report. 

The court inquiry dragged on into December. The 
police intendant at Valparaiso was indignant in his 
denial that his men shared in the attack on the Amer- 
icans. He informed Matta that the whole disturbance 
had been in the nature of a drunken sailors’ brawl. 
His contention was given weight by the appearance 
of two tipsy members of the crew from the Baltimore 
one afternoon in Foster’s court. They were returned 
to the ship for punishment with the comment that 
Americans might now understand how possible it 
was that the sailors could have been under the influ- 
ence of liquor on the fatal evening of October 16th.*4 

With no solution in sight for either the refugee 
situation in Santiago or the Baltimore affair at Val- 
paraiso, Benjamin Harrison devoted most of his 
message to Congress in December of 1891 to the 
Chilean situation. He upheld Egan’s position entirely 
as to the demand for safe-conduct for Balmacedists 
under his protection, though he reported at the same 
time that police restrictions had been relaxed. “I have 
not been willing to direct the surrender of such per- 
sons as are still in the American legation,” he said. 


4 Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Egan to Blaine, 
December 4, 1891. 


TROUBLE WITH THE COLOSSUS _ 149 


In regard to the Baltimore case, Harrison declared 
that the American sailors had been peaceable and 
orderly ; that they were attacked without cause; that 
a few of the police had tried to protect them while 
others joined in the assault; that American sailors 
were treated brutally while detained at the police sta- 
tions; and that the only explanation for the whole 
attack was hostility to the American uniform. He 
promised to call a special session to consider what 
should be done if Chile did not give prompt and 
ample apology and reparation. 

The message clearly suggested the possibility of 
war and Congressman McCreary, a Republican from 
Kentucky, told newspaper men that war-talk was 
frequent throughout the country; that a million men 
would respond to the call to arms.12 Matta wired 
Pedro Montt, the Chilean minister to Washington, 
that both the message of President Harrison and the 
accompanying report of Secretary Tracy of the 
Navy Department were either erroneous or deliber- 
ately incorrect; he told Montt to deny everything 
that did not agree with letters received from the for- 
eign office in Santiago. “Chile will maintain its dig- 
nity,” he added, “notwithstanding the intrigues which 
proceed from so low a source and threats which 
come from so high a source.”?4 

The telegram was not submitted by Montt to the 
Department of State but was given to the press. 


“Interview in the New York Herald, quoted in The Nation 
(January 14, 1892). 


“Department of State, Bureau of Archives, enclosure in 
Egan to Blaine, December 12, 1891. 


150 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


About the same time, the preliminary report on the 
Baltimore case was issued by Foster. It upheld the 
contention that drunken sailors of both navies had 
begun the affray. It found that three Americans had 
attacked one Chilean in the beginning; that no evi- 
dence was brought to light to support the idea that - 
the police killed Charles Riggin. It recommended im- 
prisonment for one American and three Chileans. At 
Washington it was stated that Harrison had not 
changed his view of the case at all after studying the 
report. 

Shortly before Christmas, Jorge Montt was in- 
augurated president, duly elected under the auspices 
of the temporary government set up after the fall of 
Balmaceda. This brought about a change in the cabi- 
net and Matta left the foreign office. He was suc- 
ceeded by Luis Pereira, who was inclined to be more 
friendly towards Egan, and the diplomatic situation 
assumed a brighter aspect. Though no written safe- 
conduct was given the refugees, they were allowed 
to board an American warship and the legation was 
submitted to no further annoyance. 

But when Pereira turned to the Matta telegram, he 
offered to withdraw it only on the ground that a 
president’s message could not be made the basis of a 
diplomatic action. This was considered by Blaine as 
an evasion and not at all acceptable. Another investi- 
gation of the Baltimore affair, taken at Mare Island 
when the warship returned to the California coast, 
revived the American charges that an unwarranted 
attack, assisted by the police, had been made on the 


TROUBLE WITH THE COLOSSUS 151 


United States Navy. Pedro Montt began a lively cor- 
respondence with Blaine to uphold the court report 
from Valparaiso. On the 20th of January came a 
demand from Santiago for the withdrawal of Egan. 
Evidently the new cabinet was not planning a com- 
plete reversal of Chile’s position. 

Blaine dispatched at once to-his minister, now per- 
Sona non grata, a peremptory demand that the Matta 
telegram be withdrawn with full apology; otherwise 
diplomatic relations would be suspended. Harrison 
then sent to Congress on January 25th the special 
message which he had promised and submitted the 
entire correspondence for the past year relating to 
Chilean affairs. He again approved Egan’s actions 
and called attention to Blaine’s ultimatum. “We do 
not covet their territory [the Chileans],” he said. 
“We desire their peace and prosperity.”!4 But he 
recommended that Congress now authorize him to 
use force to obtain the fulfillment of the American 
demands. 

It was, of course, ridiculous for Chile to consider 
a war with the powerful northern republic. Its fleet 
might do some immediate damage and the California 
coast was alarmed for a time. But the outcome of a 
struggle between two nations so unevenly matched 
could never be in doubt. It was time for the Montt 
administration to retire from its position as grace- 
fully as possible. Pereira agreed to withdraw all por- 
tions of the Matta telegram that were offensive to 


“ Message of Presilent Harrison, respecting Relations with 
Chile, p. 4. ‘ 


152 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


the United States; the request for Egan’s departure 
was cancelled; and the Chilean foreign office sug- 
gested that the Baltimore case be referred to the 
United States Supreme Court for final decision. Har- 
rison immediately expressed his full satisfaction and 
before the end of January the war clouds had dis- 
sipated. 

The decision of the Chilean court appeared next 
month. Sentences of imprisonment on the three na- 
tionals condemned in the original report were con- 
firmed. Charges against the police were dismissed, 
since no individual officer had been accused. In July 
the Chilean government offered to pay $75,000 for a 
settlement of the claims arising from the incident. 
This was accepted by the United States, and the most 
trying episode in the relations between the two coun- 
tries was brought to an end. But excitement reached 
such a height in the United States that the body 
of Riggin, the murdered sailor, lay in state a short 
while in Independence Hall at Philadelphia. Such 
an honor had been given before only to the remains 
of Abraham Lincoln and Henry Clay!?® 

It seemed the next winter that the same unpleas- 
antness would occur again. A Balmacedist plot was 
unearthed and quickly suppressed. Once more leaders 
involved in it fled to the American legation. And 

* The Nation, August 18, 1892; Captain John Codman, who 
had had thirty-three years’ experience in the navy, wrote to the 
Salt Lake City Herald on November 4, 1891, that he had read 
the report of Captain Schley to the effect that all the 150 sail- 
ors on the Baltimore were well-behaved after being long pent 


up in narrow quarters. “Well, mebbe so, mebbe,” commented 
Captain Codman. 


TROUBLE WITH THE:COLGSSUS\ 153 


again Egan held that it would mean their death if he 
released them to the authorities. But the November 
elections in the United States had brought victory to 
the Democratic candidate, Grover Cleveland. His in- 
auguration in March 1893 meant the retirement of 
James G. Blaine. Hardly had Secretary Gresham 
taken control of the State Department than he wrote 
Egan to surrender the refugees. The fiery Irishman 
argued in vain; Gresham insisted that asylum was 
not to be granted. The American minister then ab- 
sented himself from the house while his two visitors 
made their escape. One was successful, but the other 
was caught by the police.'® 

The first message of Cleveland to Congress sent 
the following December denounced Egan for ever 
receiving the fugitives. “Under no circumstances can 
the representatives of this government be permitted 
under the ill-defined fiction of extraterritoriality,” he 
said, “to interrupt the administration of criminal 
justice in the countries to which they are accredited.” 
Shortly before this message was read to Congress, 
the Jtata was declared by the United States Supreme 
Court not to have violated the neutrality laws and 
was returned to Chile.'” 

So ended the nearest approach to a war that the 
United States has ever had with a South American 
nation. The powerful northern republic had won all 
of its contentions, but it was a debatable question 
whether the victory was worth the cost. For Chile 


* John Bassett Moore, International Law Digest, p. 800. 
* Congressional Record, 53rd Congress, 2nd session. 


154 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


was one of the strongest and most progressive repub- 
lics south of Panama. If the United States were to 
succeed in the new Pan-American movement on 
which it was now centering its diplomatic efforts, the 
friendship of leading Latin American nations was 
indispensable. The northern colossus aspired to a 
headship in all American affairs; Chilean hostility 
might easily be a stumbling-block to such an ambi- 
tion. 


CHAPTER XI 
INTERNATIONAL MAKEWEIGHTS 


The greatest handicap with which the United 
States was forced to contend in its aim to be the 
recognized leader of American republics was its lack 
of material business interests in so many of the larger 
countries. Nowhere was this more evident than in 
Chile. 

“Foreign commerce is represented in Valparaiso 
by England first and then by France and Germany,” 
wrote William Roberts in 1885. “In Santiago the 
French come first ; they own nearly all of the jewelry, 
drygoods and furniture stores. The French language 
is taught in the schools along with the Spanish and 
is spoken in fashionable circles. Literature is largely 
French and men study the views and actions of 
French statesmen. No American publication of any 
kind is found in a store or club. The people of the 
United States are greatly deceived as to the influence 
which they command in this section of the world.””? 

England had been compelled by this time to share 
its monopoly of the carrying trade from Panama to 
Valparaiso with a subsidized Chilean company, and 
the Pacific Steam Navigation Company had entered 
into a partnership with the new line. Another com- 
petitor was the Kosmos, a German line. British, 
French, and German steamers also ran to Chile 


*Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Roberts to Bay- 
ard, September 24, 1885. 


156 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


through the Straits. “But the flag of the Great Re- 
public can only be seen on a few old whalers,” 
Roberts reported in 1886. 

These conditions still held in the early years of the 
twentieth century. “Americans are extremely scarce 
in this country today,’ was the comment of Alberto 
Willson, in 1907, when he described conditions to 
Secretary Elihu Root. “Americans managing an 
American company are not to be found.’”? Even W. 
R. Grace and Company, through whom the United 
States representatives in Chile drew their pay drafts, 
was managed entirely by British agents at Valpa- 
raiso. It was the only concern of any size in the later 
nineteenth century that could even be considered 
partly American, and its head office was in London. 
By 1907 it was running a steamship line from New 
York to Valparaiso, as was Wessel, Duval, and Com- 
pany, also of New York. But both lines flew British 
flags and ran monthly steamers, while ships sailed 
weekly from Liverpool for Chile.* 

Five reasons were suggested by Minister John 
Hicks in 1908 for the difficulty of increasing Amer- 
ican business in the southern republics. First, so few 
American firms in the United States had men who 
spoke Spanish. In the second place, business houses 
in Chile had long credit and large orders from 
Europe. Americans could not accommodate them- 
selves easily to the requirements of foreign trade. 


? Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Alberto Willson 
to Root, May 17, 1907; Willson was a native of the United 
States who had held office under various Chilean governments 
after becoming a citizen there. 

® Tbid. 


INTERNATIONAL MAKEWEIGHTS 157 


Then, too, the European firms had salesmen in all 
large Chilean towns who spoke fluent Spanish. He 
mentioned the conditions in the carrying trade as a 
fourth reason. His last observation was, that the 
banks, being either English, German, or Spanish, 
were not interested in furthering American com- 
merce.* 

To this paucity of business connections was added 
the blundering of American diplomacy, as evidenced 
in the War of the Pacific and the Balmaceda Revo- 
lution. The description given by Major Logan in 
1883 explained much of the unfortunate bungling 
that seemingly might have been avoided : 


The American diplomat in Spanish America has to save 
for his return to the United States; his European colleagues 
can spend their salary as their position is fixed. They speak 
three or four living languages and can mingle with all kinds 
of people, while the American is always looking for some- 
one who can speak English and he gets all of his news 
secondhand. The watchword of the American is economy; 
he has no such staff as the European and even pays a trans- 
lator out of his own funds. The American diplomat takes a 
cheap house in the suburbs and furnishes it in the plainest 
way, while his whole style of living is commensurate with 
his establishment. He receives hospitality out of deference 
to his position, but is not situated suitably to return it. He 
cannot mingle in general society because of his inability to 
speak the language; he can have no direct intercourse with 
the heads of the government to which he is accredited 
unless they happen to speak English, which is rarely the 
case; while every fact which he reports to his own govern- 
ment comes to him secondhand and is less liable to be 
correct.® 


“Tbid., Hicks to Root, May 16, 1908. 
*Tbid., Logan to Frelinghuysen, September 13, 1883. 


158 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


Logan’s report was confirmed by Roberts, who 
wrote two years later that “the seating accommoda- 
tion belonging to the legation consists of one chair. 
There are three bookcases, a desk and a table, all very 
old, and the two shields would make attractive orna- 
ments on a Chinese pagoda.” 

With these conditions prevailing, it is surprising 
that the diplomacy of the United States succeeded as 
well as it did in its initial trials of the Pan-American 
idea. The first Conference was held in 1889 at Wash- 
ington and was attended by every one of the Latin- 
American countries. The invitation to it included a 
discussion of arbitration in the agenda. As the ab- 
sorbing question for Chile was the retention of Arica 
and Tacna, its acceptance was not given at once. A 
special messenger had to be sent to Santiago by 
Grover Cleveland to allay fears that the treaty of 
Ancon might be revised. The suspicious government 
was at last induced to join, but with the plain under- 
standing that only commercial and economic matters 
would be discussed.® 

Balmaceda and other Chilean leaders were inter- 
ested then in a bimetallic union for American coun- 
tries to fight the British gold standard. A union of 
this sort among the Latin countries of Europe had 
been broken recently on the rock of opposition from 
London. Chile wanted a fight to be started now from 
the New World. In addition to the benefits that 
would accrue to its silver mines, it was making 
strenuous efforts to retire the paper money flood that 


* El Diario Oficial de la Republica de Chile, March 27, 1889. 


INTERNATIONAL MAKEWEIGHTS 159 


had come with the War of the Pacific. Thus from 
some angles, a Pan-American conference would 
prove attractive to Chile if political questions could 
be omitted.’ 

But the meeting proved a disappointment. In the 
first place, the success of the Republican party in the 
fall elections of 1888 in the United States had been 
followed by the return of Blaine to the Department of 
State just as the conference opened. Though he was 
not a delegate, he was chosen president “against the 
open opposition of representatives from the Chilean 
and Argentine republics,” according to the Ferrocar- 
vil of Santiago.® His attempt to obtain a general 
agreement for the mutual lowering of tariff rates 
among American nations was not accepted by the 
Chilean delegation. They informed the conference 
that their country would act in such matters as best 
served its own interests. At the same time the in- 
ternal political situation in the United States pre- 
vented any agreement’s being reached on bimetallism. 

Moreover, a resolution was passed that recom- 
mended obligatory arbitration in all American dis- 
putes. It specified boundaries and indemnities as sub- 
jects that would be included. Chilean delegates ab- 
sented themselves from the session in which this was 
adopted, saying that the law of nations in regard 
to the subject was sufficient for their govern- 

"Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Roberts to Bay- 


ard, December 29, 1886, with enclosure of speeches in the 
Chilean Senate by Senators Ibafiez and Concha i Toro. 


* El Ferrocarril, October 8, 1889. 


160 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


ment.® “We are obtaining a full confirmation of the 
fears shown by the Santiago press as to the purport 
and views of that Congress,’”’ commented the editor 
of El Comercio of Valparaiso. The only definite ac- 
complishment was the formation of a Bureau of 
American Republics whose chief function was to 
gather statistics. Its governing board was composed 
of the Latin-American ministers in Washington, with 
the Secretary of State as chairman. 

Chile did not feel as much resentment toward the 
United States as it did toward its sister republics of 
South America for the action on arbitration. In fact, 
William Henry Trescot, who was the American 
member of the subcommittee, opposed the resolution 
finally reported to the general meeting. Much favor- 
able comment was made of this in the Santiago press, 
although it was pointed out that Blaine did not state 
his own position. 

On the other hand, the expansion of Chile had 
produced alarm all through the South American 
continent. Diplomats from Peru and Bolivia were 
quick to seize the advantage that came their way on 
account of the attitude on arbitration taken by their 
recent enemy. By 1901, when the second conference 
convened at Mexico City, they had paved the way 
for a diplomatic isolation of Chile in South America. 
Again Chilean delegates attended a meeting of Amer- 
ican states, with the particular object in mind of 
resisting any political commitments. 


° International American Conferences; Reports of Commit- 
tees and Discussions Thereon, II. 1122. 


INTERNATIONAL MAKEWEIGHTS 161 


As the result of a compromise offered by a repre- 
sentative from the United States, the treaty that 
provided for compulsory arbitration was signed by 
several Latin-American delegations at a meeting out- 
side the conference itself. Chile was thus relieved - 
from the embarrassment of another withdrawal from 
plenary sessions. This fight for outside consideration 
of arbitration was made by the American delegation 
against the opposition of Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, 
and several of the smaller countries.1° The incident 
served to show Chile that the United States was not 
particularly interested in regaining territory for Peru 
or in revising the Treaty of Ancon. 

Pan-Americanism was now beginning to develop 
into special conferences on commercial and scientific 
subjects. As doubts of the purposes of the founder 
were gradually removed, Chile became actively inter- 
ested in these non-political movements. The project 
of an intercontinental railway to run from New York 
to Buenos Aires with branches to cities west of the 
Andes was heartily favored at Santiago. The Chilean 
capital was the meeting place for the first Pan-Amer- 
ican Scientific Congress in 1908, where scholars from 
the two Americas came together to study and dis- 
cuss such diverse subjects as astronomy, conserva- 
tion of resources, education, engineering, law, min- 
ing, hygiene, commerce, and taxation. 

The increased interest in Pan-Americanism was 
accompanied by a growing cordiality toward the 


John Vavasour Noel, History of the Second Pan-American 
Congress [sic], p. 119. 


162 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


United States among Chilean statesmen. But when 
the province of Panama seceded from Colombia and 
was recognized as an independent state so promptly 
by Theodore Roosevelt, the bogey of American ex- © 
pansion toward the south was raised again. Colombia 
at once tried to interest other nations in an active 
protest against the colossus. But it had just been 
playing a double game in signing secret treaties with 
Peru and Chile,t' and the Chilean reply was po- 
litely cold. Agustin Edwards, the foreign minister, 
answered that he regretted the incidents mentioned, 
but made no further comment. 

Though some of the Chilean newspapers were crit- 
ical of Roosevelt’s action, the press was about equally 
divided. A protest in the Chamber of Deputies 
brought by an opposition member made no change 
in the government policy of neutrality.'? The Fer- 
rocarril was most impressed by the fact that when 
the Panama Canal was opened, “Chile could lessen 
by at least one third the time necessary for com- 
mercial communication with Europe and the eastern 
part of the United States.” Even though Chilean 
opinion was divided, it represented a change from 
1897, when an American minister “regretted to write 
that in the Spanish-American War, the sympathies 
of the Chilean people were overwhelmingly for 
Spain”; when a projected treaty between Peru and 


4 Chilean Times, of Valparaiso, June 5, 1901. 


’ Camara de diputados: boletines de sesiones extraordinarias, 
November 25, 1903, p. 438. 


INTERNATIONAL MAKEWEIGHTS 163 


Chile left all matters of dispute to the arbitration of 
the Spanish queen."* 

Theodore Roosevelt took another step soon after- 
wards that frightened many Latin Americans, when 
he announced his policy of the “Big Stick.’’ Accord- 
ing to this, the United States would exercise a species 
of international police power in the regions of the 
New World where nations could not abstain from 
frequent revolutions or from piling up debts that their 
revenues might be unable to meet. But, it was added, 
the stable, progressive countries would not be subject 
to such control. In explaining this doctrine, the 
American president used the illustration of Colombia 
and Chile as two types of nations he had in mind. 
Chile was a country that could help enforce the Mon- 
roe Doctrine, he said later on his visit to Santiago, 
where he was cordially received. Chileans felt little 
fear of the “Big Stick.” 

Elihu Root also stopped in Chile on his South 
American tour and made speeches denying any ideas 
of political aggression by his country. On another 
occasion a visit was made by the American fleet, 
which was received with great enthusiasm. Much 
care was taken to avoid any disturbances, and the 
conduct of the American officers evoked favorable 
comment. 

Agustin Edwards, who owned a number of im- 
portant Chilean newspapers and magazines, began a 

campaign of interesting his countrymen in the United 
ee Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Wilson to Sher- 


man, May 20, 1898; for further details of the treaty see chap- 
ter xiii. 


164 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


States. His leading daily, E] Mercurio, ran Sunday 
letters from New York. He took pains to express 
constantly his approval of American diplomacy in the 
New World, and admitted that he was trying to allay 
the feelings of distrust that had been so long rooted 
in the Chilean mind.'* “The sole promise of the 
realization of such works as the Pan-American rail- 
way is sufficient to dispel the specter of the Yankee 
danger,” he wrote in 1903. “Europe is very far 
away, disconnected from us, forming in fact another 
world.”!5 Of the Panama Canal he declared that, in 
making the United States a commercial rival of 
Europe, it would prove a blessing for all South 
America. To his mind, furthermore, the policy of 
Roosevelt could not be considered a menace towards 
well-organized countries. 

Edwards was a prime mover in the campaign for 
using American educational methods. It was logical 
to do so, he contended, since the United States 
achieved its greatness under a democratic system. In 
consequence of his writings, the government sent 
four educators to the northern republic to study its 
system of public instruction. American methods be- 
came very popular, especially in certain types of 
private institutions. A number of teachers from the 
United States were engaged, and arrangements 
adopted for an interchange of professors between 
the University of Chile and American universities. 
Furthermore, American business was beginning to 


“Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Ames to Hay, 
August 12, 1905. 


* El Mercurio, March 15, 1903. 


INTERNATIONAL MAKEWEIGHTS 165 


take a real interest in Chile as a field of enterprise. 
The efforts of statesmen in both countries to in- 
crease friendly relations and forget the quarrels of 
the past held out the promise of a change for the 
better. In the first decade of the twentieth century, 
American influence was growing. 

Then in 1909 came another dispute that brought 
a threat from the northern republic to break off 
diplomatic relations. It arose out of one more vexati- 
ous claim of an American company against the 
Chilean government. As had been the case so often 
before, the company had ceased to operate in Chile, 
and the money was demanded by heirs of the original 
claimants, all of whom lived in the United States. 
In the middle of the nineteenth century, one of the 
largest American business houses in Valparaiso was 
that of Alsop and Company.’® It was one of the 
earliest concerns to take an interest in Antofagasta 
nitrates, and as far back as 1862 became involved in 
the Chilean-Bolivian quarrel. By 1872 the firm had 
gone out of business and one John Wheelwright be- 
came its liquidator. At the same time, it had become 
a creditor of the Bolivian government, which was 
unable to pay the company its debt. Accordingly, rich 
guano deposits were assigned to the liquidator as well 
as a share in the customs receipts. This brought the 
heirs of the company into conflict with Chile when 
Antofagasta passed under the control of the latter.1 


* At that time American ministers drew their pay drafts 
through Alsop, turning to Grace and Company when Alsop 
went out of business. 


* Alsop Claim; the Case for the United States, p. 4. 


166 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


In an unratified treaty of 1895 Chile had promised 
Bolivia to assume the Alsop debt. All other claims 
of American citizens were settled by an arbitral com- 
mission at Washington in 1902, but this one item 
was thrown out by the vote of the Chilean and neu- 
tral members because it was held to be a private mat- 
ter between Alsop and Company and the Chilean 
government. Negotiations with Bolivia dragged on, 
and the assumption of this claim was being used by 
Chile as a bargaining device. In 1903, when the 
American minister at Santiago again brought up the 
matter, he was offered a lump sum that Secretary 
Root declared to be less than half that which Bolivia 
agreed to pay Wheelwright in 1876. Difficulties of 
adjustment, moreover, were enhanced by the violent 
fluctuations in exchange, due to the paper-money 
standards of both South American countries. 

In the treaty signed with Bolivia in 1905 the claim 
was mentioned by name, but the sum Chile agreed to 
pay was little more than half the amount proposed 
two years before. Root at once declared flatly that 
the offer was entirely inadequate. Chile promised in 
further correspondence with Bolivia that not a cen- 
tavo would be paid any claimants unless they re- 
nounced all rights against the latter country. An al- 
lowance of two million pesos was set aside to satisfy 
all claims, although the United States contended that 
the Alsop share alone amounted to more than that. 
Federico Puga Borne, the Chilean foreign minister, 
announced in 1907 that the fund provided for that 
item in the Bolivian correspondence was his final 
offer. It was rejected by the Alsop heirs. 


INTERNATIONAL MAKEWEIGHTS | 167 


All other claimants included in the treaty of 1905 
were satisfied, and Chile now threatened to review 
the whole Alsop case and scale down the debt even 
further if the company did not accept immediately. 
The point was made that, as the firm had a Chilean 
charter, it was entitled to no diplomatic protection 
from the United States and that this had been recog- 
nized by the commission in 1902. The American re- 
ply was that Chile’s action amounted to a confiscation 
of property, and that its position, if maintained, 
would mean that the United States could not defend 
the rights of its citizens abroad. 

For two years more notes were exchanged between 
Washington and Santiago to no effect. Repeatedly 
the government of the United States requested an 
opportunity to examine documents that would show 
why the claim should be so much reduced. Chile in- 
sisted that its own courts were the sole authorities 
competent to decide the matter. A special mission was 
sent from Washington by the State Department to 
Santiago to demand that the question be arbitrated 
at once, or that not less than one million dollars in 
American gold be paid by the Chilean government. 
The latter replied that it would accept an arbiter, but 
would refer to him the question whether the United 
States should have intervened at all. Thereupon the 
northern republic gave notice that diplomatic rela- 
tions would be severed at once if Chile did not 
abandon this point.1® 


* Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Knox to Pierre- 
pont, November 17, 1909. 


168 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


But the risk of international rupture did not last 
long. It was agreed that the two countries had mis- 
understood each other. They consented to submit the 
question to the King of England, and in the protocol 
they signed did not mention the disputed point that 
had brought them so close to a breach of relations. 

The decision of Great Britain was on the whole 
favorable to the United States. The entire claim as 
first admitted by Bolivia was allowed and reckoned 
in bolivianos according to the rate of exchange at 
the time the award was made.’® Minor points were 
decided against the United States, such as certain 
items in its brief demanding payment for damages 
done to the company at Chilean hands in its mining 
rights. The interest was set at the Bolivian rate of 
five, instead of the Chilean rate of six per cent as 
the American lawyers had asked. Chile’s contention 
with respect to the jurisdiction of its courts was re- 
jected, since the submission of the case to an arbiter 
was considered an answer in itself.?° 

As the Alsop dispute proved an effective make- 
weight over against all of the careful strengthening 
of friendly relations which had preceded it, so did the 
influence that the United States had been gaining in 
Pan-American conferences find a counterpoise in an 
alliance among South American nations. These were 
the three republics that had made the most rapid 
progress in the arts of both peace and war, namely 
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. A definite union among 
aad os Claim: The Decision of Award by Great Britain, 


piaie 
» Ibid., p. 9. 


INTERNATIONAL MAKEWEIGHTS 169 


these three—the A. B. C. powers—might well bring 
down in a measure the international balance in the 
New World. 

Argentina and Brazil, the two largest South Amer- 
ican states, had long been rivals. Chile’s complete 
victory in the War of the Pacific had been viewed 
with complacency by Brazil for two reasons. The 
Brazilian boundary with Bolivia had never been de- 
termined with accuracy, and the mountain republic 
was much weakened through its crushing defeat. 
Then too Argentina was forced to divert its whole 
attention to this growing power on its western 
border. 

When William Roberts arrived as American min- 
ister at Santiago, two years after the Treaty of 
Ancon, President Santa Maria intimated that it 
might not be long before the United States and his 
own country met at Panama. The embarrassed envoy 
turned this aside with a laugh in which all of the 
members of the cabinet joined who were present at 
the private interview.2! But whether Santa Maria 
was serious or not, most of the other countries of 
South America feared that Chile had just such an 
aim. A competitive armament race on land and sea 
with Argentina followed the war and, as has been 
seen, by 1900 diplomatic isolation was threatening 
the late victor. Chilean statesmen worked quietly and 
patiently to offset this danger. All disputes with 
Argentina were settled by British arbitration in 


“Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Knox to Bay- 
ard, July 8, 1885. 


170 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


1902; a treaty was signed with Bolivia in 1905; no 
further expansion seemed planned other than the 
definite acquisition of Tacna and Arica. 

Then in 1907 the rumor was heard that an under- 
standing among Argentina, Brazil, and Chile was 
being reached on all phases of international politics. 
Peru became alarmed immediately, and complained 
to the United States that American and Peruvian in- 
terests were both being menaced, but the northern 
republic saw no reason to protest. Not long after- 
wards it was reported that a defensive alliance be- 
tween the two southernmost republics had been re- 
jected at Buenos Aires because Brazil was to be in- 
vited to join. An unpleasant quarrel followed be- 
tween Baron Rio Branco, the foreign minister of 
Brazil, and Dr. Estanislao S. Zeballos, his official 
counterpart in Argentina. A telegram from the for- 
eign office at Rio de Janeiro instructing its ministers 
to agree to no treaty as long as Zeballos was in office 
was read in the Argentine Senate. Rio Branco im- 
mediately declared it a forgery Before the year of 
1909 had come to a close, the tripartite alliance 
seemed impossible.** 

But reports of a secret understanding persisted. 
In 1915 the three South American powers offered 
mediation between the United States and Mexico at 
the time that marines from the northern republic 
were landed at Vera Cruz. President Wilson 
promptly accepted the offer, and though the dispute 
was brought to an end by the overthrow of Huerta 


2 O Jornal de Commercio, Rio de Janiero, November 3, 1908; 
El Mercurio, Santiago, October 7, 1908. 


INTERNATIONAL MAKEWEIGHTS 171 


at Mexico City, the very fact that mediation had 
been permitted seemed to give the final impulse 
needed to bring an A. B. C. alliance into concrete 
form. It was officially ratified soon afterwards, and 
represented three leading ideas: unlimited extension 
of the arbitration compromises that had been made 
by them in past years; an agreement to submit all! 
international disputes to an investigation before re- 
sorting to war; an understanding that any one of the 
countries would permit the other to intervene in in- 
ternational difficulties that it might have with outside 
parties.7% 

How far the alliance was determined by a spirit 
of opposition to the increasing influence of the 
United States has never been established. It has even 
been said that the idea was first suggested by Elihu 
Root when during the course of his journey through 
South America he spoke of the ways in which the 
southern countries could help the aims of his own.** 
But it was something of a potential check neverthe- 
less to any undue expansion on the part of the 
northern republic. 


* Carlos Becu, El A. B. C.; su concepto politico y juridico, 
p. 44. 

* Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Hicks to Root, 
December 11, 1907. 


CHAPTER XII 


NEUTRALITY ABROAD AND DIFFERENCES AT HOME. 


The entry of the United States into the Great War 
applied the “acid test” to the effectiveness of Pan- 
Americanism in political codperation. Instead of all 
the Latin-American republics joining their northern 
neighbor in a common effort on behalf of “liberty, 
civilization, democracy, and humanity” to make the 
world safe for all concerned, most of the important 
nations adhered to the neutrality that they had de- 
clared at the outset of the struggle. Among them 
was Chile. 

Here, more actively by far than the government 
at Washington, that of Germany had sought to ad- 
vance the interests of its nationals in many a field of 
endeavor. German communities were established at 
Valdivia and Punta Arenas. Banks that were nomi- 
nally private concerns, but in reality branches of 
large German houses in Europe, were started in 
Santiago. Schools in southern Chile were subsidized 
by the government of the Kaiser and wealthy Ger- 
mans contributed books and supplies to them.? As 
early as 1902 American locomotives were being dis- 
placed by importations from Germany, and a few 
years later the traffic manager for the Chilean gov- 


*Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Consul Bowen 
to Secretary of State, May 10, 1910. 


ABROAD AND AT HOME 173 


ernment railways was a German.” Loans were sought 
by Chile in the Berlin Bourse instead of at London. 

But this was only a beginning. As in other neutral 
countries, the influence of Germany in Chile was ex- 
aggerated when the war threw all Europe into rival 
camps. True, the military system had been changed 
from French to German, and even the Boy Scouts 
of Chile were learning the goose-step. German in- 
fluence was particularly strong also in scientific pur- 
suits. But the Allied countries had by no means been 
displaced in most of the fields that they had domi- 
nated. England and France had as much hold on 
Chilean interests as their enemy could possibly have. 
Moreover, the intellectuals, in great majority, were 
altogether Francophile in their sympathies and not 
averse either to the British. 

Through the early years of the war Chile had had 
its own peculiar problems in maintaining a position 
of neutrality. On account of the nitrate deposits as 
sources of supply for the manufacture of explosives, 
both the British and the German navies during 1914 
and 1915 chose the waters near the Chilean coast as 
a field for their operations. A few island groups 
under the jurisdiction of the South American nation 
were far enough away from the mainland to make 
- it difficult to enforce its neutrality laws in the insular 
harbors. The coastal configuration at the southern 
end of the continent, with the numerous small 
islands clustered there, presented another difficulty. 


2 Tbid., President W. H. Marshall of the American Loco- 
motive Company to Secretary Root, November 9, 1906. 


174. CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


Many merchant vessels of both belligerents were 
converted into auxiliary cruisers soon after the out- 
break of the war and often defied the Chilean port- 
laws.® 

There was indeed more reason in 1917 for Chile 
to hold grievances against the Entente than there 
was cause for its declaring war against the govern- 
ment of the Kaiser. It was the British navy with its 
enforcement of a blockade that had caused a 
short business depression in 1914. The northern ni- 
trate market almost became closed as England re- 
quisitioned a large part of its own merchant marine 
for war purposes, while its blacklists stopped most of 
the Chilean trade with Germany. Nitrate plants shut 
down one after another. The agricultural districts 
around Santiago were consequently depressed, be- 
cause the northern section could not buy its food- 
stuffs. Lulled into security by the prospect of con- 
tinued incomes from the northern mines, Chile had 
deferred since 1894 a return to specie payment that 
had been scheduled four or five times. Now deposits 
were withdrawn from the banks, and the paper- 
money basis had to be continued indefinitely. 

The business depression did not last long after the 
government took effective measures to fight these 
dangers. An advance of money to nitrate producers 
kept the industry up to a forty per cent level. A loan 
to the banks, which had united under the leadership 
of the Banco de Chile to cope with the situation, 


® Alejandro Alvarez, La grande guerre européenne et la 
neutralité du Chile, pp. 152-153. 


ABROAD AND AT HOME 175 


enabled them to meet the demands of their deposi- 
tors. The number of public employees was reduced. 
Taxes on liquor and tobacco, as well as stamp taxes, 
were sharply increased. And within a year the 
United States began to buy nitrates and the market 
revived. But Chileans did not feel kindly toward the 
Entente nations for the part that their blockading 
operations had played in bringing the business of the 
nation nearly to ruin. 

Moreover, great resentment had been felt through 
the country over the capture by a British squadron 
of the German cruiser Dresden in a harbor of the 
island of Juan Fernandez. The German ship had not 
obeyed Chilean laws, but had overstayed its time in 
port and was subject to internment. Without wait- 
ing, however, to see what action the Chilean govern- 
ment would take, a British squadron had sunk the 
vessel in the harbor. Notes of protest were sent to 
both Berlin and London, but the action of England 
aroused far more criticism than the mere fact that a 
cruiser had overstayed its time in Chilean waters.* 

According to the view of most of the Chilean 
statesmen, the entrance of the United States into the 
war because of its own grievances against Germany 
did not alter the position of their country. It was 
pointed out that the time when the United States 
should have asked for joint American action had 
passed. President Wilson had protested against Brit- 
ish blockade decrees in the name of his country alone. 
It was even intimated that the northern republic was 


“Ibid., p. 227. 


176 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


quite complacent over the workings of English black- 
lists in South American commerce, because thereby 
its own traders were enabled to take possession of 
the German field.® 

Arturo Alessandri, who as president after the war 
became such a pronounced friend of the United 
States, made a strong fight in the Chilean Senate 
against abandoning a neutral position. ““We must not 
forget,” he wrote in La Nacién, “that when James 
G. Blaine began an aggressive conduct against us in 
the ’80’s which even his own country later con- 
demned, he tried to provoke a joint action with 
European countries against the annexation of Ta- 
rapaca to Chile. It was Germany through the mouth 
of Chancellor Bismarck who said, “Let these people 
receive the fruit of their sacrifices, efforts, and vic- 
tories.’ ” 

“What did the United States do,” asked Robert 
Huneeus in El Diario Ilustrado, “when Chile, like 
the Don Quixote of South America, tried to prevent 
Spain from reconquering territories near her own in 
1865?” He then traced the course of Chilean-Amer- 
ican relations since the time of Blaine’s intervention 
in the War of the Pacific. He stressed particularly 
the affair at Quinteros and the Baltimore affair dur- 
ing the revolution of 1891, and next described the 
Alsop Claim. “We admire the United States,” he 


5El Mercurio, April 22, 1917, containing interview with 
Victor Robles, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee 
of the Chamber of Deputies; G. Gallardo Nieto, Newtralidad 
de Chile ante la guerra, p. xlvii. 


ABROAD AND AT HOME 177 


concluded, “but while admiring her, we also know 
her.7° 

The accusation advanced later against Chile that it 
was in close sympathy with Germany can hardly be 
sustained. In the Entente press the country was re- 
peatedly called “pro-German.” But as early as 1914 
the British Foreign Office, in order to deny any feel- 
ing of this on its part, made public announcement 
that it was satisfied with the attitude of the South 
American nation. As a Chilean publicist later ex- 
pressed it, “Chile remained neutral in the war be- 
cause it saw no profit in a parasitic role similar to 
that of the theatre ‘supers’ who swell the personnel 
of the chorus without singing a single note.’’* The 
republic maintained its neutrality for the simple and 
excellent reason that the procedure conduced most to 
its national interest. 

European business men were prompt to enter the 
South American market again at the close of the 
war. Even Germany tried to renew its former profit- 
able connections. By 1920 the Krupps were nego- 
tiating for a site in Chile on which they planned to 
build a factory that would dwarf the Essen plants.® 
England retained its hold on the nitrate fields. To this 
end the Nitrate Producers Association was formed, 
with headquarters in London, representing ninety- 
eight per cent of the output from Chilean mines. 
Through a committee of twenty members, four of 


* El Diario Ilustrado, April 30, 1917. 

™Joaquin Walker Martinez, Clamores de intervencién diplo- 
matica, p. 16. 

® New York Times Current History, June 1921. 


178 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


whom were designated by the Chilean government, 
it fixed nitrate prices for the world. But in re- 
ality, a smaller committee, resident in London and 
dominated by Anthony Gibbs and Sons, made all of 
the recommendations that the larger group adopted.® 
American interests have complained continuously of 
the British monopoly in this respect. It was even 
charged in the United States Senate in 1924 that 
British firms were behind the opposition to Henry 
Ford’s plan for developing Muscle Shoals.*° 

But much of the trade of Europe with Chile, par- 
ticularly that of Germany, had been diverted to the 
United States. Not only was this retained by the 
northern republic, but its commerce continued to 
grow. In 1910 the United States trailed both Eng- 
land and Germany in imports to and exports from 
Chile. Great Britain was far in the lead and Germany 
was gaining every year. In 1920 figures for German 
trade showed a sharp decline for the decade, while 
England was hardly holding its own. On the other 
hand, the United States had passed both of its rivals, 
and its imports from Chile were double those of the 
British."? 


° Department of Agriculture: Report of C. J. Brand, con- 
sulting specialist in marketing, “Position of Great Britain in 
the Chilean Nitrate of Soda trade.” 

” Congressional Record, 68th Congress, 1st session, Vol. 65, 
pp. 3665-3797. 


“By comparison of the report of the Second Pan-American 
Commercial Conference, pp. 400-401, with the Bulletin of the 
Pan-American Union, LIV. 48-49 (January 1922), the changes 
may be seen. In 1910 Chile sent exports to the United States 
valued at thirty million dollars. Slightly more was sent to 
Germany and five times as much to England. Imports to 


ABROAD AND AT HOME 179 


The United States now regained the market in 
agricultural machinery, principally through the ef- 
forts of W. R. Grace and Company, who were very 
active in selling to Chilean farmers. The same com- 
pany also increased its steamship service, so that its 
freight and passenger vessels from Valparaiso now 
come into New York harbor every other Monday. 

Although American business men made no ap- 
preciable effort to challenge the British monopoly of 
the nitrates, their activities in other mining fields 
grew tremendously. In 1913 the Bethlehem Steel 
Corporation acquired through a subsidiary the Tofo 
iron mines in Coquimbo, which had formerly be- 
longed to a French company. About the same time, 
the Braden Copper Mines Company began to exploit 
the mines near Rancagua. Connected with the latter 
were the Guggenheim interests which formed in 1912 
the Chile Exploration Company. In May, 1915, its 
huge metallurgical plant started operation in north- 
ern Chile, and the corporation began to exploit at 
Chuquicamata the largest deposit of copper ore 
known in the world. A rival plant in the same region 
was soon afterwards erected by the Anaconda Copper 
Chile from England amounted that year to thirty-six million 
dollars, from Germany to twenty-nine and a half million, and 
from the United States to twenty million. In 1920 the exports 
to England had fallen to less than half the amount in 1910, 
while those to Germany had dwindled to less than three million 
dollars. On the other hand, exports to the United States had 
quadrupled and were now more than twice the value of those 
sent to England. Imports into Chile from Germany had fallen 
‘off tremendously also; those from Great Britain showed a 


slight increase; those from the United States had more than 
doubled. 


180 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


Company. All of these American concerns now be- 
gan to erect villages for their workers according to 
the American models, with hospitals, schools, and 
club-houses owned by the company.’* 

But it was in the field of Chilean finance that the 
entrance of the United States was most marked dur- 
ing and after the World War. Part of the accumu- 
lated Chilean gold reserve that had been deposited 
in German banks and then moved to London was 
now shifted to New York banking-houses. The first 
payment of any size for Chilean nitrates, made in 
exchange on New York instead of London, was ac- 
cepted by the South American producers when an 
American firm bought four thousand tons.** In ac- 
cordance with a section of the Federal Reserve Act 
of 1913, moreover, the National City Bank of New 
York obtained permission to establish branch banks 
in various South American cities and soon opened 
one in Santiago. Thus a great disadvantage to Amer- 
ican business in Chile was removed."* 

Shortly after the close of the war, a financial 
mission headed by Eliodoro Yajfiez left Santiago for 
the United States to study business methods and ar- 
range for a large government loan. No satisfactory 
terms could be obtained at that time; but two years 
later through a group of six American banking- 

2 William Spence Robertson, Hispanic American Relations 
with the United States, pp. 265-268; George E. Montandon, 


“An American Enterprise in Chile,” in Overland Monthly, 
December 1909. 


% New York Times Current History, November 1915. 
™ Cf. supra, chapter xi. 


ABROAD AND AT HOME 181 


houses a loan of twenty-four million dollars was 
floated. One stipulation made by the bankers was 
that most of the money be spent in the United States, 
as it was understood that the loan was primarily for 
railway equipment and construction.*® 

In the summer of 1925 Professor Edwin W. 
Kemmerer, of Princeton University, was engaged by 
Chile to study its national finances, which had been 
unsettled for half a century. He had been head of an 
American financial commission to Colombia only 
two years before. As a result of his recommenda- 
tions a Federal Reserve Bank was created at Santi- 
ago which had the exclusive right to issue paper 
money for the nation, convertible into gold at the rats 
of exchange then prevailing. The new bank wyas a’so 
to be the fiscal agent for the central governmerst and 
likewise for municipalities, railways, and other large 
business concerns. A new banking law outlined by 
the Kemmerer Commission became effective on 
March 26, 1926.1 

The problems of sanitation as well as those of 
finance in Chile received attention from Americatr 
experts. In October 1925, James Stalbird, a sanitary 
engineer of Washington, was engaged for one year 
as expert chemist and bacteriologist in the Chilean 
Ministry of Hygiene. In August of the same year 
Dr. John D. Long, Assistant Surgeon General of the 
United States Public Health Service, was loaned to 
Chile by the United States and became technical 


* New York Times, February 2, 1915. 
* New York Times Current History, March 1926. 


182 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


adviser to the government in the matter of public 
health. 

The purchase of a palatial mansion at Santiago 
for the American embassy in 1922 was a visible token 
of the increased importance of the northern republic 
in Chilean affairs. Eight years before, the United 
State had raised the rank of its minister to that of 
ambassador, and Chile had done the same for 
its representative in Washington. The complaints of 
Logan and Roberts in days past with regard to in- 
adequate housing conditions that impaired their posi- 
tion and influence with the Chilean government 
held: good no longer.'7 

This story of peaceful penetration in Chile was 
du, ylicated in so many other South American coun- 
tries that chances were bright for a more vigorous 
Pan-A mericanism, when the Fifth International Con- 
ferencte of American States met at Santiago in 1923. 
On itfs agenda were arbitration, disarmament, inter- 
national agreements to restrict the sale of alcoholic 
liquéor in accordance with the new prohibition laws 
‘in the United States, and many of the old com- 
mercial problems that had not been solved in former 
meetings. Not only because of interest and impor- 
tance alone, but because of the lapse of thirteen years 
since the holding of the Fourth Conference, a period 
during which a world war had been fought, there 
might have been reason to hope that a new interna- 
tional gathering of the Americas around a council- 
board at the Chilean capital for the discussion and 


* Cf. supra, chapter xi. 


ABROAD AND AT HOME 183 


determination of matters presumably of common 
concern would render Pan-Americanism in spirit 
and action more of a reality than had been its lot 
heretofore. But difficulties apeared before the con- 
ference had even opened. Between 1910 and 1921 the 
northern Colossus had greatly extended its influence 
toward the south. It controlled Cuban finances, and 
Haiti was held by United States marines. The Domi- 
nican Republic and Nicaragua were under American 
tutelage. Preponderant influence of the United States 
was also evident in Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru 
through the semi-official loans recently contracted by 
these nations. Further, Mexico refused to attend the 
sessions because the Obregon government had not 
been recognized by the United States. Peru declined 
the invitation because of its hostility toward Chile. A 
proposal to include Canada, since it had sent a dele- 
gation to the Naval Limitation Conference at Wash- 
ington in 1921, and the suggestion that a representa- 
tive from the League of Nations be invited to the 
Conference, were vetoed by the United States on the 
ground that the meetings were to be devoted to 
affairs exclusively American. 

The Conference did not accomplish a great deal. 
An agreement was reached for the registration of 
trade-marks, which was acceptable both to the Latin 
Americans as producers of raw material and to the 
_ United States as a manufacturing country. This had 
been a stumbling-block at two previous gatherings 
in 1906 and 1910. A maritime code was adopted that 


184 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


would make the lot of shipping far easier. Perhaps 
the most encouraging feature of the session was the 
request for other special conferences similar to those 
on commerce, finance, and scientific subjects that had 
been held before. Delegates from many nations asked 
that provisions be made for conferences on hygiene, 
education, geography, the press, eugenics, interna- 
tional law, transportation, and engineering. 

The Conference indeed was more marked for its 
disagreements than for its harmony. The chief inter- 
est of Chile lay in its proposal for naval disarma- 
ment. This plan really concerned only Chile, Argen- 
tina, and Brazil, the powers which had joined in the 
A. B. C. alliance of 1915. But the United States felt 
that its work on disarmament was already set by the 
Washington Conference of 1921, and the smaller 
countries had no navies. If any scrapping of battle- 
ships were agreed upon at Santiago for the A. B. C. 
powers, it would have meant a virtual abandonment 
of their navies, since Argentina and Brazil each had 
two dreadnoughts and Chile only one. Accordingly 
Argentina asked for a mere maintenance of the 
status quo, whereas Brazil contended that its un- 
settled international relations and its vast coast line 
required an increase in its navy. Secret conferences 
among the three powers produced no agreement, and 
the proposal was dropped at the last public session. 

The failure to adopt the Chilean plan or to work 
out any compromise at all on the subject showed 
finally that the A. B. C. alliance had been disrupted. 


‘ABROAD AND AT HOME 185 


The entrance of Brazil into the World War in the 
wake of the United States, while Argentina and 
Chile stayed neutral, was the beginning of the dis- 
integration of the entente among the three South 
American powers. The Santiago Conference left no 
doubt as to its dissolution. 

For the first time in a Pan-American Conference, 
Latin-American nations represented at the gathering 
in the Chilean capital showed openly their opposition 
to domination by the United States. The fact that 
Mexico did not attend emphasized the need of revis- 
ing the organization of the Pan-American Union. 
As it was composed of representatives from Latin- 
American countries in Washington, no nation re- 
fused recognition by the United States could belong . 
to it. A motion was made at Santiago by the Costa 
Rican delegation that each country appoint its repre- 
sentative to the Union hereafter whether it was offici- 
ally recognized by the government at Washington or 
not. The proposal was fought by the American dele- 
gation, but a compromise was made retaining the 
provision that heads of diplomatic missions at Wash- 
ington be members of the Union but allowing non- 
recognized countries to appoint special delegates. 
The practice of having the United States Secretary 
of State as permanent president of the Union was 
also discontinued and the office made elective. 

The most embarrassing proposal encountered by 
the American delegation was that of Uruguay: to 
create an American League of Nations that would 
include a Pan-American Monroe Doctrine. This was 


186 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


finally abandoned when Ambassador Henry P. 
Fletcher, speaking under instructions from Secretary 
Hughes, declared that this doctrine was the “uni- 
lateral national policy of the United States” and his 
country could not regard with favor its conversion 
into a Pan-American policy. 

The press of nearly every nation in attendance 
rated the Conference as more or less of a failure. 
This was resented by many of the delegates. Agustin 
Edwards, of Chile, scored both the papers of his own 
country and those of the United States for their 
attitude. Mr. Fletcher, on his return home, reported 
that in social and economic matters the Conference 
was a great success, but that “we did not discuss 
state matters at all.’’?8 

While Chile was maintaining its thorough inde- 
pendence in international questions, it was con- 
fronted again with a crisis in domestic affairs that 
threatened to duplicate the Balmaceda incident. For- 
tunately, however, civil war was avoided. 

Chilean politics since 1891 had tended more and 
more to resemble the French bloc system with numer- 
ous parties that differed little in their views. Fol- 
lowers of Balmaceda, who had established a new 
party as soon as liberal amnesty laws were passed 
in their favor, were not long in forming coalitions 
with other groups and securing prominent positions 
in some of the short-lived cabinets. In 1900 there 
were eight parties in the Chamber of Deputies, and 
by 1906 there had been sixty changes in the minis- 


* New York Times, May 29, 1923. 


ABROAD AND AT HOME 187 


tries since the overthrow of Balmaceda.’® But none 
of this signified particular unrest. The revenue from 
the nitrate fields kept most of the Chileans content 
with the way their state was being run. Dispensing 
of personal political favors was the most vital ques- 
tion of the early twentieth century, since export taxes 
brought enough revenue to allow government bu- 
reaus to abound. Though a few labor troubles 
clouded the peaceful horizon, continued prosperity 
prevented any serious problems. It has been seen how 
the business depression of 1914 was checked. The 
exports from the nitrate mines reached a record 
height in 1917 and Chile actually reduced its debt 
during the war. 

But with the return of peace, trouble started. The 
expanded nitrate market could remain so no longer. 
The desire of the producers to maintain high prices 
through a London pool still further reduced the buy- 
ing field. Unemployment such as Chile had never 
known before now stalked through the north. Strikes 
among longshoremen and miners threatened to close 
the port of Antofagasta. A peculiar turn to the labor 
trouble was given by the demand of the unions for 
strict prohibition of the liquor traffic.2° In a word, 
the wants of workingmen could no longer be ignored. 

The old Liberal Alliance that had been so shaken 
by Balmaceda and had lasted in a loose form 
throughout the years, now showed signs of renewed 


* Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Hicks to Root, 
March 13, 1906. 


* New York Times Current History, December 1920, 


188 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


life when it placed Arturo Alessandri in the field as 
its candidate for president in 1921. The Democratic 
party that formed one of its branches attracted to it 
the bulk of the laborers and salaried men who were 
in the throes of political discontent. The men who 
still called themselves Liberals, though outside of the 
Alliance, united with the small but compact Con- 
servative group to form the Unionist Coalition, and 
presented Luis Barros Borgojio as their candidate. 

The election returns showed 179 electoral votes 
for Alessandri to 174 for his opponents, and it was 
understood that the Senate would not accept the 
count. A situation resembling the Hayes-Tilden con- 
test of a former period in the United States had de- 
veloped and was settled in a similar manner. A Court 
of Honor, chosen so as to be representative of both 
coalitions, decided by a vote of five to two that 
Barros Borgofio was entitled to receive two of the 
electoral votes recorded against him.*! The peaceful 
character of the Chilean citizenry was shown by the 
acceptance of this decision, even though the minority 
members of the Court had refused to attend its 
sessions for a time. 

Arturo Alessandri was inaugurated in December, 
1921. He stood as the representative of a new middle 
class composed of small merchants and farmers and 
the increasing number of bureaucratic employees. 
The Radical party that formed the majority of his 
group of supporters desired to sever relations be- 
tween church and state and to give the provincial 


2 New York Times Current History, November 1920. 


ABROAD AND AT HOME 189 


governments more authority than the centralized 
Chilean system had ever allowed them. The new 
president stood for both of these ideas and thus his 
program bore a striking resemblance to that for 
which Balmaceda had fought. 

In addition to such familiar demands was the 
platform of the Democratic party for labor reforms. 
Alessandri became sponsor for this legislation also, 
and added his own pet measure of a proportional in- 
come tax to meet the increasing deficit caused by 
the decline of the nitrate market. Longshoremen gave 
an impetus to the labor-union drive for prohibition 
by refusing to load alcoholic beverages at any port. 

Once more live issues were agitating Chilean 
politics and the supremacy of the old order was 
threatened. The making of alcoholic liquors held 
fourth place among the industries of the nation; and 
the vineyards on the estates of central Chile were a 
source of considerable income to many of the fami- 
lies who had been ruling the nation since the days 
of Portales. The demand for prohibition thus entered 
the class struggle. 

The issue of separation of church and state also 
had a significance not apparent on the surface. The 
financial depression caused many of the radicals to 
criticize the enormous wealth of the Roman Catholic 
Church. In Santiago alone its property was valued 
at more than a hundred million dollars. In anticipa- 
tion of the possible attacks that might be made with 
the inauguration of Alessandri, it was alleged that 
church officials had sent a million and a quarter dol- 


190 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


lars to Rome.?? With such charges abroad, it was 
evident that a bitter religious struggle might develop 
quickly. 

The new executive seemed at first to have plenty 
of energy and enough popular support to push 
through all of these changes to which he was dedi- 
cated. But he had entered office in a period of de- 
pression. The business revival that came to most 
countries between 1921 and 1923 did not reach 
Chile. As its government deficit increased, Alessandri 
was forced to unpopular measures in his frantic 
efforts to meet the yearly budgets. Besides this, a 
Unionist majority controlled the Senate and that 
body refused to consider his legislative program. 
His cabinets changed frequently, because of lack of 
confidence on the part of the upper chamber. Finally, 
the senators resorted to the old tactics of leaving un- 
finished the appropriation bills for the coming year. 
Alessandri then called a special session in December, 
1923, which he adjourned the next month when the 
Congress would not follow his suggestions. The Sen- 
ate, moreover, desired a guarantee that he would not 
interfere in the coming congressional elections. 

It was the duplication of the winter of 1891, with 
a few important differences. The president’s income- 
tax measure had been passed by both houses. It fell 
heaviest on real estate, which bore a nine per cent 
tax. Personal incomes were burdened with a levy of 
only two per cent. A small profits tax was also in- 


” Samuel Guy Inman, Problems in Pan-Americanism, p. 90. 


ABROAD AND AT HOME 191 


cluded. But Alessandri now wanted certain consti- 
tutional changes. He asked that his cabinets be re- 
quired only to have a majority in the lower house; 
that budget legislation always be given prior con- 
sideration ; and that whenever the Congress failed to 
pass the budget, the president might spend each 
month one twelfth of the total expended the preced- 
ing year. 

Through the “Comision Conservadora,’’2? he at last 
reached a compromise. His measures were to be sus- 
tained by the opposition parties in the next Congress, 
and in return he guaranteed that elections would be 
unhampered. He likewise agreed to another consti- 
tutional amendment that would allow him to dissolve 
the Congress only once during his term of office and 
that in the first two years.?4 

It looked as if the peace-loving Chileans had once 
more avoided revolution through compromise. The 
spring elections gave Alessandri a working majority 
in both houses of the legislature, but the deficit was 
still to be faced. Civil service employees were due 
several months pay and pensions to soldiers had been 
deferred indefinitely. The income tax did not bring 
much added revenue, because collection agencies for 
it had not been well organized. 

Hardly had the Congress opened in the summer of 
1924 when army officers, some of whom had not 
been receiving more than 200 pesos ($20 to $40) a 


* Cf. supra, chapter iv; this is the commission from the two 
houses that is in session whenever congress is adjourned. 


“New York Times Current History, April 1924. 


192 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


month,?° began to demand higher salaries. The re- 
fusal of the government to meet their requests added 
another powerful element of discontent. Unemploy- 
ment still raged in the mining districts and wage 
earners talked revolution. When the labor group of 
the president’s followers found him adamant against 
all suggestions of violence, they lost interest in his 
cause. A large section of the Liberal Alliance thus 
became passive in the political struggle that grew 
more intense every day. 

In the midst of valiant efforts to balance the 
budget, with prices rising as Chilean exchange fell, 
the Radical majority in the Congress pushed through 
a bill that provided for payment of salaries to con- 
gressmen. Heretofore they had been unpaid, and the 
new measure showed that poor men had now entered 
the political arena so long monopolized by a rela- 
tively small number of wealthy families. It was not 
an unexpected step in the course of political success 
by the new middle class, but coming at the time that 
it did, it served to arouse antagonisms as no other 
law could have done. Charges were openly made 
that the guarantee given in the spring for a free elec- 
tion of this Congress had not been kept. 

In September the army officers acted. Excluded 
from the galleries when the salary bill was being dis- 
cussed, at their headquarters at the Club Militar they 
planned a coup d’état. It was executed on the fifth, 


* The peso was then fluctuating between the value of ten 
and twenty cents in American money. 


ABROAD AND AT HOME 193 


and Alessandri had to appoint a new cabinet headed 
by General Luis Altamirano. The president then 
handed in his resignation on the ninth, took a brief 
refuge in the American embassy, and left the country 
for Argentina. Altamirano was disposed to reject 
the resignation, but when the voluntary exile insisted, 
he acquiesced and became head of a provisional 
government.?® 

The new junta issued a proclamation immediately, 
promising that no military dictatorship would be in- 
stalled. To retain the passive support of the labor 
party that had allowed Alessandri to fall, it also 
made a stand for protective labor legislation. An at- 
tempt by some of the old Radical majority to secure 
the support of the navy failed, and that arm of the 
military forces was brought into the government. 

As in the days of Manuel Montt, and later of 
Balmaceda, the conservative groups appeared to be 
favored by the European powers. Great Britain rec- 
ognized the new régime six days after Alessandri 
resigned. Foreign banks in Santiago loaned it money, 
and Rothschild of London agreed to sponsor a large 
sum whenever Chile so desired. It seemed for a while 
as if the American representative would follow the 
footsteps of Patrick Egan and back the losing fac- 
tion. On a special train chartered from Santiago, 
Ambassador William M. Collier accompanied Ales- 
_sandri to the Argentine frontier. But no further step 


* Earle K. James, “Chile’s Bloodless Revolution,” in New 
York Times Current History, December 1924. 


194 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


than this was taken and the United States remained 
on friendly terms with the new administration.?* 

The coup appeared to be a success. A sale of 
government nitrate-lands, coupled with the loans 
from foreign banks, netted enough funds to balance 
the budget. But younger military officers were soon 
complaining of Altamirano. The army had tasted 
political power and was breaking up into cliques. In 
December the new civilian cabinet appointed by the 
chief of the provisional government discharged Colo- 
nel Ewing, head of the mounted police, for alleged 
interference in the coming elections for a constitu- 
tional president. A group of young officers, drawn 
mainly from the new middle class, thereupon charged 
that Altamirano was plotting to deliver the govern- 
ment to Luis Barros Borgofio. In this stand they 
were backed by the young intellectuals and the anti- 
clerical Masons. Altamirano retorted by dissolving 
all of the military juntas. A second coup was then 
carried out on the 23rd of January, 1925, by that 
part of the army opposed to the president, and an 
invitation was sent to Alessandri to return. 

Again a revolution seemed imminent. The old 
order, as represented in the Unionist party, was not 
at all disposed to accept the change. But the Chilean 
Federation of Labor, which had so long remained 
passive, returned to the ranks of Alessandri’s sup- 

* As the Archives of the State Department for 1924 are not 
yet open to the public, it is not possible to know what was 
written to Mr. Collier from Washington in regard to this inci- 
dent. One can imagine, however, the consternation at the State 


Department when news came of this astounding breach of 
diplomatic decorum. 


ABROAD AND AT HOME 195 


porters, with a declaration approving the return of 
the exiled president. Since the latter quickly reached 
an agreement with the newest junta, his opponents 
abandoned their opposition. He consented to resume 
his executive functions, whenever he received a 
promise that the military leaders would return to 
their proper duties and that a constitutional conven- 
tion for the nation would be held promptly. Alessan- 
dri came back to Chile in March, shortly before the 
Coolidge Award was made that held out a prospect 
for the settlement of the Tacna-Arica tangle. 


CHAPTER XIII 


THE GREAT QUESTION OF SOUTH AMERICA FOR 
ALL AMERICA 


The treaty of Ancon provided that a vote of the 
inhabitants should determine the ownership of Tacna 
and Arica. But forty-two years later, when Arturo 
_Alessandri returned to Chile from his enforced exile, 
the plebiscite had not yet been held. These provinces, 
though devoid of mineral wealth, were an ever-pres- 
ent menace to the peace of the New World. With 
the great powers proclaiming the new era of peace, 
with even eastern Europe solving its petty territorial 
disputes, Peru and Chile were unable to resume 
diplomatic relations of ordinary friendship. As long 
as they disagreed, South American intrigue would 
continue, business investments on the west coast 
could not be safe, the Pan-American program was 
effectively blocked. Tacna and Arica had become the 
great question of South America for all America. 

Clause 3 of the treaty of Ancén provided for a 
Chilean occupation of ten years. “That term having 
expired, a plebiscite will decide,” it continued. The 
use of the participial phrase led to a difference in 
interpreting the clause, which started the extended 
quarrel. When the year 1893 arrived and Peru asked 
that arrangements for voting be made, Chile an- 
swered that no date had been set in the treaty. The 
only stipulation was, it maintained, that ten years 


THE GREAT QUESTION 197 


must elapse before any decision was reached. Ac- 
cording to the government at Santiago, the times 
were not then propitious for a vote, since both 
countries were in an unsettled condition. Another 
revolution held Peru in its grip, while the overthrow 
of Balmaceda had only recently occurred in Chile. 
Neither nation was in a condition to pay readily the 
ten million pesos required of it, in case that it won 
the plebiscite. 

By 1898 the financial outlook was brighter, and 
again a settlement of Tacna and Arica was under- 
taken. Guillermo Billinghurst, vice-president of Peru, 
went to Santiago on a special mission for this. He 
signed there the Latorre-Billinghurst protocol, 
whereby all disagreements as to plebiscite arrange- 
ments would be referred to the Queen of Spain for 
decision. The Peruvian Congress ratified promptly 


*The original Spanish text reads: “Espirado este plazo, un 
plebiscito decidira.” The translation of the participial phrase, 
found in the Peruvian case laid before President Coolidge in 
1923, reads: “At the expiration of that term.” On the other 
hand, the Chilean text in English gave: “After the expiration 
of the term.” According to the latter version, holding of the 
plebiscite might be deferred indefinitely, while the Peruvian 
case contended that the treaty provided for the vote to be taken 
no later than 1894. The Chilean translation is based on the 
English copy of the treaty sent by Minister S. C. Phelps to 
his home government in Washington in 1883, while he was 
serving at Lima. On the other hand, the text of the same 
treaty in the British and Foreign State Papers of 1890 
is in accordance with the Peruvian version. Cf. The Case 
of Peru in the Matter of the Controversy Arising Out of the 
Question of the Pacific, p. 22; Tacna-Arica Arbitration: the 
Case of the Republic of Chile Submitted to the President of 
the United States as Arbitrator, I, p. 9; Department of State, 
- Bureau of Archives, Phelps to Frelinghuysen, December 23, 
1883; Sir Edward Hertslet, ed., British and Foreign State 
Papers, 74, 350. 


198 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


and the Chilean Senate did likewise. But the Cham- 
ber of Deputies in Santiago was uncertain. After 
three years of hesitation, the whole arrangement was 
rejected by the Chilean lower house.” 

Meanwhile, Chile had been holding out to Bolivia 
the hope of acquiring these poor but much desired 
provinces. Neither Tacna nor Arica contained nitrate 
deposits of appreciable value, although some borax 
was mined in Arica. Chile wished to have them con- 
stitute a buffer region separating Tarapaca from 
its former owner; Peru of course desired to lose no 
more territory than had already been taken away. 
Tacna particularly had been the scene of several 
heroic deeds during the War of Pacific, and patriotic 
sentiment in Peru clamored for its retention. For 
Bolivia the practical value of the provinces was much 
greater; for without them, or some other coastal 
area, it was deprived of an outlet to the sea. 

A truce had been agreed upon between Chile and 
Bolivia at the time of the Treaty of Ancén, whereby 
Chile had retained its hold on Antofagasta. All 
claims to this province were renounced by Bolivia in 
a pact signed in 1894; whereas Tacna and Arica were 
promised to it in return, if the ever-pending plebiscite 
gave them to Chile. Bolivian interest was in this way 
to be enlisted in the Chilean cause against Peru. 
But once more the Congress at Santiago failed to 
sanction the acts of the foreign office; and that be- 
cause explanatory clauses added to the treaty to 
satisfy the Bolivian legislature were not pleasing to 


> Case of Chile, p. 75. 


THE GREAT QUESTION 199 


the Chilean lawmakers. Thus nothing was settled on 
the west coast by 1900, and the former allies began 
a campaign to enlist the sympathies of the rest of the 
South American continent against their conqueror.? 

Chile had its way with Bolivia in 1905, when a 
treaty was ratified by both parliaments that ceded 
Antofagasta to the former without any promise of 
other provinces in return. Bolivia was forced to be 
satisfied with a railroad to be built at Chilean ex- 
pense, from Arica to La Paz. It was also to own the 
Bolivian part of the road in fifteen years. In another 
clause, Chile assumed all the debts of Antofagasta. 
By this treaty, the government at La Paz relinquished 
all claims to Tacna and Arica, which it had never 
owned but had hoped to receive as the quarrel over 
them dragged on. 

For seven years after the failure of the Latorre- 
Billinghurst protocol, Chile and Peru made no offi- 
cial effort to agree, although a hope was arising that 
possibly one solution would be a division of the 
provinces between the two. Agustin Edwards favored 
this in 1904, and in his position of foreign minister, 
asked the American Minister, Dudley, who visited 
him from Lima, to find out the attitude of Peru on 
such a suggestion.* It would have been a most sensi- 
ble solution; because possession of Arica gave Chile 
its buffer territory, while Tacna contained a large 
part of the sentimental value which still attached the 
provinces to Peru. But patriotic fervor had been 

> Supra, chapter xi. 


*Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Wilson to Hay, 
January 1904. 


200 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


aroused to such a pitch as the years passed that no 
government could stand in either country which 
would sanction such an arrangement. Tacna and 
Arica had become a question of prestige and of 
national honor. 

This sensitive nationalism prevented all efforts to 
reach a settlement. The Chilean press began to dis- 
cuss the cost of occupation and estimated them as 
mounting to forty million pesos, all of which would 
have to be paid if Peru bought back the provinces. 
Augusto B. Leguia, president of Peru in 1909, told 
Leslie Coombs, the United States minister there, that 
the only subject on which his people were united was 
Tacna and Arica. “A revolutionary tendency is natu- 
ral to Peruvians,” he said. “The agitation of this 
question always has the effect of nationalizing and 
solidifying opinion, and thus at times the trouble 
with Chile works for the real welfare of the country. 
No government could live a day that would sur- 
render their ultimate destiny.’’® 

When Peru sent Guillermo Seoane to Santiago in 
1908 to renew negotiations, Chile presented pro- 
posals of a commercial nature which it now wished 
to put into treaty form before Tacna and Arica were 
further discussed. These were: first, a free trade 
convention between the two countries; second, a 
line of steamers to be subsidized by both govern- 
ments; third, the joint financing of a railroad be- 
tween Lima and Santiago; fourth, an increase to 


* Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Combs to Knox, 
November 17, 1909. 


THE GREAT QUESTION 201 


thirty million pesos as the amount of the indemnity 
to be paid by the nation winning the plebiscite. 

As Chilean commerce with Peru was worth four 
times the value of Peruvian commerce with Chile, 
the first suggestion was not one of mutual benefit. 
The other three involved an expense that Peru could 
ill afford, whereas Chile was growing rich from the 
former Peruvian nitrates. More than that, it meant 
Chilean occupation would be continued until these 
measures could be put into effect, and every year the 
provinces tended to become more and more Chilean- 
ized. Seoane therefore refused to consider the pro- 
posals, and one more attempt had failed.® 

Again, in 1910, rumors of a settlement were rife. 
A certain Sefior Alfonso went on a private mission 
from Chile to Lima, and returned with the old plan 
of Agustin Edwards for a division of the provinces. 
According to the report of the American minister 
at the time, the Barros Luco administration favored 
the plan, but it was rejected in a secret session of 
the Chilean Congress. One of those who led the 
Opposition was Arturo Alessandri.7 

A realization was growing among statesmen on 
both sides that the nations would never agree to a 
plebiscite. Chile’s reputation for stable government 
inclined foreigners who had investments in the prov- 
inces to prefer that Chile retain them. For that rea- 


*Rose Book of Chile, pp. 51-53, 


* Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Fletcher to Knox, 
March 12, 1910. Neither Chile nor Peru makes any mention 
of the Alfonso mission in the cases presented in the Wash- 
ington arbitration of 1923. 


202 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


son, Peru was much less disposed to allow foreigners 
to vote than was its opponent. It also stood against 
a literacy test for voters, particularly for those who 
were born in Tacna and Arica. As more Chileans 
moved into the provinces every year to work on the 
new public improvements their country was inaugu- 
rating, Peru also held that a residence of several 
years should be made a qualification for voting, 
whereas Chile, in 1912, suggested six months as the 
proper time limit. Even more serious disagreement 
developed every time that a discussion was held 
about the character of the plebiscitary commission. 
Chile insisted that its position as occupant of the 
territories gave it the right to hold the chairman- 
ship. In 1912 it suggested that the commission be 
composed of two persons from each country and a 
fifth appointed by the Chilean Supreme Court. Peru 
promptly declined the offer, standing by the protocol 
of 1898, which had provided that a neutral was to be 
chairman.$ 

Time undoubtedly was playing into Chile’s hands. 
It extended its colonization laws to Arica in 1900, 
and to Tacna nine years later. Every new undertak- 
ing, such as the Arica-La Paz railway, brought more 
workmen from the south and more Chilean troops 
to protect them. “This railroad was provided for, 
not only to offer a commercial advantage to Bolivia,” 
wrote El Mercurio in 1905, “but also that we might 
have effective means for Chileanizing Tacna and 
Arica, for carrying to that region population, influ- 


® Case of Peru, p. 168. 


THE GREAT QUESTION 203 


ence, and Chilean elements of every kind.”® But, ac- 
cording to the Peruvians, their rival was not content 
with these peaceful methods ef fastening its clutches 
on the provinces. Peruvian schools were constantly 
being closed, they charged ; Peruvian journalists were 
persecuted ; priests were imprisoned or their churches 
closed ; some of their countrymen were forbidden to 
engage in certain branches of commerce; their day 
laborers were not allowed to earn wages on docks 
and railways; Peruvian youths were forced into the 
military service of Chile.1° 

All of these charges were explained by Chileans 
to their own satisfaction. They were in charge of the 
provinces and could not allow subversive agitation in 
schools and pulpits which tended to stir up revolution. 
Any military service forced on Peruvian boys was 
simply in line with compulsory training that both 
countries required. 

The question of the priests shows well the diffi- 
culty which any mediator might have in determining 
whether Peruvian complaints were justified. Though 
Chile ocupied Tacna and Arica in 1883, the Vatican 
continued the authority of the bishop of Arequipa 
over the provinces. His appointees were naturally 
Peruvians, who took office without regard to the 
wishes of the Chilean government. But Chilean laws 
required an official sanction from Santiago for all 
church appointments, and hence priests were not per- 


° El Mercurio, July 28, 1905. 


® Circular of the Peruvian Foreign Minister to his Legations 
Abroad, December 2, 1918. 


204 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


mitted to function in provinces to which those laws 
extended.14 

The policy of Chileanization was upheld mainly 
on grounds of the improvements that had been made 
in the provinces since they had passed out of Peru- 
vian hands. Towns had been cleaned up and epi- 
demics checked ; roads had been built ; postal and tele- 
graph systems installed; high schools for boys and 
girls established ; customs regulations had been sim- 
plified; and a much needed police protection had 
been extended to every citizen.1? It was on bases such 
as these that the powers of the world were justifying 
their control over backward territories of doubtful 
political status. Similar signs of progress have been 
cited in recent years to justify the American occupa- 
tion of Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Porto 
Rico:* 

The United States had carefully maintained a 
policy of absolute neutrality since the last fiasco of 
1883; but Peru yet hoped that it could attract the 
active sympathy and help of the northern republic. 
Agustin Edwards complained in 1905 that he had 
difficulty in persuading his countrymen that the 
Washington government was not partial to Peru and 


* Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Cresson to Knox, 
January 29, 1910. 

* Carlos Varas, Tacna i Arica bajo la soberania chilena, p. 82. 

* “Recent Progress, Social and Economic, in Haiti,” in Bul- 
letin of the Pan-American Union (November, 1923), pp. 380- 
385; editorial in World’s Work (September, 1922), “Achieve- 
ments and Mistakes in Haiti”; Sylvester Baker, “Porto Rico 
under the Stars and Stripes,” in American Review of Reviews, 
May, 1923. 


THE GREAT QUESTION 205 


probably in secret agreement ; and that Peru was per- 
sistently spreading rumors that warships for its use 
were being built in the United States.1* In that very 
year, a new Peruvian minister arrived in Santiago 
after having served his country in Washington, and 
a new American minister came to Lima. Connivance 
was immediately suspected by the Chileans and their 
doubts were not easily dispelled. 

But the United States had little desire to under- 
take another mediation. The A. B. C. discussions in 
1908 and 1909 indicated a possible intervention by 
Brazil and Argentina. The northern republic was 
quite willing to join with these two South American 
countries in an offer of good offices. Rio Branco, 
of Brazil, was trying earnestly to bring about a di- 
vision of the provinces between Peru and Chile in 
1910. But he could neither agree with Argentina nor 
present a plan that the Chileans would adopt.'® This 
was as near as any outsiders approached to mediation 
before the World War. 

The triumph of the Allies in Europe, Wilson’s 
speeches concerning self-determination, and the dawn 
of a new era revived the hopes of Peru for a revision 
of the treaty of Ancon. Chile had now held Tacna 
for nearly forty years, and Peru was convinced that 
its best chance lay in making an entirely new arrange- 
ment. Ever alert to attract American sympathy, it 
saw a golden opportunity in the neutrality which 
Chile had adopted throughout the World War, in 


“Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Ames to Root, 
August 12, 1905. 


* [bid., Dudley to Knox, March 31, 1910. 


206 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


contrast to the Peruvian action of severing diplomatic 
relations with Germany. Tacna and Arica were de- 
scribed by the Peruvians as the Alsace-Lorraine 
of South America, and Chile was held up to the 
world as the one South American country that really 
sympathized with the lost German cause. 

In December 1918, on the eve of the departure of 
President Wilson from the United States for the 
Versailles conference, riots started in Iquique, the 
chief port of Tarapaca. Strained relations resulted at 
once between Peru and Chile; consuls were with- 
drawn and armies massed on the frontiers. Wilson 
immediately dispatched notes to both parties, that 
any disturbance now would be of harm to the whole 
world just as peace had come to Europe. He called 
the attention of the disputants to their obligation to 
settle all difficulties. ““The United States is ready,” 
he added, “to furnish all possible assistance for the 
purpose of arriving at an equitable solution of the 
aftair’7*¢ 

It was not the first time that Wilsonian idealism 
had created alarm. Suggestions he had made as early 
as 1913 regarding ways for settling inter-Americari 
differences had met with disfavor in Latin America. 
The foreign office at Santiago now assumed the posi- 
tion that good offices had not been tendered by the 
United States, but merely an expression of readiness 
to help if need arose. Chile took special care to em- 
phasize that it was only interested in settling Clause 


** New York Times, December 13, 1918, 


THE GREAT QUESTION 207 


3 of the treaty of Ancon; it would never consent to 
a complete revision of the treaty. 

The Iquique disturbances did not last long, and 
Tacna and Arica were forgotten in the absorbing 
European problems that were being threshed out at 
Versailles. But Peru persisted in its hope of revising 
the whole arrangement of 1883 and possibly reopen- 
ing a discussion of the ownership of Tarapaca. 
Leguia again became president in 1919, and the 
Congress then assembled at Lima declared the pact 
of Ancon null and void. The following year a revo- 
lution in Bolivia overthrew President Gutiérrez 
Guerra, who was favorable to Chile, and set up a 
pro-Peruvian government. Both the former allies in 
the War of the Pacific then turned to the League of 
Nations. 

The first assembly at Geneva persuaded Peru to 
defer the question to a future session, but Bolivia 
was not so easily turned aside the next year. Its re- 
quest for a revision of all treaties arising out of the 
War of the Pacific was placed on the agenda by Sec- 
retary General Drummond as being in keeping with 
the League Covenant. This was a dangerous subject, 
since a revision of these pacts might pave the way 
for reopening the Versailles treaty. Throughout one 
day a filibuster was conducted in the assembly by 
the leading statesmen of Europe in order to prevent 
a discussion of the Bolivian proposal ;'* then upon 
the receipt of new instructions from La Paz, the 
request was withdrawn. 


™ Ibid., September 7, 1921. 


208 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


Thus the door of the League of Nations was 
closed. When Agustin Edwards of Chile was chosen 
president of the second Assembly at Geneva, Peru 
even withdrew its delegation. But the United States 
renewed its interest in west coast affairs as the dan- 
ger of European intervention appeared to revive, and 
the new Harding administration now moved to take 
a hand in the quarrel. The times were propitious. 
Business men in both Peru and Chile were growing 
impatient with the patriotic pride that had so long 
kept investments uncertain in and around the dis- 
puted area. An invitation from the American Sec- 
retary of State, in 1922, that both nations send 
delegates to Washington to discuss the “unfulfilled 
clauses of the treaty of Ancén’’® met with a ready 
assent from Santiago and Lima. In the summer of 
that year the conferees came together in the Hall of 
the Americas at the Pan-American building in Wash- 
ington. Once more the northern republic had under- 
taken a settlement of the War of the Pacific. 

The conference opened in a better spirit than had 
been shown for some time. Bolivia’s request to be 
included was disapproved by both Peruvian and 
Chilean delegates, and was not upheld by the United 
States. But though Peru had given up the idea of 
reopening the subject of Tarapaca, it insisted on re- 
ferring to an arbiter the question as to whether a 
plebiscite should be held at all in Tacna and Arica. If 
not, any arbiter chosen should provide the mode of 
settlement. Chile still held out against revision of the 


* New York Times Current History, March 1922. 


THE GREAT QUESTION 209 


treaty of Ancon, but favored arbitration of its unful- 
filled clause. Within a month it seemed as if the con- 
ferences would be deadlocked and once more no 
solution reached. 

Again Secretary Hughes brought the disputants 
together and Chile finally agreed to leave to arbitra- 
tion the question of holding a plebiscite. But the 
American mediator did not admit the right of an 
arbiter to decide the fate of Tacna and Arica. If it 
were decreed that no vote would be taken, a new 
conference should be held between the disputing 
countries to determine what ought to be done. This 
compromise was signed as a protocol in September 
1922, and two months were allowed for its ratifica- 
tion by the legislatures of both nations.19 

As far as Peru was concerned, President Leguia 
easily silenced all opposition and ratification followed 
forthwith. The real fight was to be made in Santi- 
ago; for the Chilean delegation had abandoned a 
position that had been held by their country for forty 
years.”° President Alessandri endorsed the agreement 
and at once prepared for the struggle. The returned 
delegates were given controlling positions in a new 
cabinet, while executive influence pushed the protocol 
through the lower house. The popularity of the fight- 
ing president was then at its height, and the Unionist 
majority in the Senate did not dare reject the entire 
agreement. It resorted to the familiar tactics of add- 
ing unwelcome reservations. 

* Tbid., August 1922. 


” Namely, that it would not consent to any revision of the 
treaty of Ancon. 


210 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


The battle was then resumed in the Chamber of 
Deputies, where the reservations were stricken out 
by a two-thirds vote. Though months had passed, 
chances for Chilean ratification were so bright that 
the time limit was extended. Again the senate con- 
vened to discuss the protocol. But the two-thirds 
majority it needed to override the Chamber was lack- 
ing. Alessandri won his fight and Chile ratified the 
protocol as it was signed.21 In January 1923 the 
President of the United States accepted the position 
of arbiter. Two years were allowed for the countries 
to present their cases and reply to the arguments of 
the other. In March 1925 the Coolidge Award was 
made. 

The plebiscite clause of the treaty of Ancén was 
upheld ; a commission of one Peruvian, one Chilean, 
and one American—the last named serving as chair- 
man—was to be appointed to fix the rules for vot- 
ing and to superintend the process. All voters must 
pass a literacy test, excepting those who had owned 
real estate in the provinces since July 20, 1922. 
Natives of Tacna and Arica were given the right to 
take part in the plebiscite, and both Chileans and 
Peruvians who had lived in the provinces for three 
years and in their local districts for three months. 
Foreigners who were eligible for naturalization were 
also included. On the other hand, all persons were 
excluded who belonged to the army, navy, police, or 
civil service of either country. A dispute as to the 

™ According to the Chilean constitution, neither house can 


override a decision of the other except by a two-thirds vote; 
cf. supra, chapter ix. 


THE GREAT QUESTION 211 


drawing of the northern boundary of Tacna was de- 
cided in favor of Peru, which was thus given the 
Tarata section without further argument.22 

Riots against Leguia had to be quelled with an 
iron hand when cabled reports of the award reached 
Peru. A general strike and parades of protest showed 
the excitement that prevailed. Leguia wrote Presi- 
dent Coolidge that his decision had “undeservedly 
approved the moral position of the republic of Chile.” 
For it was not only the declaration that a plebiscite 
should be held which made the award appear a vic- 
tory for Chile. The residence qualifications of two 
and a half years gave a vote to all the citizens of 
that country who had moved into Tacna and Arica 
since July, 1922. The requirement that voters should 
be able to read and write excluded numbers of Peru- 
vian Indians who were born in the provinces. At 
Santiago, on the other hand, the bells of all the 
cathedrals were tolled in celebration of the outcome 
of arbitration by the United States. 

It was perhaps fortunate for the Washington gov- 
ernment that this was the case, as Chile was a far 
stronger nation than Peru. The completion of its 
program of naval construction had added two dread- 
noughts and several cruisers to the fleet. It might 
have resisted an adverse decision in a manner that 
Peru could never have done, thus placing the United 
States in a situation where it would be forced to use 
its military power or else back down from its posi- 
tion as an arbiter, should Chile oppose its decrees. 


™ New York Times Current History, October 1925. 


212 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


On the other hand, New York bankers had bought 
seven million dollars’ worth of Peruvian government 
bonds in October, 1924, which were guaranteed by 
certain national revenues that were to be collected by 
Americans. Financially also Chile was more inde- 
pendent of the United States than Peru. 

But a closer examination of the Coolidge Award 
showed not only that Chilean rejoicing was a bit 
premature but that the arbiter had merely begun a 
real solution of the question. The provision that all 
who were born in the provinces could vote meant a 
return of many natives who had fled from Chilean 
rule. On the other hand, all civil employees who were 
to be barred from the polls would be Chileans. The 
American who was to be chairman of the plebiscite 
commission might well expect trouble with the Chil- 
ean authorities when these rules for the registration 
of voters were put into effect. 

At first it seemed as if the United States had 
chosen a more capable representative than it had sent 
to the west coast forty years before. Though it had 
turned once more to its army for a man, the new 
appointee was General John J. Pershing, hero of 
the World War. When local authorities interfered 
with the staff of the Peruvian commissioner, Persh- 
ing obtained from them a promise that hereafter the 
Peruvians would be allowed free passage through any 
part of the provinces. A secret society organized in 
Arica to protect Chilean interests was promptly sup- 


* New York Times Current History, October 10, 1924; cf. 
Arthur’s Message to Congress, supra, chapter viii. 


THE GREAT QUESTION 213 


pressed by the Chilean governor himself. When the 
provincial police suppressed a Peruvian newspaper, 
Agustin Edwards, the Chilean commissioner, joined 
Pershing in upholding the rights of the press.?* 

But complaints continued to come from Peru that 
Chile was blocking a fair enforcement of the plebiscite 
rules. Coolidge rejected a request from Leguia that 
American marines replace the local police. Pershing, 
however, was induced to make a tour of inspection 
through both Tacna and Arica during which he in- 
quired minutely into the activities of the local admin- 
istration. This caused tremendous protest from the 
Chileans. Edwards charged that the American com- 
missioner was permitting Peru to defer the vote in- 
definitely when he listened to every trivial complaint. 

Meanwhile, at Santiago domestic politics took an- 
other curious turn. Alessandri had come back the 
preceding March in the midst of tumultuous rejoic- 
ing. Some of the more active Unionists had even 
been deported on account of fear of a revolution. The 
restored president, realizing how much he owed to 
the labor factions, again promised favorable laws for 
workingmen, and a large number of social and labor 
reforms were inaugurated by executive decree. Some 
of these were modelled on the laws of Soviet Rus- 
sia; others on recent legislation in Mexico. But while 
the right of labor to organize and the right to strike 
were both recognized, Alessandri had no intention 
of alienating the powerful foreign nitrate interests. 
When workingmen in Antofagasta attempted to or- 


* New York Times Current History, October 1925. 


214 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


ganize, the movement was stopped peremptorily by 
the nitrate companies. Soldiers had to be sent to 
quell the ensuing riots and two thousand persons 
were killed. Once more Chilean labor lost interest in 
Alessandri’s cause.* 

The president aroused further opposition by refus- 
ing to call a constitutional convention. Instead, he 
offered a new constitution of his own for the voters 
to accept or reject im toto. It was adopted in the late 
summer of 1925, but Alessandri’s victory was short- 
lived. He had agreed to hold office only until Decem- 
ber. As the presidential elections drew near, one of 
his cabinet was put forward as a candidate. Once 
more Alessandri was suspected of tampering with 
the choice of his successor. He was further embar- 
rassed by the refusal of the candidate to quit the 
cabinet. The president then tendered his own resig- 
nation and turned over his duties to Luis Barros Bor- 
gofio, his Unionist opponent of 1921, who became 
vice-president. In November, 1925, the Liberal Alli- 
ance agreed to join the Unionist Coalition in backing 
Emiliano Figueroa Larrain for president. He was 
duly elected the next month, being opposed only by a 
labor candidate who made a very poor showing. The 
old order was in the saddle again.?° 

The probable effect of such changes on the result 
of the plebiscite was doubtful. Alessandri had been 
the champion of American arbitration from the be- 
ginning. He now joined Edwards in Arica, but his 


*° The Nation, October 14, 1925. 
*° New York Times Current History, November 1925. 


THE GREAT QUESTION 215 


withdrawal from the government left in power the 
Unionists who had never been enthusiastic over the 
Washington conference. As the breach between Per- 
shing and the Chileans widened, even Alessandri 
grew cold. 

By October, both Pershing and General Morrow, 
chairman of the boundary commission, were ready 
to return to the United States. The former claimed 
that Chilean officials obstructed him in all his efforts 
to prepare for a fair plebiscite. He based his state- 
ments on Peruvian complaints, and demanded eleven 
guarantees from Chile for the protection of those 
entitled to vote. One item was the right of the com- 
mission to interfere in all questions in Tacna and 
Arica where the plebiscite was involved. Another 
was that Chile should reduce its military garrison to 
the size of the Peruvian army on the other side of 
the boundary. Further, the commission should have 
the power to remove any civil authority, and all per- 
sons deported from the provinces should be returned 
at Chilean expense. 

In the middle of November Edwards declared that 
the situation had become hopeless when Pershing re- 
fused to set an exact date for the voting. “General 
Pershing is involuntarily the best collaborator of 
Peruvian obstruction,” he said.27 He demanded reg- 
istration by the 20th of December and a vote by the 
first of February. When the American commissioner 
continued to investigate every complaint from Peru, 
Chile informally submitted a memorandum of the 


* Ibid., January 1926. 


216 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


doings of the commission to the Secretary General 
of the League of Nations. This was not an official 
protest, but the arraignment of Pershing was bitter 
and the step implied a new effort to involve the 
League in American affairs. 

On December 9, 1925, Pershing offered a motion 
fixing the date for a plebiscite. But in his accompany- 
ing speech he again accused Chile of administering 
the territories unlawfully and of preventing a free 
vote. His motion included a request that the Chilean 
delegation agree to fulfil all past and future acts of 
the commission. Edwards consequently voted in the 
negative and the proposal was passed by a vote of 
2 to 1. Chile thereupon appealed to Coolidge, who 
after a month’s consideration overruled the objections 
which were brought to his attention. Meanwhile, 
Pershing resigned and returned home. 

For a short time it was thought that perhaps the 
United States would decline to go further, but Presi- 
dent Coolidge insisted that the arrangements for 
registration and voting continue. General William 
Lassiter was appointed to succeed Pershing, and the 
plebiscite was set definitely for April, 1926. The 
United States government could hardly have acted 
otherwise, as the reopening of the Tacna-Arica ques- 
tion made it impossible for the situation of the past 
forty years and more to continue. Then, too, the 
Chilean memorandum to the League of Naitons con- 
stituted a species of challenge to the headship of the 
northern republic in the New World. It even implied 
a menace to one of the multifarious interpretations 


THE GREAT QUESTION 217 


of the Monroe Doctrine. Hazardous as it might be 
for the United States to continue the attempt at 
mediation, even more danger was involved in aban- 
doning it and thus paving the way for a possible 
intervention by the League of Nations. 

The new American commissioner was soon in- 
volved in all of the difficulties that had checkmated 
Pershing. His decision that government teachers and 
employees in the postal and telegraph service should 
be excluded from voting was made over the protest 
of the Chilean delegation, who once more appealed 
to Coolidge. On the other hand, when he voted that 
railroad employees might take part in the plebiscite, 
the Peruvians sent a protest to Washington. Though 
President Coolidge backed his new appointee in both 
cases and Lassiter continued to arrange for the reg- 
istration of voters, prospects for a real settlement of 
the dispute became gloomier each day.28 

At Washington, Frank B. Kellogg had succeeded 
Charles E. Hughes in the State Department. Toward 
the end of March, proposals for the settlement of 
the dispute by direct negotiations were sent from 
Washington to the South American west coast. Both 
Peru and Chile agreed to another meeting in Wash- 
ington; but whereas Peru claimed that the plebiscite 
was thus suspended automatically, the government at 
Santiago insisted on moving forward to the regis- 
tration. On March 27, 1926, when Chilean voters be- 
gan to register, all Peruvians stayed away from the 
booths in accordance with orders from their commis- 


“Lassiter, over the protest of the Chilean commissioner, 
postponed the date of voting to May 15. 


218 CHILE AND THE UNITED SItAres 


sioner. It had become evident that the fulfillment of 
the Coolidge Award was impossible. 

The United States government now centered its 
hopes on the parleys at Washington. On April 18, 
Secretary Kellogg suggested two new solutions of 
the problem. He first proposed that Tacna and Arica 
be made a neutralized state, either independent or 
under the protection of another South American 
nation. If this did not meet the approval of the 
negotiators, the alternative suggestion was to trans- 
fer the provinces to “a South American state not a 
party to the negotiations,” which would then make a 
suitable money payment to both Chile and Peru. 

It was well understood that Bolivia was the nation 
to which the provinces might be transferred. Though 
it had been refused a share in the negotiations of 
1922, there had been many suggestions in the press 
of the United States that this would be the most 
equitable solution of the quarrel over Tacna and 
Arica, since the mountain republic needed an outlet 
to the sea. Besides, a Bolivian government loan had 
lately been contracted with New York banking houses 
which gave the American lenders control of the entire 
revenues of the nation; and it was now reported that 
further money was available in the United States to 
enable Bolivia to buy the disputed district. 

The idea of an independent neutralized state did 
not meet with any degree of favor in either Chile or 
Peru.?® On the other hand, the action of Secretary 

” The suggestion originated with Agustin Edwards, who re- 


signed as Chilean minister in February, 1926. It was trans- 
mitted to the United States in December, 1925. Many Chileans 


THE GREAT QUESTION 219 


Kellogg in bringing back Bolivia into the wrangle 
served only to complicate matters further, for Presi- 
dent Siles, the new executive in the mountain repub- 
lic, at once wrote to Washington his enthusiastic 
appreciation of the suggestion and requested a seat 
at the conference. Though this was denied him by 
President Coolidge, the hopes of Bolivia were again 
high as it reéntered the lists. 

The summer of 1926 saw the breakdown both of 
plebiscite and of direct negotiations. In May, Presi- 
dent Figueroa Larrain, at the opening of the Chilean 
Congress, stated as to Tacna and Arica that “there 
remains only the execution of the award handed 
down by the arbiter, which conforms to our demands 
for a realization of the plebiscite.” But the speech of 
General Lassiter on June 14 before the plebiscitary 
commission dashed all hope of a solution through 
the Coolidge Award. Citing definite cases of riots 
and disturbances wherein Peruvians suffered, he 
charged that so many of the latter had been or would 
be deterred from voting that no fair election could 
be held. “The conditions above outlined have been 
brought about, not only with the approval of Chilean 
authorities, but with their connivance,” the American 
official declared. He thought this had been evidenced 
by Chile’s “failure to restrain the criminal activities 
of certain patriotic or political organizations whose 


and Peruvians feared that to neutralize the provinces and give 
them independence at the same time would involve the use of 
American marines who are now so frequently dispatched to 
trouble centers of the Caribbean. 


220 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


operations have been accompanied by unmistakable 
evidence of official support and approval.’”’*° 

The indignation of both Chilean government and 
people on receipt of this speech was unbounded, and 
four days afterwards Chile withdrew from the direct 
negotiations at Washington, declaring at the same 
time its intention of retaining the provinces until the 
Coolidge Award was fulfilled. In answer to Lassi- 
ter’s charges, Agustin Edwards replied in an official 
report sent to all foreign governments that the riots 
cited by the American official were caused solely by 
the undue postponement of the plebiscite. The 
American commission, he charged, had played the 
part of a detective agency trying to fasten guilt on 
Chile for crimes allaged by Peru, rather than the 
part of mediator trying to settle a dispute with 
impartiality. 

So ended the second effort of the United States 
to be a peacemaker in the quarrels of South Amer- 
ica’s west coast. Once more as in 1883 does Chile, 
the stronger of the disputants, accuse the northern 
republic of siding with its enemy, while at the same 
time it retains the provinces of Tacna and Arica in 
defiance of American opinion. Not only the prestige 
of the United States but the reputation of the whole 
arbitral method of settling international disputes 
has been impaired by the unfortunate failure of the 
United States in one of the most complicated and 
delicate tasks its diplomats have ever undertaken in 
the New World. 


*® Gen. William Lassiter, “American Official Account of the 
Anti-Peruvian Campaign,” in New York Times Current His- 
tory, August 1926. 


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BIBLIOGRAPHY 223 


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224 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


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230 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 





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232 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


Periodicals 


American Historical Review, xi, 1905: “Letters of 
Alexander Everett.” 

American Political Science Review, May 1917: Castro 
Ruiz, C., “The Monroe Doctrine and the Government 
of Chile.” 

American Journal of International Law, June 1920: 
Mathieu, Beltran, “The Neutrality of Chile during 
the European War.” 

American Review of Reviews, May 1908: “How Chile 
Received Our Fleet”; May 1908: Shepherd, W. R., 
“Education in South America”; May 1923: Baxter, 
Sylvester, “Porto Rico Under the Stars and Stripes.” 

Aurora de Chile, Files of, 1812-1813. 

Bulletins of the Pan American Union, 1910-1926. 

Chicago Weekly Magazine, Sept. 16, 1882: Blaine, 
James G., “The Foreign Policy of the Garfield Ad- 
ministration.” 

Chilean Times, Valparaiso, Oct. 5, 1889; June 5, 1901. 

Christian Science Monitor, Files of, 1914-1925. 

El Comercio, Lima, Oct. 17, 1908; Oct. 26, 1909. 

Diario Oficial de la Republica de Chile, 1900-1920. 

El Diario Ilustrado, Santiago, Nov. 11, 1903; Nov. 14, 
1903; Nov. 21, 1903; April 30, 1917. 

El Ferrocarril, Santiago, Files of, 1889-1926. 

Gaceta Ministerial de Chile, 1817. 

Independance Belge, Brussels: Editorial on “A. B. C. 
Alliance,” May 27, 1910. 

The Independent. Dec. 4, 1902: “Chile’s Aim in South 
America.” 

O Jornal do Commercio, Rio de Janiero, Nov. 3, 1908. 

La Libertad Electoral, Santiago, Dec. 27, 1895; Nov. 
20, 1900. 

Literary Digest, Jan. 4, 1913: “The New Latin Amer- 
ican League.” 

London Times, Jan. 22, 1918. 

La Manana, Santiago, Oct. 20, 1909. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 233 


El Mercurio, Santiago, Files of, 1889-1926. 

El Mercurio, Valparaiso, Nov. 17, 1862. 

The Nation, Oct. 9, 1891: Trumbull, John, “Our Neu- 
trality in Chile” ; Oct. 29, 1891: Godkin, E. L., “Our 
Treatment of Chile’; Dec. 17, 1891: Godkin, E. L., 
“Complication with Chile”; Jan. 14, 1892: “Demo- 
cratic Congressmen and Chile’; Jan. 21, 1892: 
“American Testimony from Chile’; Aug. 8, 1892: 
Editorial; March 15, 1917: Robertson, William 
Spence, “Chile and the World War”; Oct. 14, 1925: 
Roller, A., “White Terror in Chile.” 

New York Evening Post, Files of, 1916-1926. 

New York Sun, Files of, 1916-1926. 

New York Times, Files of, 1914-1926. 

New York Times Current History, Files of, 1914-1926; 
Dec. 1919: Jones, Willis Knapp, “Tacna and Arica” ; 
Dec. 1920: Montenegro, Ernesto, “Chile’s First 
Middle-Class_ President”; Jan. 1921: Palmer, 
Thomas, Jr., “Armed Forces of Chile and Her 
Neighbors”; Nov. 1921: Nieto del Rio, F., “Chile’s 
Conflict with Bolivia and Peru”; April, 1922: Be- 
lainde, Victor Andrés, “Peru’s Attitude on the 
Tacna-Arica Issue” ; Feb. 1923: Inman, Samuel Guy, 
“Obstacles to Pan American Accord”; Oct. 1923: 
Hughes, Charles Evans, “The Monroe Doctrine 
After One Hundred Years”; Dec. 1924: James, 
Earle K.: “Chile’s Bloodless Revolution”; May, 
1925: Montenegro, Ernesto, “The Tacna-Arica 
Award; its Influence on Chilean Policy.” 

La Nacién, Santiago, Feb. 26, 1917; April 15, 1917. 

La Nueva Republica, Dec. 24, 1895. 

Outlook, Sept. 7, 1912: “The Alsop Claim” ; March 21, 
1914: Roosevelt, Theodore, “Chile and the Monroe 
Doctrine.” 

Overland Monthly Magazine, Dec. 1909: Montandon, 
George E., “An American Enterprise in Chile.” 

Pan American Magazine, Files of, 1920-1926. 


234 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


Political Science Quarterly, March, 1892: Moore, John 
Bassett, “Asylum in Legations and Consulates and 
in Vessels”; Sept. 1893: Moore, John Bassett, “The 
Late Chilean Controversy.” 

El Porvenir, Santiago, Dec. 27, 1895. 

Die Post, Berlin, April 12, 1910. 

La Prensa, Buenos Aires, Jan. 28, 1892. 

Revista Chilena, V (1913): Cummings, Alberto, “El 
Reglamento Constitucional de 1812”; Errazuriz, 
Crescente, “La Cronica de 1810.” 

Saturday Review, May 16, 1891: “The Itata Question” ; 
Aug. 1892: Editorial. 

South Pacific Mail, Valparaiso, Files of, 1923-1926. 

Voz de Chile, Santiago, May 20, 1863. 

World’s Work, Sept. 1922: “Achievements and Mis- 
takes in Haiti.” 

Zig Zag, Santiago, Nov. 16, 1905. 


INDEX 


A. B. C. alliance, 169, 171, 
184, 205 

Adams, Charles, 103 

Adams, John Quincy, 22, 
24 ff., 37, 71, 116 

Aguirre, Manuel, 22 

Alabama affair, 90 

Aldunate, Luis, 117 


Alessandri, Arturo, 176, 
1SSeie Ose 196. ZOle 
209 £., 213 ff. 


Alfonso mission, 201 

Allen, Heman, 27, 30 £., 
39 4.;.36 ff. 

Alsace-Lorraine, 206 

Alsop and Company, 165, 
167 £., 176 

Altamirano, Luis, 193 f. 

American League of Na- 
tions, 185 


American Republics, Bu- 
reau of, 160 

American Stagecoach Com- 
pany, 60 


Amunategui, Miguel Luis, 
130 

Anaconda Copper Company, 
180 


Ancon, Treaty of, 117, 120, 
158, 161, 169, 196, 198, 
205, 207 ff. 

Andes, 4, 13, 20 f., 30, 141, 
161 

Anglican Church, 121 

Anthony Gibbs and Sons, 
178 

Antofagasta, 97 f., 102, 
116, 165, 187, 198 f., 213 


Argentina, 
No commercial treaty 
with United States, 50 
Joins Chile against Santa 


Cruz OZ, th. 

Tne GAS BC) alluanee; 
168 ff. 

Rejects disarmament pro- 
gram, 184 f. 


Receives Alessandri, 193 
Arica, 70, 98, 102 ff., 113 ff., 

130, 158, 170, 195 ff. 
Arica-La Paz railway, 202 
Arthur, Chester A,. 112, 114 
Astaburuaga, Isabel, 122 f. 
Audiencia, 6, 10 
Aurora de Chile, 16 ff. 
Australia, 58 


Balderrama, Colonel, 70 

Balmaceda, José M., 
As foreign minister, 112 f. 
Elected president, 131 f. 
Revolution against, 136 ff. 
Fall of, 150 

Baltimore affair, 146 ff., 
1523076 

Banco de Chile, 174 

Baquedano, General, 130 

Barinaga, 103 

Baring Brothers, 56 

Barros Arana, Diego, 12, 22 

Barros Borgofio, Luis, 188, 
194, 214 

Barros Luco, 201 

Barton, Colonel Seth, 71, 
122 ff. 

oe Andres, 48 ff., 57, 74, 

6 


236 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


Bethlehem Steel 
ation, 179 

Biddle, Captain, 23 ff. 

Bigler, John, 80 f. 

Pe Sac al 
7 


Corpor- 


protocol, 


Billinghurst, Guillermo, 197 
Bismarck, Count von, 176 
Blaine, James G., 
Tries to settle War of 
the Pacific, 106 ff. 
Handles negotiations dur- 
ing Balmaceda revolu- 
tion, 135 ff. 
Head of Pan-American 
Conference, 159 
Bland, Theodoric, 23 f., 37 
Bolivia, 
Wheelwright in, 58 
Wars with Chile, 61 f. 
Joins Chile against Spain, 
88 f. 
In War of the Pacific, 
104 f£. 
In First Pan-American 
Conference, 161 
In Alsop case, 166 f. 
Peace with Chile, 198 f. 


Tries to enter Tacna- 
Arica negotiations, 
207 f. 


Bonaparte, Joseph 9 

Bonaparte, Napoleon, 9, 83 

Braden Copper Mines Com- 

pany, 179 

Braganza dynasty, 9 

Brazil, 22, 49, 168 ff., 184 f., 
205 

British Honduras, 78 

Brown, Rear Admiral 
George, 142 

Buchanan, James, 89 


rs Aires, 1319) Zines, 
3 


Bulnes, General, 65, 72 f., 
121, 126, 129 
Burgess, Captain Nat, 122 


Cabildo, 6, 10 £., 21 

Caldera, 59 

Calhoun, John C., 71 

California, 73 ff., 150 f. 

Callao, 16, 25, 57, 62 f., 69, 
93, 105, 142° 

Campino, Juan, 34 f., 48 f. 

Canada, 183 

Canning, George, 39 

Canton, 70 

Caribbean Sea, 83 

Carrera, José Miguel, 13 ff., 
18, 20 £., 24 

Carvallo, Manuel, 60, 79, 
125 

Cass, Secretary Lewis, 82, 
144 


Catalina Islands, 140 
Causten, Elizabeth, 79 
Cemeteries, 121 ff. 
Central and South American 
Telegraph Company, 141 
Central American Federa- 
tion, 49 
Chacabuco, 21 f. 
Charles IV, King of Spain, 
B39 
Chile, 
As a colony, 3 ff. 
Wins independence, 11 ff. 
Early national life, 29 ff. 
Faces Europe, 54 ff. 
Growing enmity towards 
United States, 67 ff. 
Threatened by Europe, 
83 ff. 


INDEX 


(Chile, continued) 

In War of the Pacific, 
97 ff. 

Domestic politics, 120 ff. 

Near war with United 
States, 135 ff. 

During early Twentieth 
Century, 155 ff. 

During World War, 172 
ff 


In later negotiations over 
Tacna-Arica, 196 ff. 
Chile Exploration Company, 

179 


Chiletown, 75 

China, 37, 147 

Chincha Islands, 86 

Christiancy, Judge Isaac, 
102 £., 105 

Chuquicamata, 179 

Clay, Henry, 22, 152 

Clayton, Secretary, 125 

Cleveland, Grover, 153, 158 

Club Militar, 192 

Cochet, Jean, 110 

Cochrane, Lord Thomas 
Dundonald, 25 £., 29, 63, 
68 ff. 

Collier, William M., 193 

Colombia, 49 f., 58, 162 f., 
183 

Colorado, 147 

Comision Conservadora, 191 

Commercial treaties, 13, 22, 
30, 34, 46, 74, 76 

Compana Salitrera, 108 

Concepcion, 11 

Conservative party, 120, 126 
ff., 130, 188 

Constitutions of Chile, 31 f., 
35, 44, 51, 120 


237 


Coolidge, Calvin, 210 f., 213, 
216 £., 219 

Coolidge Award, 195, 210, 
ZAZZNG ite 

Coombs, Leslie, 200 

Copiapo, 57, 59 

Coquimbo, 179 

Costa Rica, 185 

Cotton, George, 81 

Council of the Indies, 17 

Covadonga, 88 

Credit Industrial, 111 

Criterion, 54 

Crooks, John, 54 

Crump, William, 71 

ee José Maria de la, 73, 
8 


Dart, 87 

Declaration of Independ- 
ence, 12, 16, 18 

Democratic party, 188 f. 

Dominican Republic, 83 f., 
183, 204 

Downes, Captain, 25 

Drummond, Eric, 207 


East Indies, 37 

Ecaudor, 57 f., 62, 77 £., 83, 
88, 94, 183 

Edwards, Augustin, 162 ff., 
186, 199, 201, 204, 208, 
ZISiE 220 

Egan, Patrick, 136 ff., 142 
ff., 145, 150 ff., 153, 193 

Egana, Rafael, 38 f. 

El Comercio, 160 

El Diario Ilustrado, 176 

El Mercurio of Santiago, 
164, 202 

El Mercurio of Valparaiso, 
72 


238 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


England, 19, 52 f., 100, 138, 
UBER ZS) 

Errazuriz, Frederico, 128 ff., 
141 

Errazuriz, Isidoro, 139 

Esmerelda, 88 

Essen, 177 

Essex, 19 

Estanco, 33 f., 43, 46, 67 f. 

Evarts, Secretary, 101, 107, 
113 


Ewing, Colonel, 194 


Ferdinand VII, 9 f., 16, 20 

Ferrocarril, 85, 159, 162 

Figueroa Larrain, Emiliano, 
214, 219 

Fletcher, Henry P., 186 

Florida, 27 f. 

Folger, Charles, 54 f. 

Foster Recabarren, 
E., 147 

France, 61, 100, 114, 155, 
173 

Franklin, 68 

Freire, Ramon, 31, 36, 41 f., 
45, 62 

Frelinghuysen, Frederick T., 
DZ te LS 

French revolution, 8 


Judge 


Galapagos Islands, 77 

Galveston, 141 

Garcia Calderon, Francisco, 
105 f., 108, 112, 116 ff. 

Garcia Carrasco, José, 9 f. 

Garfield, James, 106, 109, 
112 

Germany, 100, 142 f., 155, 
172 51777206 

Good Return, 67 f. 

Grace and Company, 179 


Greek revolution, 13 

Gresham, Secretary, 153 

Guamey, 69 

Guano, 110 f., 118 

Guayaquil, 56 

Guggenheim interests, 179 

Guizot ministry, 72 

ee Guerra, President, 
20 


Haiti, 84, 183, 204 

Halifax, 54 

Hamm, John, 46, 48 ff., 54 
f., 64 


Harding, Warren G., 208 

Harrison, Benjamin, 148 ff. 

ee Rutherford B., 100 f., 
10 

Henriquez, Camilo, 16 f. 

Hicks, John, 156 

Hillyer, Captain, 20 

Hoevel, Matthew, 17 f. 

Holy Alliance, 38, 65, 83 

Huaraz, 115 

Huerta, Victoriano, 170 

ee Charles, 186, 208 f., 
21 

Huneeus, Robert, 103, 176 

Hurlbut, Stephen A., 107 ff., 
11, diss 


Iglesias, General, 117 

Independence Hall, 152 

Iquique, 137, 139, 141 f., 
206 f. 

Italy, 61, 147 

Itata, 140 £., 143, 153 


Jefferson, Thomas, 16 
Johnson, Andrew, 90 
Juan Fernandez, 46, 175 


Kellogg, Frank B., 217 f. 
Kemmerer, Edwin W., 181 


INDEX 


Kilpatrick, General Judson, 
92, 95 £., 107, 109 ff. 

Kosmos, 155 

Krupps Company, 177 


La Gaceta Comercial, 142 

La Gazelle, 69 

La Nacion, 176 

Landreau, Théophile, 110 f., 
113 

Har Paz lO2Z st tl 7 199% 207 

Larned, Samuel, 30 ff., 34 

Larrain family, 11, 20 

Lassiter, William, 216 f., 
ZNO te 

Latorre-Billinghurst proto- 
col, 197, 199 

League of Nations, 
207 te 217, 

Leguia, Augusto B., 200, 
207, 209, 211 

Liberal Alliance, 187, 214 

Liberal party, 127 ff., 132 f., 
188 


183, 


Lima, 33, 68, 70, 87, 94, 
102, 108, 199 ff. 

Lincoln, Abraham, 86, 89, 
152 

Lircai, 42, 120, 134 

Livingston, J. R., 17 

Llai-Llai, 59 

Logan, Major, 114 ff., 130, 
157 £., 182 

Long, Dr. John D., 181 

Longomilla River, 73 

Lynch, Patricio, 105, 108 f. 


Admiral. 


, 


McCann, 
139, 141 

Macedonian, 25, 68 ff., 72, 
76, 79, 124 


Rear 


239 


McCreary, Congressman, 
149 

Madison, James, 12 f., 20, 90 

Mafia, 147 


Maipo, 26 


. Mann, Horace, 61 


Mare Island, 150. 
Martinez de Rozas, 
Juan, 11, 20 
Masonic Order, 194 
Massey, Minister, 116 
Matta, M. A., 144 ff. 
Matta, Manuel, 84 
Maule River, 59 
Maximilian, Emperor 
Mexico, 83 
Meiggs, Henry, 59 
Méndez Nufez, 
89, 92 
Mestizo, 5, 43 
Methodists, 131 
Mexico, 49 f., 77, 83, 116, 
183, 213 
Mexico City, 160, 171 
Miers, John, 33 
Monitor Araucano, 17 
Monroe, James, 22, 25, 27 f., 
90 


Dr. 


of 


Admiral, 


Monroe Doctrine, 38 f., 91, 
163, 217 

Montero, Lizardo, 115 ff. 

Montesquieu, 8 

Montt, Jorge, 143, 150 

Montt, Manuel, 65 f., 68, 72 
f£., 76, 80 f., 85, 126, 129, 
135, 144, 193 

Montt, Pedro, 149, 151 

Morrow, General, 215 

Morse, B. F., 60 

Morton, Levi P., 111 


National City Bank of New 
York, 180 


240 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


National Institute, 126 

National Observatory, 60 

Naval Limitation Confer- 
ence, 183 

Nelson, Thomas, 86, 89, 
91 f. 

New England, 16 

New Orleans, 107, 147 

New York City, 75, 156, 
161, 179, 212 

Nicaragua, 77 f., 183 

Nitrates, 97, 102 ff., 135 ff., 
165, 173 ff., 187, 194, 198, 
ZO ZTSi i 

Nitrate Producers Associ- 
ation, 177 

North, John Thomas, 138 


Obregon, Alvarez, 183 
O’Higgins, Ambrosio, 3, 5, 
8 


O’Higgins, Bernardo, 20 f., 
23, 25 §., 29 1.,,30 43,42 £., 
51, 60, 121 

Old Spanish Party, 43, 46, 
53 


Ontario, 23 
Oregon, 75 
Osborn, Thomas, 102, 104 


Pacific Steam Navigation 
Company, 58 f., 155 
Paddock, Anthony, 47 
Panama, 57, 112, 155, 162, 
169 
Panama Canal, 162, 164 
Panama Congress, 40 
Pan American Union, 154 
First Conference, 1889, 
158 f. 
Second Conference, 1901, 
160 


First Scientific Confer- 
ence, 1908, 161 
Fifth Conference, 1923, 
182 
Pareja, Admiral, 88 


.“ Partridge, General, 114 f. 


Pendleton, John, 71 

Pereira, Luis, 150 f. 

Pérez, Joaquin, 80, 94, 127, 
129 


Pershing, General John J., 
212 £2 215ette 
Peru, 
Revolution in, 4 
War of Independence in, 
23) i 
O’Higgins goes to, 30 
Under Santa Cruz, 61 ff: 
At Congress of Lima, 78 
Wars with Spain, 86 ff. 
In War of the Pacific, 
97 ff. 
In Pan-American Con- 
ferences, 160 f. 
Fears A. B. C. alliance, 
170 
In later Tacna-Arica ne- 
gotiations, 196 ff. 
ree Judge Newton, 101 


Peyton, Balie, 72, 74 

Pierola, President, 105, 109, 
111 

Pinto, Anibal, 129 ff. 

Pinto, President, 31, 41 

Placillas, 143 

Poinsett, Joel Robert, 13 ff., 
18 ff., 24, 28 

Pollard, Major, 64 f., 69, 71, 
84 

Polk, James K., 71, 122 


INDEX 


Portales, Diego, 43, 45, 55, 
62 f., 189 

Porter, Captain, 19 ff. 

Porto Rico, 204 

Presbyterians, 131 

Prevost, John B., 23 ff., 37, 
TO0h:, 79 

Prieto, Joaquin, 42 f., 45, 
61, 72, 121, 129 

Protestants, 121 f., 126 

Puga Borne, Federico, 166 

Punta Arenas, 172 


Quillota, 62 
Quinteros, 142 f., 176 
Quito, 77 


Rancagua, 20 f., 179 

Republican party, 159 

Revolutionary junta, 9 ff., 
7 


Revolutions, 9, 19, 30, 35, 
62, 80, 84, 98, 137, 192 
Riggin, Charles, 146, 150, 

152 


Rio Branco, Baron, 170, 205 

Rio de Janeiro, 170 

Rio de La Plata, 21 

Robert and Minnie, 140 

Roberts, William, 155 f., 
169, 182 

Robinson, Jeremiah, 39 f. 

Rodgers, Commodore, 92 

Rojas, José Antonio, 8 

Roman Catholics, 6, 35, 51, 
120, 122 

Roman Catholicism, 7, 47, 
61, 120 f., 128, 189 

Roosevelt, Theodore, 162 f. 

Root, Elihu, 156, 163, 166, 
171 

Root, Dr. Thomas, 96 


241 


Rothschild, of London, 193 
Rousseau, 8, 16 

Roustan, Minister, 118 
Rush, Richard, 39 

Russia, 86 


San Diego, 140 
San Francisco, 75 
Sanfuentes, Enrique, 133 


«San Martin, José de, 21 


Santa Cruz, Andrés, 62 f., 
83, 95 

Santa Maria, Domingo, 130 
Tiny USS) 

Santiaso,.3, 5, 13, £. 17 fe, 
33, 40, 47 £., 59, 174 

Sarmiento, Domingo Fausto, 
61 

Schley, Captain, 146, 148 

Seaone, Guillermo, 200 f. 

Seville, 9 

Seward, William, 95 

Shirreff, Captain, 37_ 

Shubrick, Captain, 126 

Siles, President, 219 

Sitana, 70, 79 

Smith, Eliphalet, 69 ff. 

South Pacific Steamship 
Company, 80 

Soviet Russia, 213 

Spanish merchants, 15 

Spanish trade-system, 7 f. 

Stalbird, James, 181 

Starkweather, Minister, 76 

Strain, Captain Isaac, 67 

Susan Constant, 4 


Tacna, 98, 104, 113, 116 f., 
119, 158, 170, 195 ff., 199 
Tey AVE in) PAV) ant 

Tagle, President, 45 

Talcahuano, 54, 68, 73, 81, 
122 


242 CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES 


Talleyrand, Minister, 109 
Tarapaca, 98 f., 102 ff., 111 
ff., 138, 176, 198, 206 ff. 

Tarata, 211 

Tariffs, 32 f. 

Taveira, Minister, 88 

Thomson, James, 60 

Tocornal, Enrique, 64 

Tocornal, Manuel, 127 

Tofo mines, 179 

Tracy, Secretary, 149 

Trescot, William Henry, 
111 ff., 160 

Trevitt, Consul, 81 f. 

Tribunal del consulado, 14 

Triple Entente, 174 £., 177 

True Blue saloon, 146 

Trumbull, Ricardo, 140 

Trusty, 54 

Turkey, 13 


Unionist Coalition, 188 
Unionists, 214 
United States of America, 
Early dealings with Chile, 
Tie 


Incurs Chilean hostility, 
67 ff. 

Mediates Chilean-Spanish 
War, 89 ff. 

Role of, in War of the 
Pacific, 97 ff. 

Near war with Chile, 
135,45. 

Relations with Chile in 
early twentieth century, 
155 ff. 


Relations with Chile dur- 
ing World War, 172 ff. 
Mediates in Tacna-Arica 
dispute, 196 ff. 
University of Chile, 61, 164 


Upper Peru, 21 - 
Uruguay, 185 
Uspallata, 21 


Valdivia, 172 

Valdivia, Pedro de, 4, 13 

Valdiviano Federal, 52 

Valentin, Rafael, Arch- 
bishop of Santiago, 123 ff. 

Valparaiso, 19, 22 £., 25 £., 
32 £., 55 ff, Gee 
91, 121, TARAS TAG ios. 
179 

Vanderbilt interests, 78 

Varas, Antonio, 80, 127 

Vatican, 203 

Venezuela, 48 

Vera Cruz, 170 

Versailles, 3, 206 f. 

Vial, Augustin, 15, 124 f. 

Viceroy of La Plata, 9 

Viceroy of Peru, 6 f., 13, 21 

Vicufia, Claudio, 137, 143 

Vicufia Mackenna, Benja- 
min, 90, 130 

Virginia, 4 

Voltaire, 8 

Voz de Chile, 84 


Walker, William, 77 


Walker Martinez, Carlos, 
131 
War for Southern Inde- 


pendence, 86 
War of the Pacific, 97 ff., 
130, 135, 157, 159, 169, 
176, 198, 207 f. 
Washington, George, 3 
Webster, Daniel, 71 
Wessel, Duval, and Com- 
pany, 156 
Wheelwright, John, 165 f. 
Wheelwright, William, 56 ff. 


INDEX 243 


Whigs, 71, 78 YaAfiez, Eliodoro, 180 
Willson, Alberto, 156 Yungai, 63 
Wilson, Woodrow, 170, 175, 

205 Zeballos, Dr. Estanislao, 


Worthington, William, 39 170 


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Date Due 


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MAY 2 4 59 


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